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THE NATURE OF WORSHIP

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THE WORD worship, whether noun or verb, comes from the Anglo-Saxon and signifies worthship, a quality of worth or worthiness in a given person. In the older English use it was freely applied to human beings. In England certain minor magistrates are still addressed as "your worship." In the marriage service in the *Book of Common Prayer* the man, putting the ring upon his bride's finger formerly said, "with my body I thee worship." The Roman Church preserves this ancient usage of the word in the clear distinction which it makes between adoration and worship. God is the sole object of adoration. The Virgin Mary and the saints, as human beings whose exceptional worth calls for veneration, are to be worshiped.

In modern America we have generally ceased to use the word *worship* as applied to human beings, except in a semiplayful sense, as when a lover may tell his beloved that he worships her, or the very ground she treads on. A judge or a mayor with us is "your honor," not "your worship." Among American Protestants, at least, the word has, in common use, come to signify only what goes on in a church service, or in the individual soul in uplifted moments when it turns towards God. Using the word in this restricted sense, I turn to the question of what is the nature of worship.

Worship, on any level, is the endeavor of the human soul to enter into an advantageous relationship with the divine, a relationship which shall bring to the worshiper some sort of satisfaction, by causing the Deity to adopt a favorable attitude towards him, or by enabling him to ascertain the will of God, or by opening to him some measure of illumination, of strength, of peace from sources outside of himself. In the more primitive forms of religion the favor of the gods was sought by magical rites which were supposed to compel their attention; or by threats to abandon them for other gods; or by propitiatory sacrifices, sometimes culminating in the offering of children, as Iphigenia was sacrificed at Aulis. The will of the gods was sought in various ways, from the examination of the entrails of slain beasts by the Roman augurs, to a resort to sacred books in which the divine will was believed to be revealed. The experience of St. Augustine upon opening the New Testament at a chance when he heard the voice singing "Take up and read," is a classic instance of this latter method. The quest

for illumination, strength, and peace is abundantly illustrated by the practices of yogis, hermits, and mystics of every sort.

While these three motives may be thus distinguished for purposes of analysis, in actual practice they are inextricably interwoven, appearing with varying degrees of emphasis in most forms of worship. They are all to be found, more or less sublimated, in the worship of the Christian church. Thus the sacrifice of the Mass is explicitly declared to be a propitiation for sin, and in Protestant churches the service of worship has very frequently been thought of as a means of pleasing the Almighty by the homage addressed to him in hymns and prayers. The scripture lessons have often been regarded as a means of discovering the divine will. "Let us attend to the reading of the Word of God," says the minister; "thus saith the Lord. . . ." And a good many preachers seem to regard the sermon as an authentic way of communicating the will of God to their hearers, crying with Peter the Hermit, "Dieu le veult!" And every form of Christian worship has been found by multitudes to be a way towards inward illumination, peace, and strength, although the Quakers, with whom this motive is the almost exclusive one, illustrate it more completely and adequately than any other group of Christians.

Even where Christianity is found in its most ethical and intellectual aspects these motives linger in sublimated form. Though we may have wholly outgrown the idea of a Deity whose favor is to be propitiated, we still desire to live "in tune with the Infinite," to conform our lives to the fundamental laws of the universe instead of courting disaster by running counter to them. On the higher levels of religion men have learned to seek this end not by trying to persuade God to do what they want but by making his will theirs—"not my will but thine." As religion has become more ethical, we have discovered that one of the best ways to ascertain the divine will is to live righteously, "He who doeth the will shall know. . . ." So man has lifted ethics out of mere obedience to tribal customs to a level where right conduct has become an integral part of the higher forms of religion, until a nonethical religion seems to us well-nigh a contradiction in terms, though plentifully illustrated in humanity's past. And the quest for peace and strength and guidance finds abundant illustration in the intellectual no less than in the more superstitious forms of Christian worship.

Worship, whether it be viewed as the expression of any one of these motives or of a combination of them, is an essential part of religion. Within Christianity, at least, there can be no religion as a personal experience without the inward quest for the divine, nor as a social phenomenon without some form of public worship. Where these are lacking, man has a code of ethics, as in Confucianism or in the least corrupted forms of Buddhism,

or in the Ethical Culture societies of today. These may imitate religion in some of the forms used at their gatherings; or they may become religion, as Buddhism did, by the development of forms of worship; but it is the element of worship, this endeavor to establish a relationship with a Being, or beings—a controlling Power outside ourselves and accounted divine—which differentiates religion from a nontheistic ethical system.

The conduct of worship is, therefore, the primary function of a church, whether the predominating aim of the particular form of worship be to propitiate the Deity, or to guide and stimulate its adherents in ways of right living, or to bring to them consolation in distress, faith in place of doubt, courage to face the difficulties of life, the peace which passeth understanding. It is this function of the church which differentiates it from all other human societies. In Christian history the church has dropped off many functions which it once exercised. In the Dark Ages it was bridge builder and architect, the nursery of arts and letters, the guardian of rudimentary science, the almoner to the sick and needy, often the administrator and ruler. With the growth of civilization most of these functions have inevitably been secularized, but the conduct of worship as the primary function of the church, with the consequences in ways of community influence which flow out from it, remains untouched. To the Ethical Culturalist, as to the hardheaded rationalist, the function of worship may seem an inadequate reason for the perpetuation of the church, a lingering survival of an outworn superstition. Possibly he is right in thinking that worship will someday be altogether superseded by ethics. In that case the churches will eventually disappear, to be replaced by institutions of a different order, but, while they last, the conduct of worship remains their chief reason for existence. When they go it will be because organized worship, as social phenomenon, has ceased to have value for men.

Now an *act* of worship inevitably implies an *object* of worship, and in recorded human history those objects have been various beyond number. They have been magical articles supposed to be endowed with supernatural powers: a meteorite fallen from heaven, a fetish. Or they have formed a pantheon of nature deities: "stocks and stones" rudely carved or exquisitely fashioned; or human heroes idealized and deified by myth and legend; gods made in the image of man whether in outward form or in word pictures. Or the object of worship has been conceived of as an infinite and all-holy Power too pure and vast for any human portrayal, with whom men may yet enter into communion.

> Some seek a Father in the heavens above;
> Some ask a human image to adore;
> Some crave a Spirit vast as life and love;—
> Within thy mansions we have all and more.[1]

[1] George Matheson.

The modern critic disdainfully points out the anthropomorphism of all such ideas of God. But in time past anthropomorphism has often exercised an elevating influence over the minds of men. When the savage turned from the worship of fetishes or of beasts to that of beings with human attributes, an advance was registered in the upward progress of mankind. When the ancient world sloughed off the pagan deities with their human frailities for the idea of a God who embodied the noblest and loveliest of human attributes, a still greater advance was made. And if even today's most intellectualized and spiritualized conceptions of a suprapersonal Deity still seem encumbered with anthropomorphic traits, that is because of the limitations of the human mind and speech, whereby we are forced to picture and describe the ineffable in words which were framed with reference only to the mundane and the concrete. From the time when men turned from the cruder forms of fetishism it is probable that they have always conceived of God as the idealized form of what they themselves imagined most ideal and desirable. Man has always seen God more or less in his own image. "With the pure thou wilt show thyself pure, with the froward thou wilt show thyself froward."[2] The divine is seen as a glorified and transfigured reflection of the human because the human mind is a mirror which reflects objects not as they really are but always in patterns shaped and colored by our limited human experience.

It is for this reason that the idolater falls into the error of identifying his homemade image with the ultimate Reality. And his critic not infrequently falls into the same error because he fails to recognize that the various human ideas of God, often gross and superstitious, always limited and imperfect, are only groping endeavors to describe in an intelligible vernacular the unseen Reality which men feel to be behind the flowing veil of time and sense. He fails, that is, to distinguish between the symbol and that which is symbolized, and when he has pointed out the absurdity or unreality of the symbol, he imagines that he has also disposed of that which the symbol is intended to suggest. But that haunting Reality is not so easily dispossessed.

> They know not well the subtle ways
> I keep and pass and turn again.

The ancient image may be shattered by the hammer of the iconoclast, or left to fall neglected on its face, but only because the worshiper has found a lordlier incarnation of the Spirit.

> They reckon ill who left me out;
> When me they fly I am the wings.
> I am the doubter and the doubt,
> And I the hymn the Brahmin sings.

[2] Psalm 18: 26.

What the worshiper seeks is some way of envisaging in comprehensible form this mysterious Power in which he feels that he lives and moves and has his being. His image may seem crude and revolting to another, but he defends its sanctity, often with ferocity, because it is *his* image of the divine, *his* refuge in trouble, the denial of which is to him sacrilege. Instead of crying out that "the gods of the heathen are no gods," the modern man of understanding should meet idolatries with the words, "Behold I show unto you a more excellent way." That more excellent way has led through the gradual elimination of the bestial and the sensual, of the anthropomorphic even in beautiful and ennobling forms, to the emergence of the idea of God as the unseen but all pervasive Power manifest throughout the universe, to be worshiped in spirit and in truth.

In circles which have abandoned even this idea of God, worship inevitably disappears. If no Being, or Power, exists, with whom men may establish some sort of relationship, the primary function of the church disappears. Its gatherings take on the nature of Ethical Culture meetings, which continue to provide the stimulus offered by the recital of noble human thought and example and by the study of the obligations arising out of human relationships, and in which perhaps there may remain some consideration of man's relation to the universe in terms of science. But there is no worship in the common understanding of that word without belief in a Being, revealed in nature and in man, yet behind and above nature and really greater than man, from whom some sort of response may rationally be expected. Worship simply comes to an end if there be no Reality beyond ourselves which makes response to us, for it is based upon the postulate of such a Reality. If there be no Divine Spirit, then the human spirit cries out into the empty darkness and is but deluded into reassurance by the mocking echo of its own voice. That is the belief of many people today. Given a mechanistic interpretation of the world, a view which sees life as a series of physico-chemical reactions, which finds in humanity the solitary manfestation of intelligence and love in the universe, and the whole *raison d'être* of worship comes to an end.

But that theory raises quite as many problems as it solves. It is no less anthropomorphic than are many forms of religious faith, because to view the world as only a vast mechanism without conscious purpose or direction is merely to see it in the likeness of man's own limited and imperfect mechanical contrivances. So far as the phenomena of worship are concerned, it leaves unexplained the effect of worship upon the human spirit. Perhaps the clearest and most obvious effect is the catharsis of the soul in worship, the sense of purification, of renewal of strength and peace, of impulse to right living. It is true that that catharsis comes in other ways as well. It is to be found in a flight from the clamor of

many voices to the beauty and silence of nature; in the love of great art; in consecration to work, especially of an intellectual nature, when felt to be well worth while and done for the joy of creation and not for a coveted wage. But the common worship of God is the most effective means for promoting it yet devised by men. It may be argued that in all these cases the catharsis of the soul is the result merely of quiet, of intense contemplation of something passionately loved and desired, of group-suggestion as to what is beautiful or true or good, and that it proves nothing as to the nature of the universe or the reality of any Infinite Spirit. Yet it is difficult to see how this effect can be brought about in the human soul if the cause be not independently existent in the universe.

Does not our idea of God depend ultimately upon our interpretation of the human soul? If all life, including the processes of the human intellect, the emotion of love, the appreciation of goodness and beauty, be no more than the result of a series of curious physico-chemical reactions of matter arising automatically in the peculiar conditions of warmth and moisture temporarily prevailing upon our planet, then obviously the universe is a blind, deaf, and dumb affair, unconscious and without spiritual significance. In that case what ground have we for setting any value upon such moral and spiritual qualities as mankind may show forth, save as they can be proved to have some survival value for the individual or the race? But, in such a world, has life enough value for the majority of the race to be worth the struggle to survive? If life is only a much-ado-about-nothing of clotted atoms, frantically dashing to and fro, like billiard balls inexplicably endowed with a consciousness and a will to live in spite of infinite labor and sorrow, by forces, themselves unconscious, which drive men blindly hither and yon to strike, rebound, and fall at chance into the pit, then life not only eludes our understanding but nullifies all our moral standards.

But we are led to ask how intelligence can arise out of absence of intelligence; how an emotion like love can develop from insensate matter; how a judgment of values can be formed in a universe which knows neither judgment nor value? No doubt the *conditions* of life can be expressed in terms of physics and chemistry, no doubt all life as we know it is dependent on a delicate adjustment of moisture and temperature on this particular planet, but nonetheless it would seem certain that the qualities which in man flower into intellectual and spiritual attributes must be rooted in the universe itself; in a word, that there must be that in the universe which corresponds to the soul of man. Is not that the ultimate basis for any spiritual interpretation of the universe, for every idea of God, for religion itself?

We cannot put into a clear and definite intellectual statement the ineffable experience which the worshiper interprets as a divine response,

for it is a matter of feeling rather than of thought. The experience of the worshiper is as difficult to describe to one unfamiliar with it as that of a person deeply moved by great beauty. How explain the inner effect of a symphony nobly rendered to one's neighbor who has heard nothing but a confused noise? or of a painting like Titian's "Assumption of the Virgin" to a literalist who sees only the absurdity of representing a woman standing on a cloud? Or it is like the experience of great love. How can one describe what it is to be deeply in love to a self-centred person who has never known what love is? But for the worshiper the experience seems undeniable and valid. The familiar sonnet of Archbishop Trench offers perhaps something like an adequate interpretation of it.

> Lord, what a change within us one short hour
> Spent in Thy presence will avail to make!
> What heavy burdens from our bosoms take!
> What parchéd grounds refresh as with a shower!
> We kneel, and all around us seems to lower;
> We rise, and all, the distant and the near,
> Stands forth in sunny outline, brave and clear;
> We kneel, how weak! we rise, how full of power!
> Why, therefore, should we do ourselves this wrong,
> Or others—that we are not always strong—
> That we are sometimes overborne with care—
> That we should ever weak or heartless be,
> Anxious or troubled—when with us is prayer,
> And joy and strength and courage are with Thee?

The psychologist may readily explain the *form* which the divine answer takes if he knows the predisposition of the worshiper. But the fact that the worshiper *does* experience a sense of purification, of justification, a renewal of strength and peace, a reintegration of life, is exceedingly difficult to explain except on the basis of a spiritual quality in the universe with which the worshiper somehow forms contact, a Power manifest not only in nature but also sympathetic with the ideal outreaching of the soul, a Power which we, by force of our human limitations, personalize as a Being and call God.

Worship, then is based upon this assumption of a Power or Being, unseen yet existent, with whom contact is established. Professor Pratt, in his book entitled *The Religious Consciousness,* has differentiated two main types of worship in his sagacious chapter on "Objective and Subjective Worship." Objective worship is intended primarily to influence the Deity to whom it is addressed. Its effect on the congregation, though it may be considerable or even powerful, is nevertheless indirect, secondary, incidental to the main purpose. In Christianity he finds objective worship most effectively illustrated in the Roman Mass. Subjective worship, on the

other hand, is conducted primarily with a view to the effect on the worshiper, its purpose being to stimulate in him the desired feeling and attitude of heart and will. It is illustrated in the various forms of Protestant worship. He recognizes that these two aspects of worship are, indeed, inextricably intertwined. Objective worship does often, perhaps usually, produce potent subjective effects. Subjective worship still is dependent upon an object to whom worship is addressed. In practice the two types of worship are not to be sharply differentiated. Thus the Roman Mass, though externally a pure case of objective worship, yet undubitably promotes in many worshipers a high type of subjective worship. By its music and its dramatic quality, its emotional appeal, it turns the heart toward God. It is notable that the Quaker form of silent worship, which is subjective in a high degree, produces a similar effect by totally different means, through silence and the influence of the group mind. The fact is that almost all our worship is, in varying degree, both objective and subjective. It is objective in that in form it is inevitably turned outwards, addressed to a Power other than ourselves, whatever be the terms under which we may conceive of that Power. It is subjective in that its real essence is the inward turning of the heart, a movement of the spirit, without which the outward form is null and void, but which is nevertheless more or less dependent upon external worship for stimulus and support. The difficulty for the modern man lies in the impossibility of believing that God is persuaded, cajoled, or coerced by sacrifices, prayers, or praises into paying heed to him or that God is literally pleased with adulation or adoration. That belief offered a sufficient reason for objective worship in the past, as it does still for multitudes, and was the pathway which led men to turn towards the divine. But for many of us moderns true worship is not the outward action but the inward turning of the heart towards God, "the exploration of the Divine," and the value of the outward form lies wholly in its power to awaken, to stimulate, to guide this impulse.

The form which does this most effectively must be both objective in its assumption of a divine Reality and subjective in its effect upon the soul of the worshiper. But its assumption of an objective Reality must be framed in intellectual terms which the worshiper accepts, since the subjective effect is greatly diminished or utterly dissipated if the worshiper is aroused to intellectual or moral protest, as it would be were the service marred by an incongruous or grotesque episode. I wonder whether a large part of the hold of the services of both the Roman and the Eastern churches upon their adherents is not due to the very fact that they are conducted in tongues not understood, and often not even heard, by the people, so that the provocation to intellectual dissent is reduced to the vanishing point. It is quite true that the English Reformers demanded that the service

should be conducted audibly and in the vulgar language understood by the people. The protest was justified on many grounds. Yet the Roman practice is not only consonant with the Roman theory of the Mass; it has also a certain psychological warrant. In the mood of worship is not the worshiper justified in not wishing to have the personal idiosyncracies or even the spoken word of the minister or priest too obtrusively thrust upon his attention? His mood is one of feeling rather than of thought, a tide of the spirit "too deep for sound or foam," moving to great music or sonorous words coming from afar with familiar echoes which neither stir the slumbering intellect nor stimulate the conscience to active questioning. The worshiper is, in fact, wrapped in an inner silence, though submerged by outward sounds which sweep him onward without conscious movement on his part, and the effect is one of exaltation and purification which may be profoundly effective. To jar him into conscious criticism of what is done or said or sung is to shatter and destroy the very mood which he has come to seek.

That, if I mistake not, is the psychology of much of Catholic worship, and in lesser degree of the English rite for those so familiar with the Prayer Book that they give little heed to the intellectual content of what is heard but are swept along by the majestic language which has much of the appeal of music. Indeed, such is the emotional appeal of an august ritual or of great music that it may at times quite override and trample down the protest of the intellect. Some of you may have heard the Harvard Glee Club's rendition of Grechaninov's setting of the Nicene Creed. A baritone voice, which rises and falls to interpret each phrase, chants the creed against a woven tapestry of sound, ending with a triumphant climax. If one may compare a thing heard with a thing seen, one might say that the effect is like that of an exquisite mediæval statue of the Virgin and Child standing beneath a stained glass window which glows with light and warmth. The emotional stimulus is so powerful that for the moment it quite overcomes my own radical intellectual dissent from the creed; I find my lips moving with the chanting voice, and to cross myself when it ceases seems a wholly natural impulse.

I have noted the same effect upon myself in attending the Divine Liturgy in the Russian church in Paris. The service, of which I could understand hardly a word though I am acquainted with its general form and content, is entirely intoned or sung by unaccompanied men's voices to some of the most beautiful religious music in the world, in the presence of a congregation displaying passionate devotion. The effect upon me is wholly emotional, without any intellectual or ethical content, yet profoundly moving in its stimulation of the inner spirit of worship. But if the service were in English, intelligibly rendered, that spirit would be largely dissipated

by my intellectual refusal to accept the doctrinal, and perhaps the ethical, assumptions upon which the whole service rests.

This is an aspect of the psychology of worship which most Protestant churches have almost entirely overlooked. In our emphasis upon the intellectual and the ethical we have forgotten alike the power and the legitimacy of the emotional, the primacy, indeed, of mood and feeling in worship. What the worship of the future needs is a type of service created to awaken and express the mood of wonder and awe in the presence of the Infinite, without estranging the worshiper from the intellectual life of his time or leaving him to play blindman's-buff with its ethical problems. Obviously we cannot return to the Roman Mass, even though, as Pratt truly says, "it has no rival in the whole round of religious ceremonial for impressiveness and for the production of deep but controlled religious emotion." Unfortunately it enshrines not only a whole dogmatic system which we have rejected, but it is built upon a conception of the universe which we have entirely outgrown. It assumes a world in which supernatural transactions are habitual between God and man through the mediation of divinely appointed agents. The Catholic vehemently repudiates the suggestion that the priest in effect practices magic. Magic, he says, is the employment of the supernatural for personal and nefarious ends, and its agents are in the service of the devil; the priest employs the supernatural for social and spiritual ends in the service of God. We may readily accept this distinction, yet point out that both sacramental religion (in the Catholic sense) and magic arise from the same primitive conception of the universe as a world in which supernatural powers, whether good or evil, can be enlisted by human agents who have had conferred upon them the ability to use the necessary formulas and rites. It is a world in which transformations can be and are brought about *ex opere operato.* It is difficult to see how belief in the efficacy of magic can be logically denied while belief in the power of the priest to conduct efficacious sacraments is retained, but of course the human mind is seldom logical! No doubt belief in this type of sacramental religion will long persist among people who retain the more primitive frame of mind, and among some others with whom the beauty of ritual and the emotional appeal of the Roman service can override the logical and intellectual difficulties which it presents. We may regard sacramental religion (in the Catholic sense) as an interpretation of the universe which has been completely undermined by modern science, but the world is not likely ever to see another ritual in any way comparable to that of the Catholic Church as an expression of that belief.

Modern thought has incontrovertibly established a wholly different conception of the world in which we live, and if this has largely been accomplished by science in the last 150 years, the tide had long before

begun to set this way. When the Reformed churches repudiated the doctrine of transubstantiation, they struck a body blow at the whole sacramental theory, even though they retained some of the sacraments modified in form and diluted in theory. Inevitably worship took on other modes, forms of praise and adoration, of aspiration and ethical impulse, of illumination and guidance. The note of propitiation waned, the desire to know the will of God reached fuller expression. The decline of external authority brought freedom to try new, simpler, more direct, more individual ways of worship. Many of the old formulas lost their appeal and became archaic, if not grotesque. Men let them go because they affronted their intelligence, and, even more, because they became an affront to their idea of God. It was their desire to be themselves, and to worship God in spirit and in truth that led men to devise the manifold forms now in use in Protestantism. Insofar the tendency was sound and wholesome, even though the resulting forms of service were often meagre and unimaginative, sometimes crude and vulgar.

Now Protestantism is confronted by a revolution of thought which is far more fundamental than that of the Renaissance and the Reformation. The Protestant theology of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while representing certain great gains over Roman Catholicism, is hardly more acceptable than the earlier faith to the man of modern training. It represents an intermediate stage between the great system of Catholic thought, which was logical and strongly interlocked if one accepted its premises, and the interpretation of the world presented by modern science. Protestantism has only this advantage over Catholicism, that it is more fluid, less stabilized, and can therefore be more easily transmuted into modern forms. It would seem that it must be thus transmuted, or eventually pass away.

But any such transmutation must effect its forms of worship. As men seek a new idea of God, they will seek new ways of expressing that idea. When Calvin emphasized the sovereignty of God in a world governed by more or less autocratic monarchs, it was natural for men to speak of the Deity in the ancient phrase as "the King of kings and Lord of lords," but that expression has lost much of its meaning in a world in which only a few kings and lords linger like ghosts shorn of their power to command obeisance and obedience. When men still accepted literally the story of Creation in Genesis, it was natural for them to address the Deity as "Creator," but that word has acquired a dubious connotation for men who conceive of the universe as an endless process of becoming, even though we may still use it in some figurative sense. The whole process illustrates the thesis that every form of worship should be the natural and inevitable expression of the idea of God which prevails among the worshipers. Yet we

are confronted by the power of old and endeared associations to sanctify traditional forms, ceaselessly reiterating outgrown beliefs, long after the questioning mind has ceased to regard them as anything more than dubiously figurative statements.

It is precisely at this point that the whole modern problem of worship arises. Devotees of the Catholic Church tell us that the offices of missal and breviary, developed through several centuries, sanctified by long use, and regarded as only one degree less inspired than the Bible itself, cannot possibly be rivaled by any ready-made human compilations. Adherents of the English rite take much the same position, though with less justification. And both are right in a measure. No rival compilations could now be produced which would express with anything like equal effect the point of view either of sacramental religion or of the Protestant Reformers. No ritual of any wide appeal or abiding value can be made to order, as is amply illustrated by the painful experience of Richard Baxter and the futile labors of many others since his day. A ritual is a thing of growth and change, of experiment and testing, is built up and developed by the labor of many hearts and minds.

The difficulty with the great rituals of the past is that they no longer express the idea of God which is increasingly prevalent among modern men. The result of this widening gulf between the intellectual presuppositions of the ancient liturgies and the beliefs of religious-minded men of intelligence and education is witnessed in the painful situation in which many find themselves. The Mass does not admit of any measure of reinterpretation by those who have ceased to believe in sacramentalism, for the sacramental idea is implicit throughout its structure. The only alternative is to break away altogether, or to let one's intellectual revolt be submerged by the emotional appeal of the service. The struggles of the Church of England to revise the *Book of Common Prayer* offer another vivid illustration of the way in which a form embodying beliefs which many of its users have outgrown becomes increasingly difficult and uncomfortable. The plight of some of the ministers of our free churches is similar. Custom expects them to follow certain usages—forms of prayer, responsive psalms, hymns, which express ideas no longer congenial to them, and which they find it increasingly difficult to "reinterpret." Hence the search for new forms: the substitution of "words of aspiration" or of "meditations" for prayers, the use of extrabiblical literature for scripture readings, the attempt to sing ethical verses for hymns expressing ideas now grown repugnant.

Since it is axiomatic that every form of worship implies an underlying intellectual idea, the man of modern mind no longer expects any single and unchanging form to satisfy men of widely varying beliefs, much less

successive generations among whom revolutionary changes in the thought of God have taken place. Even in the pre-Reformation church there were considerable variations of usage. Within the outward uniformity of the Catholic faith not only the several monastic orders but local dioceses developed peculiarities of form and custom. The Council of Trent took vigorous steps to enforce uniformity, suppressing all variant forms which could not show a standing of at least two hundred years, and the revision of the breviary which followed brought about a degree of standardization never before attained in western Christendom, though even in the Roman Church today some minor variations still persist. But, whatever measure of success may attend the attempt to secure a uniform and standardized ritual in an autocratic church with a minutely systematized and authoritative belief, it is obvious that no such methods can ever be applied to groups of men animated by the modern spirit. Among such, ritual forms will be modified or discarded as they cease to express a living conception of the Deity, and men of many minds will worship in many different ways.

To those who hold to the ideal of a united church divinely ordered, with a single and uniform ritual and ceremonial, this is a most disheartening prospect. But diversity of forms is as inevitable as diversity of belief. It is the way of life wherever freedom is not crushed by an iron hand. Furthermore freedom to experiment, to invent, to vary, promotes not only sincerity in worship but is the pathway to new beauty. Unless we believe that the whole idea of worship is so outgrown that the human heart has lost its creative impulse along those lines, there is no reason to suppose that men are incapable of developing forms of worship as noble and appealing as those of the past, however far they may depart from the ancient models. All that we have a right to ask is that the work shall be be done by men who have an intelligent understanding of the task, a comprehension of the nature of worship, a realization that they are engaged in creating a work of art rather than in preparing a scientific or a statistical statement. It is gain rather than loss to religion to have various forms of worship, providing that each form is beautiful in its own way, sincere in its own interpretation of its idea of God and of the needs of the human soul. The inadequacy of many, if not most, forms now in use among the free churches which do not use a printed liturgy, is due to the fact that they are merely traditional and lifeless, casual and haphazard sequences of disconnected episodes too scanty to be dignified, hastily prepared and slovenly rendered, and giving a wholly undue emphasis to the personalities of the minister and the choir. The result is a service without stateliness or beauty, uninteresting because unimaginative, without power to move the heart, and frequently as impotent to illuminate the intelligence as to stir the conscience.

We need first of all an understanding of the nature of worship—that we are engaged in the endeavor to turn the heart of the worshiper towards the divine, to awaken it to the sense of the mystery and wonder of the universe, to open it to the unexhausted sources of strength and courage and peace. Then we must realize that worship is not primarily a matter of intellectual statement, although any consciously felt intellectual insincerity will destroy it. The honest intellectual background is but the upright skeleton which must be clothed in flesh; else the service is gaunt and forbidding rather than beautiful and appealing. Or, to change the metaphor, the intellectual background provides only the sturdy piers of the bridge by which the worshiper passes over the river of doubt to draw near to God. The actual planks he treads, the rail he holds, are the noble words, the moving music, the endeared surroundings which speak to his heart more than to his mind, to the sentiment of all that is best and most precious to him. The worshiper ought to be all unaware of the intellectual background of the service, not because it is absent but because he is so firmly supported by it that he is hardly conscious of its presence. He ought, indeed, to be unaware of the beauty which leads him on, because of the simple directness of the art which calls no attention to itself but which leads him to face the Divine Reality with that alone in mind. And he should go forth from the service, not questioning whether or not he has heard the truth from the minister's lips, not noting precisely what has been done or how, but conscious that somehow his doubts have been cleared away, his burdens have been lifted, his irritations have been quieted, his will has been strengthened, his heart has been cleansed and is at peace, his consciousness of God has been reawakened. It is thus that God is worshiped in spirit and in truth; and to lead and guide such worship is the noblest, as it is the most essential, function of the Christian ministry.

A TRINITY FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERALS

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SOME MONTHS ago in a discussion of the rejection of the Universalist church by the Federal Council of Churches it was suggested that perhaps Unitarianism might be moving towards Trinitarianism as interpreted by Leonard Hodgson in his *The Doctrine of the Trinity*. My curiosity aroused, I read this stimulating book and found it rich in wisdom, insight, and provocative ideas. It leaves me still a Unitarian, but with an increased understanding of the meaning of trinitarian doctrine. Whether Trinitarians should read it or not I do not know, for it is sometimes asserted that the important attitude towards the doctrine of the Trinity is to believe it, not to understand it. But certainly Unitarians should read it, for, if one is to disbelieve something, it is essential that one should clearly understand what it is that one does not believe.

Although this article was nearly completed before Mr. Hodgson's book arrived, the reading has led to some revisions in the writing. One idea which he stresses is that the doctrine of the Trinity is a product of reflection about Christian experience, that from the religious life of man we may reason conclusively to statements about the nature of God. If this argument has any logical justification—and surely it has some—why may one not make the experience of religious liberals the basis for theological inductions?

That, in part, is the theme of what follows. In developing it I have taken some liberties with words. Of the "persons" of my "trinity" it cannot be said that each is a *he* and not an *it*, but not all Trinitarians agree that this is essential. I have used the words "Universalist" and "Unitarian" and "Humanist" sometimes in rather a special sense. The Trinitarian reader will misunderstand my intent, if he interprets these as merely sectarian terms. Universalism, Unitarianism, and Humanism are the forms in which religious liberalism has come, and still continues to come, to many. But religious liberalism is more inclusive than these three movements. It would be a mark of illiberalism to limit liberalism to any particular sectarian bodies. What I contend is that there are (at least) three strands in all religious liberalism, and that unless a movement comprises these strands, well woven, it is not liberal.

Similarly the religious liberal will misunderstand if he supposes that I insist upon an acceptance of some theological formula, whether very ancient or very modern. My thesis is that the genuine religious liberal is

himself a triune personality, both a one and a three, and that religious liberalism is similarly a threefold organic unity.

First, religious liberalism contains an intellectual strand. Historically this has been the Unitarian contribution. The first law of Unitarianism is: In judging the truth or falsity of assertions in the realm of religion, as elsewhere, thou shalt respect thine intelligence. The doctrine of the Trinity was rejected by Unitarians, partly because it was incomprehensible and seemed contrary to a rational interpretation of the evidence. It seemed axiomatic that nothing incomprehensible and irrational is to be accepted as true.

This approach to religious problems was thus both factual and rational. It considered the documentary and human evidence. It sought to cultivate unprejudiced thinking. It moved towards conclusions dispassionately. In this spirit it turned to the study of the Bible, of the life of Jesus, of the nature of God, of other great religions, and of contemporary social problems. It did not shrink from proclaiming what it believed to be the results of these studies. This rational study of man's world seemed to imply that God's universe is rational too.

In other words, the Unitarian emphasis is upon intellectual and religious freedom. Not only are these the privileges of every man, but every man is under obligation to assert and practice these rights. No creedal test was required for membership, but Unitarians were encouraged to think for themselves, both singly and collectively, and to say what they thought with courage and conviction. They proclaimed intellectual tolerance. They were antidogmatic, even about Unitarianism itself.

Second, religious liberalism contains a feeling strand. Historically this has been the Universalist contribution. The first law of Universalism is: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as thyself. To early Universalists it appeared that God himself must be motivated by respect for a similar law, that he loves all men and is seeking successfully to save all from sin and misery. The doctrine of endless punishment was rejected by Universalists, partly because it was ethically contrary to the spirit of holiness and happiness, both in God and in man. Hate and vengeance were not to be accepted as worthy of either.

The Universalists, like the Unitarians, turned to the study of the Bible, of Jesus, of God, and of human problems. Usually considered more emotional than the Unitarians, their feelings were not without rational direction. Their emphasis has been upon freedom from cosmic fear. Originally they used a simple creedal test for membership, but this has been twice modernized. Members are encouraged to rephrase these statements in their own words. Tolerance to the Universalist is not directed merely towards ideas; it is a tolerance for people as individuals. Universalism teaches the brother-

hood of man, not as an accomplished fact, nor as chiefly a scientific hypothesis emerging from studies in blood chemistry, but as a goal which symbolizes the feeling which each of us ought to have towards all other human beings. Universalists are against indifference, cruelty, and sin.

Third, religious liberalism contains a strand of action. Recently this has been the Humanist contribution. The first law of Humanism is: Wherever there is a need and a possibility of human betterment, thou shalt wait upon neither man nor God, but thou shalt act and persuade others to act with thee. Just as the founders of Unitarianism were impatient with the failure of religious people to think keenly and logically, just as the founders of Universalism were impatient at the failure to feel kindly and lovingly, so have the founders of Humanism been impatient with the failure of men to accept responsibility for human progress. By some Humanists the belief in God and the belief in the future life have been rejected, partly because they seem to be sedatives which lull men to inactivity. Liberalism which is merely intellectual or merely emotional seems to them to be not liberalism at all.

The Humanists, like men of the other two strands, are also students. They have pondered much the same data; they have studied the contemporary scene. They conclude that man's destiny is largely in his own hands, and either that there is no God to rescue man from the predicament in which history has deposited him, or that God can help only as man helps himself. The Humanist emphasis is upon freedom from social and political laziness and ineffectiveness. Humanist tolerance is tolerance towards hypotheses for human betterment on this earth. Humanism would agree with Croce that "history is what we make it." It is opposed to anything which deters men from accepting the responsibility which this faith implies.

I have used Unitarianism as a symbol for intellect, Universalism as a symbol for love, and Humanism as a symbol for action. These usages are not to be taken literally. Individually and in their organizations Unitarians are sometimes relatively stupid; Universalists, relatively cruel; and Humanists, relatively content to substitute a new dogma of Humanism in place of actual coöperative endeavor. On the other hand, the Unitarians have been well supplied with poets and reformers; Universalists have had their intellectuals and their men of action; among the Humanists are both lovers of wisdom and lovers of God and man. I have used these words in this way to make it clear that these three strands in liberalism exist. I contend that all three are essential. If a man is to be a genuine liberal, he must combine in one well-integrated personality the Unitarian, the Universalist, and the Humanist. He must be a thinking man, a loving man, a man of action, weaving these traits into a harmonious and organic whole.

The religious liberal is a thinking man. Not that only the highly intelligent are eligible to the ranks of liberals! Rather that each of us must be willing and be zealous to think as intelligently as we can. We must have an understanding and a respect, both for the possibilities and the limitations of human knowledge. Respect for the possibilities will keep us humble, mentally alert, willing to learn, self-critical with respect to our conclusions of yesterday. Respect for the limitations will save us from dogmatism. We will thank John Dewey for reminding us that "the quest for certainty" is a doubtful and dangerous enterprise, and Harold Larrabee for setting forth the difficulties of attaining "reliable knowledge." We will remember the words of William P. Montague: "For the irreligious freethinking would be optional, but for religionists it would be compulsory. A church member who refused to allow his belief to be tested in the light of reason would be expelled as one of little faith."

There is one misapprehension about the intellectual aspect of liberalism which needs correcting. Unitarians and Universalists often explain the smallness of their numbers on the ground that it takes intelligence to be a Unitarian or a Universalist, and that intelligent persons in any community are few in number. I challenge the first clause of this assumption. It is far easier to understand the Universalist creed than the Nicæan creed. It takes much less intelligence to grasp the traditional five points of Unitarianism than the formulation of orthodox Christianity by Athanasius. In a few simple words it should be easy to communicate the essence of liberal Christianity to any average moron.

No, it is not difficult to understand liberalism. What is difficult is to accept its philosophy and teachings without at the same time denying those teachings by becoming dogmatic and narrow and intolerant. What many people are unable to take, what some people in liberal churches cannot take, indeed what some "liberal" ministers cannot take is complete present loyalty to one's most tested convictions while admitting the possibility that subsequently these convictions may be modified. They feel unhappy in an organization which constantly reminds them that the divergent convictions of their fellow liberals may be true.

What most men wish and what many orthodox churches claim to offer is dogmatic certainty. The most prosperous days of the Universalists were the dogmatic days. The way of unquestioning belief is the easy way. The way which demands a combination of loyalty to the truths of today together with suspended judgment about truths of tomorrow is the hard way.

Sometimes it is difficult for the religious liberal to apply his convictions, to translate them from the library to life. Here we are helped by those who insist that the ideal character is the man of warm and friendly

feeling towards all he may chance to meet. He understands the place of emotion in thought and life. He knows that emotions can become terribly tangled, can cause us to harbor the poisons of prejudice and the devils of delusion. But he knows also that without an emotional commitment to the ideal of universal human brotherhood, his life is incomplete and insignificant. In denying the existence of endless punishment our Universalist forebears insisted that every individual would nevertheless receive a just, and at the same time a remedial, punishment for his sins. It is to follow in that tradition to say that we should not so sentimentalize about brotherly love as to deny the existence of evil and sin and personal responsibility for right living. But it is also to follow in that tradition to assert that it is a denial of any man's liberalism to condemn or to dislike or to shun another for accidents of birth, such as shape of nose or slant of eyes or color of skin. That so few persons of Negro or Chinese or Japanese or Philippine or Mexican ancestry have been attracted to the liberal churches of the Pacific Coast is evidence that the partialist spirit still lingers in bodies from which it should have been exorcised.

We are helped in translating liberalism into life also by those who insist that men must act. The mature Humanist does not counsel action for action's sake. He understands the necessity of founding action upon intelligence and love, upon deep benevolence and wise foresight. But it seems to him that the typical liberal is either too much in the tradition of intellect or of feeling. To the Humanist the typical liberal church resembles an athletic team continually warming up for a game that is never played. Hence the call to action.

In his zeal the Humanist wishes to convert others to this faith in action. He writes about its superiority. He engages in controversy. He is thus always in danger of forsaking action and of becoming emotionally absorbed in the very intellectual matters which he condemns. He is in danger of becoming a dogmatist. Beginning with the modest assertion that "theism is philosophically possible but not religiously necessary," he may forget that the same criticism may be made of any substitute for theism. He may become more interested in condemning the theism of his fellow liberals than in promoting coöperative projects for the improvement of humanity.

The unforgivable sin for Unitarians is prejudice against ideas and censorship of the intellect. The unforgivable sin for Universalists is prejudice against people and suppression of sympathy. The unforgivable sin for Humanists is prejudice against human aspirations that differ from one's own, and excommunication of those whose good works have a theological foundation. He who is guilty in any of these respects falls short to that extent of what a completely religiously liberal person should be.

Similarly a liberal church is one composed of persons whose members

are genuinely liberals. It is not, as some seem to suppose, the sign on the outside of the building that makes a church liberal. It does not make a church liberal to call it Unitarian, or to call it Universalist, or to call it Humanist, or even to call it Liberal. Sometimes these rationalizings help by reminding the members of an ideal. But the church is liberal only if its minister and its members are in fact liberal. That means that it will be composed of persons of varying opinion, persons who will differ among themselves in their convictions, their sympathies, and their plans of action. To discover that such differences exist in a church should not give concern, but rather satisfaction, for they are necessary but not sufficient evidence that the church is indeed liberal. It is illiberalism which, in the words of Croce, stifles "the diversity of impulses, spontaneous developments and the formation of individuality."

The history of music suggests what else is necessary to make a church liberal. Long ago men had appreciation only for melody. It was only gradually that musical taste learned to find beauty in the simple harmony of octaves or fourths or fifths. Even the interval of the third, which now sounds almost insipidly harmonious, was long rejected. In our own day new dissonances are being introduced into musical composition. Listeners are often surprised to find that what first strikes the ear as unpleasant slowly comes to be heard as a new and pleasing harmony. A liberal church, like modern music, must find place for unexpected dissonances, held together in "harmonious discord."

Too often the church unity which is sought is of the type which Hodgson calls mathematical unity, a unity measured by absence of multiplicity of beliefs and temperaments. It should be the aim of liberal churches to strive for what he calls organic unity, a unity whose achievement is measured by the intensity of a unifying spiritual power to bring together in one harmoniously coöperative project of worship and work men of widely divergent temperaments and convictions. For a church to concentrate on a narrow selection of interests implies lack of faith in its unifying power. The wider the range of interests represented in a congregation, the greater the evidence for the presence of that unifying power.

"It does not seem to be natural to men," writes Mr. Hodgson, "to appreciate other kinds of people because they are different, to want them to remain different while prospering equally." But "it is a mark of the truly educated man to have formed the habit of assuming that those who disagree with him may be equally honest and intelligent as himself." Such appreciations and assumptions Hodgson believes ought to be the devout concern of those who are true Trinitarians. I believe they ought to be equally the concern of those who call themselves religious liberals, whether trinitarian or otherwise.

If a liberal church is to be a reality it must be a continuous process of fusing diverse personalities—intellectual, emotional, activist—into an organic whole. If an individual is to maintain himself as a religious liberal, he also must carry on a similar fusing process of the everchanging traditions of thought, love, and work. This is the conclusion arrived at by reflection upon some aspects of religious experience. It suggests a possible further conclusion, not merely that the universe presents itself to man as in part rational, friendly, and active, but that these qualities are brought together in the organic unity of the being we call God.

THE INDIVIDUAL AND INDIVIDUALISM IN THE NEW TESTAMENT

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THE SWING of the pendulum between the individual and society as the focus of value and the object of concern has been so constant not only in our times but throughout human history that consideration of this relationship is always timely. Religion has to do with intimate personal matters; it also concerns society both in its institutional forms and as it shapes conduct and determines attitudes and relationships. The Christian religion illustrates in its rich and varied history the swing of emphasis between the individual and society. It is not the purpose of this essay to discuss individualism from the standpoint of philosophy but to attempt a modest approach to this question as it arises in the New Testament.

The controversy about the so-called "social gospel" which enlivened the opening decades of the twentieth century in America is no longer carried on with the same ardor and in the same terms. Perhaps the two world wars have modified the enthusiasm of social gospelers, on the one hand, and compelled the advocates of extreme individualism to reckon with stubborn social situations, on the other. But it is an unwarranted assumption to suppose that clear thinking about the New Testament teaching on this subject obtains among Christian preachers and teachers. When a Christian teacher can write, "We find Jesus saying little concerning individual personality but much concerning his ideal society" and when Christian preachers can say, "One of the central truths of Christianity is the absolute value of the individual" or "The Old Testament teaches that God is the Father of the nation; Jesus taught that God is the Father of the individual," as the writer has heard repeatedly from the pulpit, confusion of thought still exists. All these statements cannot be true, and it must be possible to inquire of the New Testament what the significance of the individual is, and to get from it a reasonably satisfying answer.

The question is not one we impose upon the New Testament, for it comes out of the thought of the first century. Christianity had its rise in Judaism, a religion with a strong sense of corporate solidarity. We know that Judaism, without losing that sense of solidarity, had driven home to the individual his personal responsibility as a member of the people of God. This was achieved primarily by emphasis upon the Law of Moses, which must be practiced by individuals and was intended to regulate conduct even in the most minute and casual relationships between man and

man as well as attitudes and acts toward God. It has been customary to sneer at legalism, but it ought to be remembered that Jewish legalism was perhaps the most thoroughgoing attempt in history to school an entire people in their religion and to apply it to the whole of their life. The synagogue was the chief instrument for individualizing religion, being local, democratic, and close to the daily life of the Jew. The doctrine of resurrection, developed late in Judaism, is among the most striking evidences of this individualizing process. It may, of course, be argued that the Law of Moses because its authority was prescriptive was not capable of satisfying the deepest needs of the individual, but it can hardly be denied that it proved to be one of the most effective means known to us for relating the consciousness of group solidarity and of individual responsibility.

We know also that Christianity spread chiefly in areas and among peoples speaking the Greek language and influenced by Hellenism, an unstable synthesis of Greek and Oriental ideas and practices. Among the Greek influences in the Mediterranean world of the first century was philosophic individualism. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, as well as their successors, made man, the individual, the measure of all things. Greek philosophy was not unaware of the problem of the state, and the great Greek philosophers made heroic efforts to buttress the state by subordinating the individual to the universal, but the new cosmopolitan Greek had learned to seek for ultimate values in the realm of what we call personality. This was, of course, the glory of Greek philosophy even if it did raise problems of human association which they and we find difficult to solve. We are not to suppose that the folk who first accepted the Christian gospel were directly influenced by Greek philosophy; they were, however, profoundly moved by the historic events which implemented these ideas. The decline of the city-state and the local religion left vast numbers of men spiritually homeless. The idea of "one world" bound together by a universal culture based not on the accidents of birth, race, religion, and nationality but on what is native to man as man was one of the noblest ever to dawn on the human mind. The corollary of the universal is the individual, for to see oneself as related not primarily to family, city, or state but to the universe is to see oneself as possessing worth and significance in the totality of existence. But this noble idea was too big and man was too little and too weak for any but the most independent and daring thinkers. Actually the fertilization caused by such thinking prepared the soil for religions which could claim antiquity, which could offer security to the individual in this world by the promise of another, which could satisfy his emotional needs, and which could introduce him to a fellowship of like-minded men. Christianity was one of these religions and its ultimate conquest of the Mediterranean world was due, humanly speaking, to the

fact that it met such needs more adequately than its rivals. Based upon the Old Testament scriptures, Christianity carried the doctrine of a moral and spiritual solidarity and continuity into a world hungry for such a sense of security. Freed from Jewish particularism, Christianity spoke directly to the spiritually homeless individual whether Jew or Greek, slave or free, male or female. It can, therefore, be argued that Christianity spread with such rapidity because it offered to the man of the first century, in something like an equilibrium, a satisfying answer to his individual and social hungers. It has been said that Christianity spread because it spoke directly to the individual, and, because individualism was the dominant need of the first-century world, it fitted that world as the hand fits the glove. One may question this analysis of the first-century situation. Is it quite certain that the initial expansion of Christianity was due to its emphasis upon the individual? Obviously Christianity did not invent individualism, nor was it the only religion with a message for the individual. Dying and rising saviour gods with whom the individual might achieve union through richly emotional rites and sacraments, promising personal immortality, were no novelty in the first century. It may be held that Christianity conquered because it offered these values together with a higher ethic and a nobler Saviour, in other words that it offered a more comprehensive and at the same time more realistic synthesis of values appealing to the individual than its rivals, but it is questionable whether its success can be attributed to the individualism of the gospel alone. To be sure, patterns for political, economic, and social organization are conspicuous for their absence in the New Testament, but the one social entity men craved in a world dominated by Rome was an immediate and primary form of association with one's fellows. This need was met by the Christian churches which sprang up wherever the gospel was preached. These small churches were like islands rising out of the sea to form a new continent. They were themselves social phenomena of the most significant kind, the creators of social theory not the product of social blueprints. It is, of course, a work of the historic imagination to ask what attracted the little people to Christianity, for our records do not come from them. Did the average church member in Corinth understand all Paul's thought? Was it the freedom of the Spirit expressed in party cries and individual extravagances under the sanction of religion which chiefly appealed to the Corinthians? Or was it the attraction of human fellowship which promised the largest satisfaction to the individual? This question of the relationship of the individual to the group is certainly central in the Corinthian correspondence and no one who reads it can fail to see that Paul is valiantly trying to reconcile the hungers for selfhood and for society. It is too simple an analysis to say that Christianity triumphed because of its individualism.

When we turn to the teaching of Jesus, it is apparent that neither the word *individualism* nor the term *social gospel* is applicable. It is true that Jesus places a higher valuation upon the individual person—even "the least of these my brethren"—than we have ever achieved in society. It is true that he said, "For what does it profit a man, to gain the whole world and forfeit his life?" It is true he looked with level eye at those "who are supposed to rule," who "lord it over" others, and the "great men" who "exercise authority," [1] as well as at the religious authorities of his day, and that he showed an understanding sympathy for the downtrodden. The one straying sheep, the one lost coin, and the profligate son symbolize the prodigal love of God and the "joy before the angels of God over one sinner who repents." But the individual has this value not in himself but only in relation to the divine purpose. And to say that the individual has absolute value in the teaching of Jesus or even that the individual "soul" has absolute value, is wholly unwarranted. There is one and only one absolute value in Jesus' teaching: the will and rule of God. Men have potential value in relation to that will. To realize this potential they must be prepared to sacrifice all that men count valuable, even life itself, taking up the cross and denying themselves.[2]

It is equally fallacious to apply the term *social gospel* in anything like its modern sense to the teaching of Jesus. It is true that Jesus concentrates upon God's rule in relation to men; he has little to say about the cosmic rule of God so prominent in the Old Testament. It is true that the rule of God implies right relations with men, for "if you are offering your gift at the altar, and there remember that your brother has something against you, leave your gift there before the altar and go; first be reconciled to your brother, and then come and offer your gift." [3] It is also true that allegiance to the kingdom involves radical ethical decisions as the Sermon on the Mount shows. But there the parallelism with the modern social gospel ends. The kingdom of God *is* and *comes by* God's act. Men neither build it nor grow it. Jesus rarely deals with social institutions as such. Marriage and divorce, for example, are not considered from the viewpoint of the "social" but from the divine sanction. The one explicit saying about the state,[4] far from clear in itself, is oriented to the demand of God and not to the necessities of society. It is sometimes argued that Jesus was a political revolutionist and that all but traces of his revolutionary gospel, which the discerning eye can still discover, were eliminated from the records when Christianity became an independent religion and came

[1] Mark 10: 42.
[2] Mark 8: 34 ff.
[3] Matt. 5: 23, 24.
[4] Mark 12: 17.

to terms with Rome. It is difficult to deal with an argument from silence, but the positive answer lies in the body of Jesus' teaching which has been transmitted. This is simply not consonant with the hypothesis that Jesus was a political revolutionist.

The most impressive evidence that Jesus cannot be reckoned as a social gospeler in the modern sense is the entire lack of the "social motive" in his teaching. He taught, it is said, the infinite worth of the human soul in the sight of God and therefore we ought to count men as precious. But this conclusion is just what is lacking in Jesus' teaching. He seems to be always and everywhere concerned with the actor not with the needy man acted upon. "I have tried in vain," writes Professor Cadbury, "to find in our Synoptic gospels a single injunction to social service based explicitly on the neighbor's need for love and service." [5] Luke's parable of the Good Samaritan, however artificial the connection between the lawyer's question, "Who is my neighbor?" and the story that follows, is illustrative of Jesus' regular habit. The neighbor is the actor, not the man acted upon. The self-regarding, not the altruistic, motive is dominant: Judge not that you be not judged; Forgive that you may be forgiven, etc. Jesus began with the inner life and with ultimate moral responsibility to God, and not with social and humanitarian motivation. To say that Jesus' gospel of the kingdom is a religion of persons-in-community may be a valid implication from his teaching but it is certainly not the way Jesus put it.

The modern rediscovery of the church as standing over against the world, if it is to stand at all, has powerfully influenced otherwise sound scholars to find that Jesus was really the founder of the church, that he had the church definitely in mind, that passages like Matt. 16:18 ff. and Matt. 18:15 ff., are authentic words of Jesus, and that the church is his social contribution. That Jesus did not contemplate a new religion and that he did think of his gospel as reconstituting the true Israel of God may well be true, but surely it is special pleading to argue that anything like the church as we know it or as Paul knew it was in Jesus' thought. The overwhelming evidence of all our primary sources is that his message was: "The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand; repent, and believe in the gospel." [6]

Jesus, then, does not think of the individual or of society in modern terms. He thinks of both in terms of the rule of God: the individual has his significance not in himself but in his potential obedience to God's rule; society is not regarded as having impressive solidarity but as destined to pass away and "social" relationships are to be radically altered not to fit the necessities of human association but to manifest the will of God. Men

[5] H. J. Cadbury, *The Peril of Modernizing Jesus*, p. 104.
[6] Mark 1:15.

are to love their enemies not because of expediency[7] but that they may be "sons of your Father who is in heaven." It may not be superfluous to point out that Jesus' teaching is not necessarily less significant for a continuing society on this earth because it is so much more radical than social theories now current.

It is not possible within the limits of this paper to examine all our New Testament writings as regards the place of the individual and society; only the general direction of thought can be indicated. Many new factors appear to alter the character of these writings as compared with the teaching of Jesus, *e.g.*, the development of the idea of the Spirit, the postponement of the *eschaton*, the growth and spread of the Christian church, the eventual clash with Rome, the influence of contemporary thinking in the direction of sacramentalism, dualism, mysticism, and contemporary ethics. At the risk of hasty generalization it may be asserted that individualism in the philosophical sense nowhere obtains in the New Testament. The sturdy Hebrew-Jewish heritage of regarding the individual as significant not in and of himself but only in relation to the will of God continues to control even those writers like the author of John's Gospel and of the Epistle to the Hebrews who most obviously work with hellenistic concepts.

Paul has been reckoned an extreme individualist, on the one hand, and his doctrine of the church as the body of Christ has been characterized as sociologically conditioned, on the other. Actually, allowing for wide differences in forms of thought, Paul is essentially one with Jesus at this point. He does present the gospel in intensely personal terms; faith, for instance, must be personal or it is nothing. His paradoxical boasting and humility, which we know about from the intimate character of our sources, is not a logical contradiction—whatever amateur psychiatrists may say about it. He is humble to the point of extravagance when he contemplates himself or any other human being as an isolated and helpless item in a moral universe. He is exuberant and equally extravagant when he thinks of himself as caught up into the majestic and loving purpose of God: "the life that I now live in the flesh I live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me";[8] "We are conquerors through him who loved us";[9] "All things are yours; . . . and you are Christ's; and Christ is God's."[10] Man, for Paul, was not so much totally depraved as totally inadequate to meet the moral demands of God, but there is, of course, no suggestion that man possesses inherent powers or possibilities of dealing

[7] Contrast Matt. 5: 43 ff. with Rom. 12: 20.
[8] Gal. 2: 20.
[9] Rom. 8: 37.
[10] I Cor. 3: 21-23.

with the moral universe; all he possesses is the possibility of faith, *i.e.,* receptivity, and that too can be reckoned as the gracious gift of God.

Paul's figure of the church as the body of Christ has been attributed to his social conditioning. Professor Dodd can write, "Paul's sense of union with Christ is conditioned by the experience of life in a society controlled by His Spirit, as well as constituted historically by His act." This may be true psychologically but it is not the way Paul puts it. He approaches from the other end, saying, in effect, that experience of life in a society, *i.e.,* the church, is conditioned and controlled by the Spirit. It is true enough that Paul addresses himself to problems of conduct in the church and out from the church, but he does not think of the church as a body of seekers (they were finders) or as a "cell" experimenting with a new economy or a new pattern of race relations in the interests of a planned society to grow out of it. The church is not even a means of propaganda in the modern sense; it is the manifestation in terms of human association of the new life from God, in the Spirit. In the church itself the social process is disregarded, as such, for when he calls the Romans or the Corinthians "saints" ("called to be saints"), he does not mean that they are called to *become* saints, any more than he regards himself as called to *become* an apostle. They are saints and he is an apostle by virtue of God's calling. What they and he must learn is how to walk in accordance with their new life. He can turn with no sense of turning from what we call the "spiritual" to what we call the "ethical," *e.g.,* "If we live by the Spirit, let us also walk by the Spirit. Let us have no self-conceit, no provoking of one another, no envy of one another." [11] The temptation to modernize Paul must be as resolutely resisted as the temptation to modernize Jesus, not only in the interests of honesty but also because what he has to say to us today can only be heard if we listen to him.

The church as a social phenomenon looms larger in the Pastorals and in the Catholic Epistles than in the teaching of Jesus and Paul. Lip service is still paid to the universal dynamic inherent in the kingdom of God and the righteousness of God, intended for man as man and not just for Christians, but attention is centred on safeguarding the integrity of the church and assuring its doctrinal soundness and proper leadership. Revelation, in another way, is also concerned with the triumph of the church, and attempts have been made to modernize its "social" message. It is true that apocalyptic is a form of eutopianism and, like all attempts of the human spirit to picture the ideal city of God, has social significance. Revelation is not the least successful attempt to describe the New Jerusalem; its majestic and magnificent periods have met human hunger for assurance in time of despair and will continue to do so—"Standeth God within the

[11] Gal. 5: 25 f.

shadow keeping watch above His own." There are times in human history when Christians see no other way, for the moment at least, than to wait God's time. Apocalyptic, however, by definition not only affords no pattern for an earthly society but no motivation for social action. The individual in all these writings is an integral part of God's elect people; he is never regarded from the standpoint of philosophical individualism.

Hebrews and the Gospel of John might be expected to isolate the individual and regard him as a unit since both, each in its own way, have definitely modified the Hebrew-Jewish view of God's purpose as working out in a time sequence, in the direction of the hellenistic two-world or two-story concept. But both writers have used this concept to validate the primitive Christian tradition that what took place in the words, deeds, and death of the historic Jesus was a communication of life, light, and truth or, as in the case of Hebrews, a fulfillment of the shadowy anticipations of reality in the institution of priesthood. It is this allegiance to the primitive tradition which prevents these writers from developing the philosophic individualism suggested by their forms of thought.

We do not find anything approaching philosophic individualism in the New Testament. God not man is the measure of all things and it is the character and the will of God which give potential and relative but never absolute value to man. If it is false, as it demonstrably is, to say that Judaism taught God's Fatherhood only of the nation while Jesus taught that God is the Father of the individual, it is equally false to say that Jesus or the New Testament teaches the absolute value of the individual soul. The rule of God is the one absolute.

The writer of the eighth Psalm understood the human dilemma quite as well as we do, *i.e.*, man's littleness and frailty over against the immensity of the cosmos; the destiny of man to be the master of nature over against his responsibility to God. The dramatic discovery of a method of releasing from the atom the energy which holds all things together in a universe, is only a commentary on the psalmist's faith. Perhaps he contemplated man's mastery of nature with more satisfaction than we do, for we are not very happy about our success. But the only ultimate solution lies in a recognition of man's responsibility not to himself, to his family, church, nation, or bloc of nations but to the order and purpose of the universe. The Christian faith is that the human individual has the capacity for such a recognition of ultimate responsibility and that in that capacity lies his significance. The New Testament writers saw this and expressed it in varied ways. Some of them found in Jesus Christ the dynamic and the redeeming power enabling sinful men to accept responsibility to God and live their lives in relation to the divine will; some of them thought of Christ as the revealer of God's will in whom and through whom life and light and

truth become luminous; some of them continued to think of Christ as the designated leader who would return in supernatural power to bring in the kingdom; all of them thought of him as in some way God's act and word to men from within humanity.

The social necessities and obligations of the modern world are inescapable. They cannot be evaded by flight, horizontally or vertically. They must be accepted as a primary responsibility. The fact that the kingdom of God is not something which we can build but that it *is* and *comes* does not release us from our responsibility to build and to grow social institutions; it rather relieves the Christian from the delusion that these institutions, even democracy, are or can ever become the kingdom of God. Our social responsibility is to build institutions through which God's rule may be manifested. It is fortunate that no blueprints for a social order can be lifted from the New Testament and set down on the modern scene. They could not conceivably fit. It is, however, lamentable to observe how the kingdom teaching of the New Testament is used to relieve the individual of his social responsibility.

The ultimate outcome of human and cosmic history is not in our hands. And this is fortunate both for us and for the generations to come. We are to seek the truth and to obey such intimations of the truth as come to us from the past and in the present. And, above all, we are called to accept the discipline of social responsibility in the knowledge that only by such an acceptance can our lives be valuable to ourselves and to others.

COMMUNISM, CATHOLICISM, AND LIBERALISM

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By and large the people whom I meet who have a warm sympathy for Soviet Russia have a strong antipathy for the Roman Catholic Church, and I am sure that most of the friends of the Roman Catholic Church dislike and distrust the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Liberals find it difficult to appraise either of these bodies accurately or to grasp fully their attitudes toward, and their relations with, each other.

It is our purpose in this essay to discuss briefly Communism, Catholicism, and liberalism, for the sake of a better understanding on our part, if we can achieve it, of what may be regarded as the three major contemporary isms and influences on the international scene. When we speak of Communism, let us mean for the moment as manifest in Russia; and when we speak of Catholicism, let us mean Roman Catholicism as represented in the Roman Catholic Church. Each then is a definite institutional entity. Liberalism, on the other hand, cannot be easily identified; let us associate it for the purposes of our thought both with political democracy and with the religion of the free spirit. It seems to me that there is no fourth power that can be compared with these three currently as far as universal significance and force are concerned, unless it be imperialism of the old order, or capitalism apart from democracy, to which we can refer only as a corruption or perversion of democracy.

We shall point out ways in which all three are alike, then ways in which Communism and Catholicism resemble each other, in spite of their antagonisms. We shall then endeavor to give an appreciative criticism of Communism and Catholicism, and finally, an exposition of liberalism.

In the first place then, we hear it said again and again that the threat of Communism lies in its desire to extend itself throughout the world. To be sure there was the Stalin-Trotsky controversy, and the Trotskyites, who were the ardent exponents of the Communist International policy, were defeated and liquidated, and the Comintern during the war was abolished, but still world domination, or at least a world friendly to the Communist way, is the aim of Russia. But Roman Catholicism is no less desirous of dominating the world, or of creating a society that is friendly, if not partial, to its interests. We know of its ambitions, and of its international planning and strategy. Catholicism, the oldest of the great powers, and Communism, the newest, vie with each other for the control of civilization. But again, the same may be said of liberalism that has been said of

these two, for liberalism has not only fought two great wars to make the world safe for democracy, but it has been constantly desirous, and can we not say commendably desirous, of extending democracy among the nations. Any vital political philosophy or religious faith has a justifiable missionary zeal. No one can object legitimately to that zeal, though there are often objectionable methods and attitudes of intolerance associated with that zeal.

And again, Communism and Catholicism and liberalism all alike have within them idealistic elements, but also corrupt and sordid elements. We have to make allowance for this. This is because they are subject to the weaknesses of human nature. No man is perfect, and no institution or movement therefore is perfect either. Sometimes we expect too much, and are disillusioned when the actuality falls short of our expectation. At other times we have an adverse prejudice to begin with, and we find inevitable flaws to bolster up that prejudice.

But let us consider further resemblances between Communism and Catholicism, both of which we must learn to tolerate and live with, for the sake of brotherhood and of a peaceful world, and both of which we must somehow or other persuade to tolerate and live with each other. "Communism in Russia is a secular religion," pointed out Captain Blackburn of the British House of Commons this week at Harvard, "and that is why Communism and Catholicism all over Europe are in such bitter conflict with each other." But it cannot be out of order to recall that both Communist Russia and the Roman Catholic Church are totalitarian bodies. What do we mean by this? We mean that the state or the church, as the case may be, possesses an authority greater than any derived from the consent of the people, and that it is an end in itself, as well as a means to an end. We mean that it is governed not by all its members, but by a few. There are perhaps a million persons in Russia at present who are members of the Party, which governs a state with a population of 170 million. In the Catholic church the priesthood is a special class, exclusively responsible for the government of the church. The clergy number approximately one half a million in the world for a church constituency of over 300 million. Some say that Mr. Stalin is a dictator; others say that he is not, but that the power is really vested in the Politburo. His eminence the pope is the supreme pontiff of the church, except that he also has a college of cardinals who elect him, advise him, and share his infallibility. He in turn, of course, appoints them.

Both Communism and Catholicism as totalitarian bodies use methods of suppression and censorship freely, and both prevent their privileged class, whether party members or priests, from mingling with those of other nationalities or other churches except upon official business.

Both stand in constant apprehension of contamination and heresy, and therefore act in a way quite different from that of liberalism. And both, tragically enough, though bristling with the urge to extend themselves, are characterized by fear. I say "tragically," because I believe that if they were not so fearful they would be far more open and coöperative, and more helpful to the progressive movements of mankind. Russia has been persecuted only thirty years, to be sure, but it has been harsh persecution; she does not trust the outside world, or the capitalist countries. At least this is one opinion that is vigorously advanced, and well substantiated. Catholicism is still, of course, the dominant Christian religion in the world at large, but it has lost ground in many quarters, and throughout the big four—the United States, England, Russia, and China—it always has been a minority faith. And though it has persecuted more than it has been persecuted, nevertheless it regards its life as in jeopardy. It is aggressive, as Communism is aggressive, but it is also fearful, as Communism is fearful.

There are many things about Communism that we should learn to appreciate. The revolution of 1905 was inspired by a hatred of autocracy, and a love of freedom, justice, and equality; and circumscribed as this revolution was, it was the forerunner of the revolution of 1917, a rebellion against the czarist regime, and against practices which we could not tolerate and at the same time be Americans. It was ideally motivated, in many respects, as was our own revolution and as was the French revolution. But it was broader in scope than these, for it included a social revolution, which again was idealistic in character, even though it became reactionary, and a rebellion against religion, which because of Russian history, it identified with the Russian Orthodox Church, for nearly a thousand years intimately associated with the monarchy, and as autocratic as the czar himself. This was not, to be sure, the Roman church, but it was part of the eastern branch which separated from the west in the Middle Ages. If Russia has not become liberal, at least her revolution was occasioned by opponents of the antithesis of liberalism. Though she may not have overcome class consciousness, she has resolved race conflicts, and she may yet teach the world something in the field of economics, as she has done so much to save the world from the Nazi yoke. I believe that it is not her economy that is dangerous, but her political organization.

And there are many things that we should learn to appreciate about Roman Catholicism too. It was the mediator of Christianity, civilization's prize possession, to the modern world. It has produced the vast majority of the saints and scholars in the history of the west. It is the inspiration and guide of millions upon millions of devout people today, and without it our civilization might quite conceivably go into quick and complete moral

collapse. Its leaders are for the most part absolutely sincere and in dead earnest about their faith, as are most of the leaders of Communism—perhaps more sincere, and probably more in earnest, than most of the leaders of liberalism. Russia has a materialistic philosophy, in spite of its idealism, and in spite of its 1936 democratic constitution and new tolerance of religion; but Catholicism has a deeply spiritual philosophy, rooted in and enriched by the profoundest insights of many centuries into the nature of the soul of men. Again, though I disagree strongly with many of the tenets of the Roman Catholic faith, it is not, I would insist, her faith that is dangerous but it is *her* political or ecclesiastical organization.

Roman Catholicism is a remnant of the remote past, and Russian Communism a reaction against the immediate present; we must try to understand both sympathetically, and must somehow or other get closer to both and bring them closer to each other—together they represent five hundred million inhabitants of the globe—and yet liberalism symbolizes a different way. Stalin is literally scornful of our democracies, and confident that they cannot work; our only effective answer is to show him that they can work. And Pope Piux IX enunciated doctrines to which the Catholic church is still wedded, condemning "progress, liberalism, and modern civilization," even as Leo XIII denounced the whole principle of the people's sovereignty and of representative government, wherever found. Thus William Laurence Sullivan as a modernist priest wrote to the pope: "The Papacy and Democracy! How grotesque the juxtaposition! How incongruous an association of ideas!" But again, if Catholicism is opposed to liberalism, our only effective answer is to persist in a thorough liberalism, and to show that liberalism works.

Finally then, what is this liberalism in which we believe, and which we would offer both as the reconciliation and solution of the world's troubles today? It is the way of the individual conscience, and the way of the four freedoms; but it is also the way of a people, as John Foster Dulles puts it, "who believe that their freedoms flow from their Creator, and who use those freedoms with the restraint which is enjoined by divine commandment."

Freedom is the realization of that higher life toward which all men in their maturity aspire. Freedom is God's supreme gift to man, which increases in value the more man himself earns and cherishes it. Those of us who believe in liberalism reject dogmatically totalitarianism and authoritarianism as the enslavement of men; we would elevate *men* instead of the state or the church. And we would rely upon truth for the establishment of authority, rather than upon authority for the establishment of truth. Liberalism means faith in freedom uncurtailed, in heresy unoppressed, in the open forum where truth may contend with falsehood, and

in the nonconformist church where the private worshiper may meet his God as his conscience dictates.

From the conservative point of view liberalism fails to take into account the frailty of mankind, and leads only to anarchy; but the liberal replies that his way of life is what develops the potential strength of mankind, and that only freedom is consistent with the concept of the dignity of human nature. And he adds that regimentation, or compulsory conformity, is a poor substitute for anarchy—that concord in spite of diversity is what is desired, and that the unity of the spirit is the real bond of peace. Brotherhood is born not of coercion, but of free fellowship.

Liberalism is the way of the future. Liberalism alone is qualified to heal the dissensions of the world. But even liberalism, to achieve its ends, must have both the power and the patience of God, and must be ready to pay the price of the principles it professes. "The liberal deviseth liberal things, and by liberal things shall he stand."

PAUL AND SALVATION

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The centuries which have intervened since Paul spoke and wrote have produced many theologians and admirers of so-called "Paulinism," but unfortunately these centuries did not produce many who understood Paul or even attempted to see religion through the eyes of the great apostle to the gentiles. Nevertheless, Paul has been used as much or more than any other New Testament writer as the exponent of some system of theology, especially in that area of theology which treats the significance of the death of Jesus. From the beginning of Christian thought this has been the case. The early emphasis on the ransom theory of the atonement found some comfort in Paul, but this was no exception; virtually all the prevailing theories of the atonement which have graced the pages of theological treatises through the ages use Paul as the chief source of authority. Anselm's theory of the outraged righteousness of God has persisted in many orthodox circles, well documented from Paul's writings. Likewise the governmental theory of Hugo Grotius continues in modern ecclesiastical thought with the Pauline supports. So the penal theories have ample support from Paul. Even the example theory of Socinus found a great deal of support in Philippians, while the more modern representative theory enjoys the splendid support of the fifth chapter of Romans. Thus Paul stands out as the exponent of many mutually exclusive theories of the atonement.

More modern New Testament scholarship has been much more intelligent in its approach, and its chief virtue lies in the fact that it attempts to understand Paul and his experience of Christ in the light of his background before attempting to formulate his ideas regarding the significance of the death of Jesus. It has become more and more evident that apart from a sound appreciation of Paul's diaspora Jewish and Græco-Roman background it is impossible to comprehend the meaning of the words he used and the ideas he associated with his religious experiences. Before any interpreter can save himself from the temptation to explain Paul from the point of view of our modern ecclesiastical theology, he must walk the streets of Tarsus, Corinth, and Ephesus in the first century, observing the language, religious expressions and practices of the people, and feeling the drive of their hopes and fears. It was certainly to the people holding these views that Paul spoke, but—more important for us—it is more and more certain that Paul was one of them, sharing their hopes and fears and experiencing something of their religious faith. More needs to be

done to see Paul in the light of his Græco-Roman background as a diaspora Jew. Paul's Jewish heritage is most frequently interpreted from the standpoint of Palestinian Judaism, and occasionally from the diaspora Judaism of Philo. The fact is that both may poorly represent the Judaism of Paul, since we know that diaspora Judaism was far more liberal than was Palestinian. On the other hand, Philo may represent nothing more than the point of view of the Alexandrian, philhellenic Jew.[1] This side of the study of Paul has been neglected and will have to be studied before we can adequately understand Paul. However,[2] we are more aware of Paul's Græco-Roman backround with its wealth of religious and ethical ideas. Paul, as a diaspora Jew, found himself at home with Græco-Roman religious terminology. He may not have been distinctively a Jew in the extremes to which he went; nevertheless he certainly was subjected to influences of an environment common to all his fellow Jews of the diaspora. This may account for the fact that wherever he preached, a few Jews accepted his message. Regardless of how exactingly tight the lines of Jewish exclusiveness may or may not have been drawn in gentile lands, the environmental factors of the Græco-Roman society predisposed him, perhaps subconsciously, to many of the views of the gentile people about him. On the other hand, it is equally evident that his Jewish heritage remained so powerful a factor in his life that one could say he never ceased being a Jew in his outlook, especially in the ethical quality of religious living. In him the Jewish and the Græco-Roman streams of life met.[3] It is probably due to this fact, regardless of Schweitzer's contentions,[4] that he knew violent inner experiences and mystical relationships less frequently found on Jewish soil.

In any intelligent study of the teaching of Paul on the meaning of the death of Jesus in God's salvation of men, one must consider both Jewish and non-Jewish factors which influenced him. Admittedly we are handicapped with regard to the details of the extra-Palestinian Judaism, and hence the Jewish factors may be overstated. On the other hand, we are now so amply supplied with an ever-increasing volume of non-Jewish material that one may speak with assurance of this side of the environmental factors which influenced Paul in his thought. From the Jewish side Paul mentions a number of details that are of great value.[5] He says

[1] E. R. Goodenough, *By Light, Light,* pp. 9, 237 ff.; "John a Primitive Gospel," in *Journal of Biblical Literature,* LXIV (1945), pp. 145 ff. The claim is advanced that the hellenism of Philo is far more representative of diaspora Judaism than has generally been supposed. Evidence to support this has not been presented.

[2] W. L. Knox, *Some Hellenistic Elements in Primitive Christianity.* The statement is made that even the rabbis were hellenized!

[3] A. Deissmann, *Paulus,* chaps. iii and iv.

[4] A. Schweitzer, *Mysticism of Paul the Apostle,* pp. 36 ff.

[5] Phil. 3: 5-7. "I was circumcised on the eighth day, of the race of Israel, of the tribe of Benjamin, a Hebrew of Hebrew parents, a Pharisee as regards the law, zealously persecuting the church, blameless according to legal righteousness."

that he was reared according to the strictest school of Judaism, namely, the Pharisaic. This means that he was of the legalistic school. His background here conditioned him to think of the God-man relationship in legal terms. This involved devotion to the sacrificial system of Judaism. It is a small step from this to the idea of vicarious suffering such as is found in II Isaiah and IV Maccabees.[6] Moreover, he lived in the atmosphere of Jewish eschatology with its vertical line between the present age dominated by evil demons and the new age which would be the kingdom of God.[7] His idea of the character of God and the state of man before God seems to be definitely Jewish. It fits his Pharisaic, legalistic background. From this element of his past he never escaped. It became one source for his interpretation of the salvation of God in Christ. It is to this element of Pauline thought that traditional theology has been most indebted. Insofar as theology has comprehended Paul's interpretation of the death of Christ from this point of view, it has been correct. It is what it failed to grasp beyond this that causes its approach to Paul to be shortsighted.

On the other hand, there was a strong contribution from the Græco-Roman side that complemented the Jewish heritage.[8] There was the belief, common to Jews and Græco-Romans, in the many dangerous unseen forces capable of wrecking human life and hopes. The magical papyri[9] give ample evidence of this threat to human welfare. But more than this, the definite comfort offered by the very popular mystery religions constitute an even better evidence of this fear which overshadowed human life.[10] Only by gaining the help of some benevolent deity could man hope to cope with these destructive powers in his world. Some gods offered protection for the present with a sure guarantee of help for the unknown future. Closely related to this phase of the pagan world there was the powerfully prevalent idea that salvation from present ills and dangers after death could be effected by mystical union with some tragic divine or semidivine being who had tasted death and had been raised to immortality. This union was generally accomplished by initiatory rites and recurring nourishment of the spirit. These sometimes took the form of a cleansing baptismal rite and sacred meals.[11] Tertullian[12] discusses these rites with their supposed values for the devotees. Paul very obviously knew these rites and the hopes attached to them. The union with a dying

[6] IV Macc. 1: 11; 6: 29; 17: 21 ff.

[7] I Thes. 4: 15-5: 11; II Thes. 2: 1-12; I Cor. 15: 23-28.

[8] T. Wilson, *St. Paul and Paganism,* pp. 31 ff. The author seems to fear the conclusions which inevitably follow from his evidence.

[9] K. Preisendanz, *Papyri Græcæ Magicæ.*

[10] H. R. Willoughby, *Pagan Regeneration;* S. Angus, *The Religious Quests of the Græco-Roman World,* chap. v; S. Angus, *The Mystery Religions and Christianity,* chaps. ii-v; E. Rohde, *Psyché,* part ii; S. Dill, *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius,* bk. iv, chaps. i, iv, v, vi.

[11] Apuleius, *Metamorphoses* ii, 20, 23.

[12] Tertullian, *de Præs. Hær.* 40; *de Bapt.* 5.

god as a means of eventual triumph was one of the most characteristic doctrines of all the mystery religions. Paul knew how much comfort and hope these conceptions gave men. He also knew the ecstatic experiences associated with many of these religions which promised such blessings to men. Of course it is true that even the casual reader may see in the Saul-David saga a type of spirit possession among the peripatetic prophets that is of the same quality as that experienced by the Corinthian church. However, the chances are that the Corinthians and Paul were more powerfully influenced by a more immediate illustration of ecstatic experience since such experiences were known in other religions of that period and locality.[13] In some Græco-Roman circles, especially the Hermetic, the Orphic, the Neo-Pythagorean, and the Neo-Platonic groups, the flesh was regarded as evil and doomed to destruction.[14] Salvation would have to save a man from the flesh which stood between the soul and God. These various groups held to different means of becoming saved from the flesh, ranging from a mental union with deity or the Whole in Hermeticism to that of specific, ascetic practices and divine nourishment in the Orphic cult. There was something of this idea in Jewish thought, nevertheless the idea was not very popular except in some Essene groups. Paul's association with gentile groups and his use of their words seem to indicate that he is at times far closer to the gentile than to the Jewish. Yet it must be borne in mind that Paul did not consciously[15] label these ideas as to source, nor did he recognize some ideas as gentile and some as Jewish. Paul's passionate devotion to the will of God was uppermost in his life. These influences came into his life, more or less unconsciously to color his experiences of God and his interpretation of these experiences. Sometimes he sounds like a Jewish writer, such as the author of the Book of Wisdom, especially in chapters 13 and 14 of that work; again he is very much like the Hermetic or more like the initiates of a mystery religion. He has no clear-cut system of thought, consistently and logically wrought out.[16] What he has is a dynamic religious experience. In speaking of this experience, he draws upon conceptions prevalent in his world, sometimes Jewish and sometimes from Græco-Roman sources. Any interpretation of these Pauline conceptions must begin with the individuality of the man Paul, especially his psychological or emotional temperament, and must cast these against the background of the person himself. Both the man and his environment must be studied before he will be understood.

[13] Willoughby, *op. cit.*, pp. 68 ff., 196 ff.; Rohde, *op. cit.*, pp. 289 ff.; Euripides, *Bacchæ* 298 ff., 862 ff.

[14] Plato, *Gorgias* 493; *Cratylus* 400C.

[15] M. S. Enslin, *The Ethics of Paul*, pp. 56 ff.; E. W. Parsons, *Religion of the New Testament*, pp. 71 ff.

[16] W. L. Knox, *St. Paul and the Churches of the Gentiles.* Knox gives too much attention to the upper strata of Græco-Roman life. He overlooks the mystery religions and religious ideas of the masses. It is among the masses that Paul himself places his converts (I Cor. 1: 26 ff.).

Before leaving the factors which influenced Paul's interpretation of the significance of the death of Jesus for man's salvation, it is necessary to consider one other factor of prime importance, namely, the embarrassing death of Jesus itself.[17] Even within Palestine the death of Jesus caused the early Christians no little trouble in the missionary movement. As late as the writing of the Corinthian letters Paul could say: "For the preaching of the cross is to them that perish foolishness . . . for the Jews require a sign and the Greeks seek after wisdom, but we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling block and unto the gentiles foolishness." [18] Paul, as if facing an accusation, asserts in Romans that he is not ashamed of the gospel of Jesus Christ; and the essence of his gospel, as he says elsewhere, is the cross.[19] The Palestinian disciples had not been able to make positive use of the tragedy. They charged this cruel death to the Jews, for they said: "He was a man approved of God . . . but ye by the hands of lawless men did crucify and slay." [20] But as far as we can tell, these early followers only declared that such a tragedy had been transmuted by God into victory. God saw what they had done, and took steps to defeat their wicked plans to put Jesus out of the way. There was no great theological interpretation to the problem. Jews and gentiles alike objected to their claims for Jesus on the basis of his shameful death. This embarrassing state regarding the death of Jesus persisted for several generations.[21] Paul seized this disconcerting tragedy and interpreted it as a divine act. This was a great step, and we may, with assurance, assume that grappling with this problem was not the least of the formative factors in Paul's religious thought. He had to do something about this seemingly unanswerable challenge to the character and person of Jesus. This problem and its solution is a part of the basic theology of Paul.

The focal point of Paul's religious thought is the death of Jesus and his resurrection. Paul's interest centres in these two events rather than in Jesus' ministry, though he certainly knows much more of the ministry of Jesus than many scholars admit. However, God's great work for man is caught up in the death of Jesus. As Paul writes about this divine act, the death of Jesus, no single theory stands out; hence the various theories of the atonement, taking their cues from Paul, all fail to do justice to Paul's thought. No one of the traditional theories represents Paul, nor do all of them combined, since they fail to see Paul in his world, and since they fail to understand Paul's conviction of what must be accomplished before man stands upright before God. They also overlook or underestimate the

[17] Parsons, *op. cit.*, p. 78.
[18] I Cor. 1: 18-23.
[19] Rom. 1: 16; I Cor. 2: 2.
[20] Acts 2: 22-23.
[21] E. C. Colwell, *John Defends the Gospel*, pp. 67 ff.

Græco-Roman thought pattern into which Paul fits his saving program. Moreover, the reason no single theory can do justice to Paul's conception of the significance of the death of Jesus is that he never analyzes or clarifies his total conception of it. Rather he speaks of it now in one connection, now in another. Most theories of the atonement consider only one aspect of Paul's thought. There are at least three approaches to this saving act of God. Sometimes Paul dwells on the legal; then at length on the moral; the cosmic, too, he mentions. The legal views the death of Christ as solving the legal problem between God and sinful man; the moral aspect views the death of Christ as solving the moral problem of inability to live the life demanded by God; the cosmic aspect views the death of Christ as potentially consummating the battle of God against the cosmic, demonic forces which thwart his will and man's salvation. All three of these, as well as other ideas, are part of an experience which places man safely within the fortress of salvation. These are not three different moves for man's salvation. They are aspects of the same experience.

The first aspect views the problem of man's salvation from an angle familiar in the common theories of the atonement. Paul's Pharisaic background is evident in this view though his is not representative of Pharisaic theological thought. God is absolutely holy and unable to look with any approval on sinful man. However, Paul goes beyond the Pharisee to add that sinful man—and all are sinful—cannot approach God. God cannot legally approach sinful man, and sinful man cannot approach God. Only when a Holy God punishes sin, or better, only when sin is removed, can he look with favor upon man. Death, the legal penalty of sin, must be exacted.[22] But God provides a means whereby his holy demands can be met without sanctioning sinful man, and without jeopardizing his holiness. This is clearly stated in Rom. 3:21-26. The sinless Christ was set apart by God himself as a propitiation, "a means or basis of forgiveness."[23] On this new basis God forgives, acquits, justifies, although man has not kept the law. The death of Christ completely meets the demands of God, so that God can forgive sinful man and still be just. The past sins are cancelled, and man stands before God "not guilty." This is a legal picture which comes from the soul of one reared in and devoted to the legal approach to God. Many of the details of this idea would be completely foreign to the Pharisaic Jew, but the approach springs from a background where vicarious suffering is at least known, and where a sacrificial system was accepted. A casual reading of II Isaiah and IV Maccabees will give one the picture of the background of the basic thought of the death of Christ in this picture. This interpretation would be perfectly comprehen-

[22] *Cf.* Burton, Smith, and Smith, *Biblical Ideas of Atonement,* pp. 178 ff.
[23] C. H. Dodd, *The Epistle to the Romans, in loc.*

sible to the Pharisee. The righteous demands of God are met by a plan greater than man's sinfulness. Sin is punished, God remains holy, and man is forgiven and can be received into his presence.

This legal aspect, however, is not the major problem with Paul. There is another problem far more difficult of solution and far more acute. This is the moral problem.[24] Man is obligated to live the righteous life before God. Just as Paul condemns the Jew for having a knowledge of God without producing a life in harmony with that revelation,[25] so also he condemns himself for not living the life demanded by God. His early life was a very gloomy one, for he says that as soon as the law came to him, that is, as soon as he became aware of the law, he died. That means that he felt he was never living according to the demands of God, although outwardly he claimed to be ahead of others of his race, and claimed "blamelessness" before the (external) demands of the law.[26] Yet he explains in a passage[27] which seems to be autobiographical that the problem of sinfulness is not with man's desires or intentions. It is far more serious. Man is the victim of the flesh; so, though he may desire and will to do what is the will of God, he cannot perform this will of God. A man may be never so sincere, but as long as he is in the flesh he cannot please God.[28] The most serious problem then is: how can a man, who is the victim of the flesh—and all are—live the life that is demanded of him? That is a moral problem. Let us state briefly how it is solved and then review the passages where it is discussed. God solves this problem by having his own Son enter the flesh, where he defeats sin in the flesh, even to its last stronghold, death. This victory came through his death and resurrection, from which he emerged to become the Spirit[29] or the indwelling Christ. These two terms, the Spirit and the indwelling Christ, are used of the same experience. By means of this indwelling Christ man mystically dies and is raised from the dead to a new, spiritual life; the flesh is crucified,[30] and man rises as a spiritual being, no longer the victim of the flesh with its passions, but a being now triumphant over the flesh. So the moral demands of God which the law could not produce because man was a being of flesh are now evident in those who, by the union with the indwelling Christ, have died and risen to become beings of the spirit. This is a part, and a major part, of the saving work of Christ. Salvation is not so much a new status before God as a new life acceptable to God.

[24] E. W. Parsons, *op. cit.* pp. 94 ff.
[25] Rom. 2: 1 ff.
[26] Phil. 3: 6.
[27] Rom. 7: 14-15.
[28] Rom. 8: 8.
[29] II Cor. 3: 17.
[30] Gal. 5: 14.

Man is saved from the power of sin. The technique of this was in essence familiar to Paul's hearers. They were well acquainted with the hope of the defeat of death by union with a dying and rising saviour god. Paul takes the same idea and proclaims the defeat of moral frustration by union with a dying and rising God—better, by union with a crucified, but ever-living and everpresent, saviour. This aspect of salvation is more emphasized in Paul than the factual, past, legal aspect mentioned above and over-emphasized in theological circles. We may now examine some passages in Paul's letters which illustrate these ideas.

Though Paul describes sin in the first two chapters of the letter to the Romans as wilful, a refusal to live in accordance with the known will of God, yet he[31] says that he is a creature of the flesh in slavery to sin. He denies any ability to understand himself, so great are the contradictions within him. He wills to do one thing and does not accomplish it. He wills not to do another and yet does it. There is no good in his flesh. He is unable either to do the good or to refrain from the evil. The power of the flesh is so great that the law was unable to accomplish its holy purpose, for the flesh is hostile to God, and flesh beings cannot please God. On the contrary, they produce such actions[32] as will bring death. This means that man is not only wilfully sinful, he is helpless and hopelessly so. On the other hand, God took decisive action[33] in sending his own Son into the arena of the flesh where by sinlessness he beat the power of the flesh and even robbed it of its last goal—death. So though the law failed because man is flesh, yet through God's Son, man is now able to fulfill the ordinances of God. This is true because he is no longer the victim of the flesh, but is in the power of the Spirit. Man receives this new dynamic by faith which brings him into living union[34] with the triumphant Lord, who is now the spirit.[35] Man in union with Christ dies, and in union with him rises to new life. He is crucified with Christ; the old nature (flesh) is nailed to the cross, and through this death man is freed from the slavery to sin. Man then is a new creation; he is in the realm of the spirit. This idea is illustrated by slavery. Once you had a master, sin, to whom you yielded obedience; now you are beyond the claims of the old master.[36] Again, just as marriage law governs the relationship of man and woman till by the death of the man the woman is set free, so the power and claims of the flesh control the man till by death the man is set free.[37] You have died with Christ

[31] Rom. 7: 14-25.
[32] Gal. 5: 19-24.
[33] Rom. 8: 8.
[34] Rom. 6: 1-7: 6.
[35] II Cor. 3: 17.
[36] Rom. 6: 16 ff.
[37] Rom. 7: 1 ff.

and are then free from the old life, and have entered a new one—the life of the spirit. The slave is free from the flesh and alive to God. So man, once a slave to the flesh, was obligated, since he could not help himself, to obey the unrighteous demands of the flesh. But now that relationship is cancelled, for man has been freed, and his enslavement to the flesh is ended. So a man in the flesh is a victim of the law or demands of the flesh, is united to these; but by union with Christ he has entered the realm of death where these relationships are cancelled. So a man beyond death is a new creature, is in another realm. Man's enslavement to the flesh has been broken by mystical union with Christ. This involves union in his death and resurrection, and present union with him in the battle against sin's demands. One might see in Rom. 5: 1-10 a general survey of the whole problem of the significance of the death of Jesus. In the first two verses we find that God acquits a man by his grace, and gives grace wherein man may now stand, and man receives assurance and the ultimate hope of the attainment of the perfect will of God. In 5: 10 the legal and the moral are restated. The death of Jesus enables God to acquit a man, but the indwelling Christ, who empowers a man to defeat sin, saves a man from the power of sin to the attainment of God's demands. As secure as these statements sound, Paul faced the necessity of warning people that they must produce the fruit of the spirit if they would be spirit beings, sons of God. In Rom. 8: 9 the conditional sentence states that if the Spirit of God lives in a man that man is in the spirit. Anyone who does not possess the spirit does not belong to Christ. But he boldly outlines what determines a spirit being.[38] He states what qualities show one to be a flesh being and what determines spirit-living. The source of this idea of moral triumph through mystical union with a personal being is hard to trace. It is certainly not Jewish, though there are some distant parallels in the accounts of spirit seizure in the Old Testament. Yet this idea is altogether at home, in principle, in the Græco-Roman world in the formulas of the mystery religions. Though the mystery religions proclaimed defeat of mortality through mystical union with a dying and rising god, Paul proclaims a defeat of immorality through this process. The source of this idea is without doubt to be found in the pagan religions of Paul's day, but Paul' unique use and interpretation and application of this idea are distinctively his own. It is interesting that just as Tertullian[39] says the Eleusinian religion claimed regenerative powers for baptism, so Paul uses baptism in Romans 6—his negative attitude in Cor. 1: 14-17 notwithstanding.[40]

The third aspect of the saving work of Christ through his death and

[38] Gal. 5: 19-24.

[39] Tertullian, *de Baptismo* 5.

[40] S. Angus, *The Religious Quests of the Græco-Roman World,* pp. 204 ff., denies the sacramental aspect of Pauline thought; Parsons, *op. cit.,* p. 99, recognizes this idea in Paul.

resurrection might be called cosmic. In both Jewish and Græco-Roman thought the world was peopled by unfriendly demonic forces. In Jewish thought these were associated with the present age in contrast with the age to come which would be controlled by God. In Græco-Roman circles these forces were a part and parcel of human life. These forces, filling the very air men breathed, caused calamities to fall upon man and evil destinies to await him. Even at death the power of these evil forces was not broken. In Jewish eschatological thought the power of these evil forces would be overthrown by the Messiah at his advent who would bring this age to an end and usher in the new age, that is, the age to come. In Græco-Roman thought, only by proper relationship to some deity could one control the actions of the evil ones. Union with gods by means of secret, mystical rites was one means of thwarting these forces, especially enabling one to triumph in the ultimate battle of life over death. What everyone wanted most was assurance of divine help in the last struggle. Immortality is a constantly recurring hope in the literature and archæological remains of the Græco-Roman period. So Paul's world was in the hands of sinister forces from which God would have to save it if man himself were to be saved. As long as these evil forces dominated the world, the happiness and well-being of man, both temporal and eternal, would be hindered and in some instances sadly destroyed. God would have to save the world from these cosmic evils in order to perfect the salvation of man. The very creation suffering under the domination of these evil forces was groaning for redemption. God's work was accomplished in a most clever fashion. The demonic forces that brought about the death of Christ thought they were winning the great battle. However, by the resurrection, they were openly defeated, and Christ began the work which would eventually destroy all opposition to God and his righteous one and make God all in all in his creation. In Rom. 8: 19 the creation, knowing the plans of God, is eagerly awaiting the redemption which is to come. All evil forces—whether evil angels, principalities, powers of the heights or of the depths—shall be defeated. The time is near at hand when man's redemption shall be completed.[41] Angelic rulers and powers are all exposed and defeated in the cross,[42] though they are apparently still deceiving and attempting to thwart Christians. By union in the death of Jesus man triumphs over these elemental (cosmic) spirits. Paul reminds the Galatians[43] that they were freed from those elemental spirits. So the victory, which is not yet a reality, is nevertheless guaranteed because in the death and resurrection of Jesus God has exposed and beaten these evil forces. At the return

[41] Rom. 13: 11-14.
[42] Col. 2: 9 ff.
[43] Gal. 4: 8-11.

of Christ these forces shall all be trampled under foot and completely destroyed. In I Thessalonians and II Thessalonians two Jewish eschatological expectations are stated, and in I Cor. 15:1 ff. this eschatological note is sounded. This is definitely salvation from a cosmic point of view. As one can see, there are Jewish and non-Jewish aspects to this idea. The fact that it is not racial, not limited to Palestine, and that it deals with forces of evil not included in Jewish interpretations, suggests a Græco-Roman coloring, and yet it has a positive Jewish background. Paul has used ideas from many sources in clarifying his faith that God will solve all problems facing his own who are fighting evil forces in a hostile world.

It might be well to look at some of the details of this saving drama. The saving act of God is based[44] upon a certain concept of human nature which was held by Orphic,[45] Neo-Pythagorean,[46] Hermetic,[47] and other groups in the Græco-Roman world. Yet such a concept of human nature is foreign to Jewish usage[48] except to the Essenes whose relationship to gentile groups is seriously advocated.[49] The Synoptic gospels present no such picture of human nature; neither do the prophets. Jewish literature of the New Testament period everywhere assumes the sinfulness of man, but asserts his power to repent and to live a godly life. That is just what Paul does not do in Romans.[50] His view of *sarx* (flesh) is certainly basic to his explanation of salvation, and certainly has its roots in Græco-Roman soil. The Orphic ideas, as reflected in Plato, suggest a picture of human nature quite in keeping with the Pauline idea. However, it seems certain that the ideas of Paul have not been taken from the Orphics in any conscious manner, but came by absorption through popular ideas in his Græco-Roman environment. The same observation would hold true for the kinship with Neo-Pythagoreanism. The fact seems clear that Paul is deeply indebted to these sources for his teaching about human nature. The same absolute need for salvation is seen in Orphism, where the god alone will loose the devotee from evil and the unending way of misery, and

[44] Rom. 8:1-8.

[45] Plato, *Cratylus* 400C—"For some say that the body is the grave of the soul which may be thought to be buried in our present life . . . the body is a prison in which the soul is incarcerated"; *cf. Laws* 782C and *Phædo* 62.

[46] *Gorgias* 493C—"I have heard a philosopher say that at this moment we are actually dead and that the body is our tomb. . . ."

[47] *Corpus Hermeticum* xiii discusses the nature of the body and its sins and gives a list of the evils of the human life: "ignorance, grief, intemperance, sensuality, injustice, avarice, folly, envy, deceit, anger, rashness, and malice." *Cf.* Gal. 5:19 ff.

[48] It occurs as a word in Sirach, Judith, and Enoch, *et al.*, but with no such usage as Paul gives it. *Cf.* I Enoch 1:9; 14:22; 15:8; 16:1; 17:6; 61:12, as illustrations.

[49] Lévy, *La Légende de Pythagore de Grec en Palestine*, pp. 268 ff.; Jülicher, article, "Essenes" in *Ency. Biblica;* Legge, *Forerunners and Rivals of Christianity*, i, pp. 155 ff.; Schürer, *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi*, ii, pp. 556 ff., 582. Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums*, pp. 458 ff., disagrees; so do Wendland and Meyer.

[50] His discussion in the early chapters of Romans does not harmonize with his confession in the above-mentioned passages.

man's own power avails nothing. All depends upon the grace of the gods.[51] The Orphic idea is further present in Paul when he reflects a knowledge and an apparent sanction of rites on behalf of the dead.[52] Here Paul is certainly leaning heavily upon good Orphic teaching.[53] It is certainly evident that both of these doctrines—the flesh as human nature and security for the deceased—spring from popular Orphic ideas of gentile society.

Furthermore, the mysticism of Paul is far removed from the experiences of the earlier Christian group. There is nothing in the Synoptic gospels to suggest this notion, and the early chapters of Acts do not reflect anything even near it. It is true that his spiritual experiences in the third heaven and in Paradise are common in the apocalyptic writers—both in the Old Testament[54] and in contemporary Jewish literature.[55] Yet these are not necessarily related to the experience of mystical union with the dying and rising Lord Jesus. This mystical union is not even in agreement with the mysticism of Philo.[56] It is, however, quite a common notion in the mystery religions of the masses in the Roman empire. In a limited sense there is a parallel in the Dionysiac union with deity,[57] but here the technique was through sacramental meals. It was more of a Bacchic revel, but one has to recall that the Corinthian celebration of the Lord's supper does offer a mild parallel. However, the true idea of Dionysiac mystical union is reflected in Plato[58] where a distinction is made between a genuine experience and a superficial excitement during the revel. The Orphic propounded a similar, but more restrained, type of mysticism. So also did many other popular religions of the Pauline world. Salvation as the union with a dying and rising god is common to all of the mystery religions. So it seems that this second pattern for Pauline salvation springs from his gentile background.

Again, the act of God in saving men was accomplished through the Son of God, a supernatural being who entered the arena of humanity to grapple with flesh and to save men who in union with him go through death to the resurrection life. The term "son of God" does not make its technical bow on the stage of early Christianity till Paul. Of course, some would insist that it occurs in the Synoptic gospels as a title of Jesus. It does, but a historical study of the term[59] points emphatically to the conclusion that a Palestinian usage of "son of God" is at best descriptive of

[51] Rohde, *op. cit.*, pp. 342, 357 (note 50).
[52] I Cor. 15: 29.
[53] Plato, *Republic* 364C.
[54] Ezek. 3: 12; 1: 4; Dan. 10: 4.
[55] I Enoch 1: 2; II Enoch 1: 8; 7: 1; 8: 1.
[56] Goodenough, *op. cit.*, pp. 204 ff.
[57] Herodotus iv, 78 ff.
[58] Plato, *Phædo* 69C.
[59] C. Guignebert, *Jesus*, pp. 259-268.

moral or spiritual quality and is never a declaration of biological relationship. If it were applied to Jesus during his ministry, it suggested nothing more than moral excellence. That the Synoptic writers meant more is evident. However, these passages where the term is used by the disciples in a technical sense, especially after the stilling of the storm and in the great confession, are regarded by form critics[60] and most historians[61] as late and hence not reliable evidence for Palestinian teachings of Jesus or the early church. Of course the demons frequently use the term and have the support of the centurian at the cross, but such evidence seems strange proof for a Christology. Son of Man, Christ, and Lord—these are the titles used by Jesus and his disciples. In the book of Acts, "son of God" never occurs in the sermons or conversations of the apostolic group till Paul begins preaching, and his first utterance is to "prove that Jesus is the son of God." Up to that point, every time Jesus is related to God, he is called *pais,* just as in the *Didaché.* This word *(pais)* could be translated *child,* but its more probable meaning is *servant.* It seems clear that the early Christians did not preach a salvation through the son of God but through a Messiah or a "servant" of God. Paul seems to have introduced the concept of the Son of God into preaching. It springs most convincingly from Græco-Roman patterns. Paul came from such an environment and preached to people familiar with such ideas. I cannot go as far as Macchioro[62] in claiming that Paul had been initiated into a mystery religion, but I feel that his patterns of thought spring from such sources. He may have adapted these and synthesized them with diaspora Jewish ideas. Yet he is debtor, both to Greek and to barbarian.

[60] M. Dibelius, *Die Formgeschichte des Evangeliums,* p. 86.

[61] John Knox, *Christ the Lord,* p. 36, footnote 15; Theodore Robinson, *The Gospel of Matthew,* p. 140.

[62] V. Macchioro, *From Orpheus to Paul,* and *Zagreus.*

Where Ignorance Is Bliss, 'Tis Folly

THERE ARE probably few thoughtful readers of the New Testament who have not at times been perplexed as they read the very familiar phrases, "as it is written," "for the scripture saith," or "according to the scriptures." For not infrequently, despite the fact that they feel they have a reasonable familiarity with holy writ, they are utterly unable to imagine what passage the later writer had in mind. As a random example, Paul's words in I Cor. 15 may be cited. Here in this all-important word of Paul the phrase occurs twice in the opening sentence. Rom. 4:25 and Gal. 3:13 give hints how Paul might have explained the former: "that Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures"; but for the closely following words, "and that he hath been raised on the third day according to the scriptures," he finds no real clue. Any attempt to see in Paul's word a reference to the gospels is checked when he realizes that in all probability none of our gospels, even the earliest, was written for more than a decade after Paul's death, and that it was seventy-five years more before they came to be accorded the sacrosanct designation "scripture." Thus he is left to ponder as to what passage Paul's thought had turned. Was it that Paul saw in Jonah an allegory predictive of Christ as later Christians did? Was it that Paul was simply so convinced that all that had happened had been prophesied that he phrased himself as he did with no especial proof text in mind? If this reader chances to be familiar with late Jewish and early Christian methods of finding biblical support for firmly held views and convictions, he may cease pondering the point and pass on to the next verse with the feeling that here is but another case where it is hard for a man accustomed to a nonallegorical interpretation of scripture in the light of its context and of the meaning of the original author to see through the eyes of many of his ancient brethren. And thus, though intrigued, he is not unduly disturbed, as, having seen the problem, he passes by on the other side.

At other times he is more disturbed. This is when he reads what is quoted as scripture but which is far from his memory of what the passage cited really said, and when stopping his reading and turning back to the Old Testament, he finds the passage saying something very different, at times diametrically opposed. That there are a good many such passages every thoughtful reader of the Bible knows. A particularly clear example is found in Acts 15:14-18.

James, who seems to have succeeded Peter as the head of the Jerusalem community is talking with representatives from Antioch about the proper attitude to take to gentile converts. He refers with approbation to the words of "Symeon" *(i.e.,* Peter) who had "rehearsed how first God visited the gentiles, to take out of them a people for his name." Then follow the amazing words:

> And to this agree the words of the prophets; as it is written,
> After this I will return,
> And I will build again the tabernacle of David, which is fallen;
> And I will build again the ruins thereof,
> And I will set it up:
> That the residue of men may seek after the Lord,
> And all the gentiles, upon whom my name is called,
> Saith the Lord, who maketh these things known from of old.

The words are "amazing," not merely because from the letters of Paul we would scarcely expect James to have held such a view, but because the quoted "words of the prophets" are so strangely different from the passage in the Hebrew scripture.

The passage cited is, of course, Amos 9:11-12. Whether these verses are by the fiery prophet of Tekoa or, as many modern scholars maintain, are a later addition to the earlier writing, is of no especial concern to us at the moment. Whoever wrote them, they had been long a part of the prophecy. The difficulty lies not in the fact that they are a strange opposite to the burden of the book but because they are so completely contrary to what James is supposed to have said. They read:

> In that day will I raise up the tabernacle of David that is fallen,
> And close up the breaches thereof;
> And I will raise up its ruins,
> And I will build it as in the days of old;
> That they may possess the remnant of Edom, and all the nations,
> Over whom my name is called,
> Saith the Lord that doeth this.

What stands in the earlier writing as a promise that eventually God will restore prosperity to Israel, that Israel will possess the lands of Edom and of her other ancient enemies whom David had subjected but who had successively rebelled and broken away, has strangely become a prophecy of the gentile mission, the conversion of the heathen. What is the explanation of this amazing transformation?

As soon as one reads the Amos passage in the Septuagint, the translation of the Hebrew scriptures into Greek originally made for Greek-speaking Jews and eagerly accepted and adopted as "*the* Bible" by Greek-speaking Christians, the enigma is solved. Precisely this reversal of meaning is found in the Septuagint passage, and the explanation is obvious. The Hebrew words for *Edom* and *man* are so closely similar as to lead to a natural confusion; furthermore, by a very natural blunder the Hebrew for "may possess" could be easily read "may seek after." Thus the translator misconstrued the passage and taking "remnant of Edom" in the sense of "rest of men" made it the subject, not the object, of the verb with the utter inversion of meaning.

There can be little question that the quotation in Acts is from the Septuagint, not a fresh translation of the Hebrew text of Amos. There are minor variations but the texts are so substantially identical, especially in this obvious mistranslation, that there can be little ground for doubt as to the dependence of the one upon the other.

Thus the shocked surprise of the reader of the text of Acts yields.

His first feeling that there has been an amazing carelessness in quoting "according to the scriptures" gives way to relief. The New Testament writer has, after all, been manifestly faithful to the text before him. It is simply that his Bible was not the Hebrew text but the Septuagint, as was true of probably most of his fellow Christians.

But at this moment of pleasant regained confidence another serpent of suspicion raises its head. This quotation is in the mouth of James, the brother of Jesus. Is he, a Galilean peasant, likely to have known the Septuagint? Is he likely to have used it in preference to the Hebrew Bible? And certainly what we know of first-century Palestine and its practices entirely warrants the feeling that an unqualified No must be returned to both these queries. And with this comes back the suspicion that James of Jerusalem, in the light of Paul's experience with him, is scarcely likely to have held these views, congenial though they had come to be in the wider Græco-Roman world.

What, then, is the likely solution of this somewhat complicated problem? Of course, it is always possible to close one's eyes and refuse to see the difficulties. And in every age there have been many who counseled this comforting procedure. For many this sort of ostrichlike attitude may be "comforting" but it is distinctly not satisfying; and it can hardly lead to a radiant or positive confidence. Rather, they agree with Bishop Butler's word: "Since things are what they are and results will be what they will be, why seek to be deceived?" And they have enough confidence in writings which have proved an arsenal of strength for so many centuries to feel that they require no such absurd and dishonoring defense.

If this thoughtful reader, to whom occasional reference has been made, chances to be a classical student, he may in this quandary recall the terse but revealing word of that master historian, Thucydides:

> As to the speeches that were made by different men, either when they were about to begin the war or when they were already engaged therein, it has been difficult to recall with strict accuracy the words actually spoken, both for me as regards that which I myself heard, and for those who from various other sources have brought me reports. Therefore the speeches are given in the language in which, as it seemed to me, the several speakers would express, on the subjects under consideration, the sentiments most befitting the occasion, though at the same time I have adhered as closely as possible to the general sense of what was actually said.

As he ponders these honest words of the old Greek, it may well be that he will find the confused details of his own problem falling into shape. It will not seem particularly surprising if the author of Acts, writing at the end of the century, familiar with the rapidly spreading gentile mission, seemingly so wondrously blessed by God, and knowing this prophecy of Amos which appeared to foretell precisely what he was himself seeing happening day by day, was confident that what was so clear to him must have been clear also to those before him who in the wisdom of God had been privileged to direct the church's destiny in its critical days of development.

From Off the Campus and On

THERE IS one subject which is always sure to evoke lively discussion among ministers, be it discussed in the cloistered calm and seclusion in which a theological faculty is popularly believed to dwell or among parish ministers who have been known in unguarded moments to style their habitat in contradistinction the no man's land or firing line—and that subject is worship. And from apparently reliable signs a good many laymen are increasingly confident that in most churches—at least in their own—there is still comfortable room for improvement. No one is more competent to discuss this thorny subject than Dr. Foote. Now a resident of Cambridge, Massachusetts, he has been minister of Unitarian churches in New Orleans, Ann Arbor, and Belmont, Massachusetts. For ten years he gave instruction in the Harvard Divinity School in hymnody, liturgics, parish administration, and homiletics. He has edited two hymnbooks and is the author of many books and articles, among which are *The Minister and His Parish, Three Centuries of American Hymnody,* and *Thomas Jefferson: Champion of Religious Freedom.* It is a distinct pleasure to publish this essay by Dr. Foote and to promise our readers a second, "The Minister as Artist," in the near future.

Professor Robinson holds degrees from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, St. Lawrence University, and Stanford University. Following a parish ministry of sixteen years he joined the faculty of San Jose College in 1928 as assistant professor of mathematics. The next year he transferred to the department of philosophy, in which since 1933 he has been an associate professor. He has written many articles, of which the most recent is "Ethics and Civilization" in the *Journal of Liberal Religion.* He is a member of the American Philosophical Association and of the Universalist Ministerial Association.

Professor Purdy has been professor of New Testament on the Hosmer Foundation at the Hartford Theological Seminary since 1933. Previous to this appointment he had been professor of biblical literature for seven years at Earlham College and for ten years professor of practical theology at Hartford. He is a graduate of Penn College and of Hartford, holding also a Ph.D. from the latter institution. All students of the New Testament know the volume *Jew and Greek: Tutors unto Christ,* which he published in 1936 in collaboration with G. H. C. MacGregor. Other volumes from his pen are *The Way of Christ, Pathways to God, Jesus' Way with People, Jesus as His Followers Knew Him,* and *The Gospel and Letters of John.* In 1920 he served in central Europe with the Hoover Child Commission and ten years later in the Balkans under the American Friends Service Commission.

Mr. Greeley has been minister of the Arlington Street Church, Boston, since 1935, coming to that historic pulpit from the Unitarian Church in Concord, New Hampshire. He is a graduate of Harvard College and also the Harvard Divinity School, is a past president of the Boston Area Council of Churches, secretary of the American Unitarian Association, and a director of the Massachusetts Council of Churches and of numerous other religious and civic societies and boards.

Professor Branton is a graduate of Mississippi College and of the Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary. Following study in Berlin he was for three years a fellow in New Testament at the Divinity School of the University of Chicago, receiving his doctorate in philosophy in 1934. After seven years of teaching at the University of Oklahoma, Linfield College, and the University of Oregon he came to Colgate-Rochester in 1940 to succeed Professor Parsons as head of the department of New Testament.

The steady stream of letters of appreciation of our book reviews and notices continues. Frankly, we are proud of this department and believe that it meets a distinct need. For this summer issue we are extending somewhat its usual generous compass to include reviews of forty books by thirty-two reviewers. Once again the editor wishes to extend his hearty thanks to these men who in the midst of exacting duties continue to find time for this invaluable service. He wishes that space permitted more than this bare introduction, but he assures them that the inadequate listing is very far from being a perfunctory gesture. Dr. Abrams is a professor of sociology in the University of Pennsylvania. Dr. Aubrey is president of Crozer Theological Seminary and professor of Christian social philosophy. Dr. Auer is professor of history and theology at Harvard. Professor Beare has the chair of New Testament studies in Trinity College, Toronto. Dr. Bixler is president of Colby College. Professor Bond is head of the department of religion at Bucknell. Professor Brightman is a member of the department of philosophy at Boston University. Dr. Cranston is professor of religion at Dartmouth. Dr. Enslin is professor of New Testament at Crozer. Dr. Garrison is literary editor of the *Christian Century*. Professor Gilmour has the chair of New Testament at Queen's Theological College, Kingston, Ontario. Dr. Hartt is assistant professor of theology at the Yale Divinity School. Dr. Hitti is a professor of Semitic literature at Princeton University and an eminent Arabist. Professor Hudson has recently rejoined the Colgate-Rochester faculty as professor of American church history and administrative associate. Mr. Hunter is executive secretary of the department of Christian education in the diocese of Massachusetts. Dr. Irwin is professor of Old Testament language and literature at the University of Chicago. Mr. Ivey is minister of the Second Baptist Church, Richmond, Va. Mr. Keighton is professor of preaching and worship at Crozer. Dr. Matthews is professor *emeritus* of Old Testament at Crozer. Dr. Moehlman is professor *emeritus* of church history at Colgate-Rochester. Mr. Morey is supervising principal of the Swarthmore (Pa.) public schools. Dr. Ohl is assistant professor of Latin and romance languages at Temple University. Professor Outler is a member of the department of theology at Yale. Dr. Pauck is professor of theology at the Chicago Theological Seminary. Dr. Prentice is professor *emeritus* of Greek at Princeton. Professor Pritchard has the chair of Old Testament at Crozer. Professor Ramsey is a member of the department of philosophy at Princeton. Dr. Scammell is professor of English at Boston University. Dr. Schloerb is minister of the Hyde Park Baptist Church, Chicago. Dr. White is a psychologist in the Veterans Administration at the Guidance Centre of Pennsylvania State College at Chester. Professor Wolfe has the chair of Old Testament at Western Reserve. Dr. Wright is professor of philosophy at Dartmouth.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man, by H. and H. A. Frankfort, John A. Wilson, Thorkild Jacobsen, William A. Irwin, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, ©1946, pp. vii, 401, $4.

The appearance of this book is a significant milestone in the progress of ancient Near Eastern studies. It is the first serious attempt on the part of specialists in the several fields of ancient culture to extract from the materials of their respective areas of interest the evidence for speculative thought. The excellent result of this coöperative attempt to grapple with a large problem is an indication of what we may now expect from collaboration of scholars in the various disciplines of the ancient Near East. A general inquiry, such as this essay is, is fully warranted by the mass of texts now sufficiently understood by an increasingly large group of scholars. Both the general reader and the more critical scholar can but be grateful for this new departure in a study of old material.

The subtitle, "An Essay on Speculative Thought in the Ancient Near East," is a more accurate label for the contents of this symposium. It contains five essays. First, there is an introduction by Professor and Mrs. Frankfort concerned with the broader aspects of interpreting mythopœic thought as it appears in the texts; the second essay of ninety pages by Professor John A. Wilson deals with thought in ancient Egypt; the third, by Dr. Thorkild Jacobsen, now director of the Oriental Institute, is concerned with patterns of thought in Mesopotamia; the fourth section is an attempt by Professor William A. Irwin to summarize within the compass of 137 pages the phenomenon of speculative thought as it appears in the literature of the Hebrews; the last section, by the Frankforts, has to do with the emancipation of thought from myth as it broke from earlier molds in the later literature of the Hebrews and in Greek philosophy. To describe this work as a symposium is not to imply that it lacks unity; it is amazingly well integrated and throughout bears evidence of adherence to a closely knit plan. The task to which these scholars have addressed themselves could not have been done by one man; speculative thought through several millennia and in such different places as Mesopotamia, Egypt, Greece, and Syria is too large a subject for one scholar to do well. But together these scholars, whose reputations are well established in their respective fields, have written an intensely stimulating book—one which the educated layman with a modicum of curiosity may not only understand but enjoy.

While this work has been made possible by archæology one will look in vain for mention of excavations, pottery, strata, debris, and other terms which usually occupy a conspicuous place in books on archæology. This absence should not mislead the reader to oversimplify the problems of interpretation. The texts which underly the discussions—with the exception of the Old Testament and Greek sources—had first to be excavated, deciphered, and then translated. There has gone into the making of this book over a century of exploration, of excavation, of intense scientific study. Frequently portions of the literature are quoted in translations, but more often the texts are summarized and interpreted as to their larger implications. There remains yet the need for accurate translations of many of the texts discussed which are available to the interested layman.

In Chapter I the Frankforts attack the problem of extricating thought from the

seemingly fantastic form of myth, in which the pre-Greek cast his speculation. Ancient man sought to interpret his experience and to give it order, coherence, meaning. These he expressed by means of myth, a cloak for mythopœic thought. To get at the logic of the ancient Near Eastern mind one has to see myth not as fancy or as a device for amusement, but as a carefully chosen means of expressing man's answers to certain fundamental questions. One essential difference between ancient and modern man lies in the way in which man's basic experience is viewed. For the early thinker the experience with which he was confronted was conceived as "Thou," a being to be experienced emotionally in a dynamic reciprocal relationship. For modern thought the "Thou" has become "It." This basic difference in interpreting experience is the key to understanding the seemingly irrational forms in which early thought is cast. The Frankforts summarize their thesis thus: "Hence when early man is faced by an intellectual problem within the many-sided complexities of life, emotional and volitional factors are never debarred; and the conclusions reached are not critical judgments but complex images" (p. 26).

Professor Wilson has given in Chapter II a concise and clear statement of Egyptian cosmology and cosmogony and has concluded that the Egyptian was true to his observation of his own particular environment in producing his cosmic scheme. While the Egyptian stories or origin are constructed generally along lines which suggested themselves, there is some evidence for positive speculative thought. It is noted that "the most interesting advance lies in a very early attempt to relate creation to the processes of thought and speech rather than to mere physical activity" (p. 60-61). Subsequent chapters deal with the function of the state in Egypt and with values of life during the various periods of Egyptian history. Strangely enough, Egypt did not contribute any lasting element to the continuing stream of world thought and philosophy.

In Mesopotamia, Dr. Jacobsen holds, the cosmos was thought of as a state, organized according to the pattern prevailing in the fourth millennium. This belief in a universe organized as a state was the means which served well to unify the social order through many centuries of history. The pattern of society which evolved in ancient Mesopotamia has in no small measure come down as an important tributary to the stream of the world's life.

Professor Irwin's monograph on Israel's intellectual contribution—by far the longest essay in the volume—deals with such a variety of subjects that it defies any concise summary. Suffice it to say that it is well written and stimulating in its attempt to define in general terms the contributions of the Hebrew genius to the world's thought. Because of the place which Hebrew literature has come to occupy in two great religions, it is likely that Professor Irwin's attempt to interpret will occasion considerably more debate than that of the other contributors to the volume.

The student of the Bible will find much to interest him in this book. For example, in the section on Egypt there are numerous references to subjects familiar to those who read the Old Testament: Egyptian accounts of creation are contrasted with Babylonian and Hebrew accounts (p. 50); some of the four pairs of gods of precreation existence have their parallels in Genesis 1 (p. 52); according to one Egyptian text man was made in the image of god (p. 55); the Memphite theology is a possible background for the Logos doctrine in the New Testament (p. 56); Ptah rested after he had made everything (p. 59). These references picked from ten pages of discussion of Egyptian thought could be multiplied many times over to illustrate the constant reference to ideas which are the stock in trade not only of the minister but of the student of Western culture.

Far more important are the comparisons and contrasts of a more general character between the thought about God, man, the world, in the different areas. The claim for Israel's distinctive genius once rested solely upon the dogma of divine inspiration of the literature. The first success in the decipherment of Assyrian and Babylonian documents did much to shatter that ancient claim for uniqueness. Now, after almost a century of research in the fields of Near Eastern thought and life, it is interesting to see reappear the claim for Israel's uniqueness among the thinkers of the ancient world. But now the claim is put forth in the light of the thought in Egypt and Mesopotamia. Thus by the very same science, the results of which at first proved so disturbing, the assertion of Israel's genius is acclaimed. In the final chapter the Frankforts conclude: "It is possible to detect the reflection of Egyptian and Mesopotamian beliefs in many episodes of the Old Testament; but the overwhelming impression left by that document is one, not of derivation, but of originality" (p. 367).

One general impression garnered from a careful reading of this book is that it will serve to allay the ghost of the "primitive mind" so frequently conjured up by the harassed expositor of some obscure passage of the Bible. This unhappy phrase—so arrogant in its invidious comparison between ancient and modern thought—has too long served as a cloak for ignorance of the intellectual powers of the ancient. It betrays the failure to see what really lies back of a myth, a ritual, a legend, and to translate this into terms which are more congenial to the modern mind. The sympathetic and discerning appraisal of the intellect of the ancient Near Easterner found in these essays should serve to create a new respect for those who happened to live in a time of mythopœic thought and a new humility for those of us who have done comparatively little with our greatly enlarged possibilities.

This bold venture at a new perspective of the ancient Near East will, without doubt, long remain a stimulating and valuable contribution to our attempt to understand and to use the past.

JAMES B. PRITCHARD

The Source of Human Good, by Henry N. Wieman, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, ©1946, pp. vii, 312, $3.50.

"The bomb that fell on Hiroshimo cut history in two like a knife. Before and after are two different worlds. That cut is more abrupt, decisive, and revolutionary than the cut made by the star over Bethlehem" (p. 37). With this flashing, though somewhat ambiguous, metaphor, Professor Wieman proposes his judgment that the context of human existence has changed and, therefore, error and truth-mixed-with-error (as in traditional philosophy and theology) will no longer suffice. We must have and live by *truth* or we perish, shortly and miserably. The truth that will save us is his "newer naturalism," the gospel of "the creative event." "This view claims to be able to take account of all the intricacies and subtleties—all the height, breadth, and depth of human existence—omitting, explaining away, flattening out, or truncating nothing" (p. 6). The remainder of the book is devoted to the explication and establishment of this grandiose claim.

To do so, he must lay a metaphysical base. He begins by rejecting all the classical metaphysics from Plato to Kant; "the transcendental must be ignored, except as an imaginative construction of the human mind. . . . The active God derived from the Jewish tradition and the Forms derived from the Greek tradition are both brought down into the world of time, space, and matter and are there identified as events displaying a definite structure with possibilities" (p. 8). This would seem to

suggest some sort of radical empiricism or a process-metaphysic, but Wieman is careful to reject not only Dewey's doctrine that the structures of experience are created in or by the process of inquiry but also Bergson's view that creativity as such has no formal character (p. 194). Nor will Whitehead serve; his notion of a primordial order and a domain of eternal objects are, for Wieman, remnants of the transcendental metaphysics which he has already eschewed (pp. 192-194). Having thus discounted both alternatives of radical empiricism and formalism, Wieman proffers in their stead his own metaphysics of the creative event (chap. 3). This is a special kind of event which is able to reorganize the mind which apprehends it and to transform its appreciable world (p. 57). The creative event may be identified with creative good (p. 58). It may also be identified with God (p. 305). It is the source of human good.

The result of all this is a metaphysical jumble. "The metaphysics we are defending interprets freedom as a kind of determinism. Also this metaphysic is a materialism including what is spiritual. It is a spiritual metaphysics which is none the less material through and through" (p. 301). This way of arguing is inconsistent because the presupposition as to what is ultimate changes twice in the course of the argument. First, it is said to be "the passage of existence" (p. 72); then it is said to be "creativity" (p. 298, but note that on p. 306 creativity is called a "concept" and a "possibility"); finally, we are told that "quality is the ultimate substance of the world" (p. 302). In his desire to escape logical requirements of both empiricism and formalism, Wieman falls into unintelligibility. One cannot speak (as Wieman does on p. 195 *en passant*) of a determinate order in a process without exhuming at least some of the difficulties concerning a transcendental growth which Wieman has already neatly buried on pp. 6-7. The plain fact is that he does not live up to his own philosophical billing. His claim to explain everything without omission or truncation turns out to be sheer fustian.

The gospel of this newer naturalism is the glad truth that man's good lies in his service of the creative good. "Serving the creative event that renews itself is the work of man—the supreme vocation of human history" (p. 74). Here we see Wieman's effort to move from metaphysics to religion. Man's religious relations to this source of his good is, by active service, to realize its beneficent but impersonal stimulation of growth in meaning and value. Creative good is suprahuman, but it is neither personal nor does it admit of any sort of "I-thou" relatedness. Human emotions are for the savoring of the enrichment and expansion of meaning. But love for or from the source of human good—this is neither possible nor relevant. God is a complex vector in the environment, without personality or grace.

As far as its religious import is concerned, there is nothing new about this kind of naturalism, except its peculiar vocabulary. Man's choice is either to adjust to the impersonal pulsation of a dynamic but blind process or be destroyed as a natural consequence of maladjustment. Here is Thomas Carlyle's retort to Margaret Fuller about accepting the universe made in all theological seriousness and without the mitigation of Carlyle's dyspepsia and notorious bad manners. And Wieman's futile struggle to identify this naturalistic perspective with Christian theism simply fails to persuade or impress. What is more, I should think that it would be deplored and rejected as decisively by the radical empiricist as by those who take or stand on the core of affirmative Christian faith.

The failure of the sections on philosophy and theology is all the more unfortunate because it obscures the real value of the book which begins to appear whenever Wieman turns to matters of practical ethical and æsthetic concern. For example,

the discussion of "good and evil" (chap. 4) and "the kinds of evil" (chap. 5) is wonderfully penetrating and fruitful of practical insight. In his analysis of the various types of inertia as productive of evil, or the unintended evils of what he calls "the protective hierarchies," or the intricacies of sin and demonry, Wieman shows himself a profound and realistic psychologist. Likewise, the chapter on "beauty" (chap. 6) is most intensely interesting and provocative; I should think it would have important significance for contemporary theorizing about the relation of art and culture. As far as I could make it out, the section on social justice (pp. 247 ff.) bespeaks a real sensitivity to and great understanding of the contemporary ethical dilemma of our industrial society. In all of these discussions, the basic motifs are clearly borrowed from the Judæo-Christian ethical tradition and their force is not greatly inhibited by Wieman's peculiar idiom and characteristic ambiguity.

The case is rather different with the section on sexual love (pp. 235 ff.). The language here is altogether too ambiguous; indeed, it is ambiguity carried right to the edge of *double entendre*. Sexual love is extolled in a fashion to remind one of the aging D. H. Lawrence, and yet nowhere are monogamy and conjugal fidelity specifically enjoined as prerequisites of the highest expression and achievement of what Wieman calls "the ways of abundant love" (p. 239). It may be that Wieman is *not* proposing or sanctioning sexual promiscuity, as Charles Clayton Morrison has supposed (compare *Christian Century,* Nov. 13, 1946). But if he is not, Wieman has his own loose language to thank for having drawn such a charge down on him.

Here, then, is a book of highly mixed character and, on balance, a failure. In recording such a verdict, it is important to add that the failure has come about in spite of Professor Wieman's very great gifts and eager spirit. It illustrates, as well as anything could, the fact that there are limits beyond which the coaptation of Christian faith and philosophical world views cannot go. A thoroughgoing environmentalism is one of them.

ALBERT C. OUTLER

The Philosophy of War and Peace, by Albert C. Knudson, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1947, pp. 221, $2.

> From time to time there are convoked in Europe certain general assemblies called Congresses, to which deputies from every State repair solemnly to return in the same way . . . where all the affairs of Europe are overhauled in detail; where men lay their heads together to deliberate whether the table they sit at shall be square or round . . . whether one plenipotentiary shall sit with his face or his back to the window, whether another shall come two inches further, or less far, into the room on a visit of ceremony: in fine, on a thousand questions of equal importance which have been discussed without any settlement for the last three centuries and are assuredly very fit to engross the statesmen of our own.
>
> It is possible that the members of one of these assemblies may, once in a way, be blessed with common sense. It is even not impossible that they may have a sincere desire for the general good.

With some slight change in the agenda, these words might have been penned this morning. They were in fact the words of Rousseau in his revision of Saint-Pierre's *A Lasting Peace through the Federation of Europe,* published in 1761. Mankind is still perilously close to Hobbes' universal war of all against all, "for as the nature of foul weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain, but in an inclination thereto of many days together; so the nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. *All other time is peace.*" Because we simply cannot afford another peace conference, we must avoid war at all cost; and in such a world, no more opportune time than *always* could have been chosen by Dean Knudson for the publication of this volume.

Of the four chapters into which the book is divided—"The Apologetic for War," "Modern Causes of War," "Growth of the Argument for World Peace," and "The Road to World Peace"—only the first and third are in any sense "philosophical," and they are by all odds the best. In general, in the second and fourth chapters too many subjects are undertaken too briefly; and one gains the impression, more from content and viewpoint, it is true, somewhat less from the author's citations, that the main lines of his position were formulated during or shortly after the first world war with only superficial reference to present realities.

In the "Apologetic for War" arguments are classified as based on the combative nature of man, the dynamic nature of the state, or the beneficent function of military struggle. And there is some overlapping. The views of Hegel, for example, combine the second and third of these reasons for the inevitability or the benefits of war.

Among "nature of man" theories of war, Dean Knudson refers to the "pessimistic theological anthropology" of neoörthodoxy. And against such views he contends that "human nature is fundamentally a capacity for action, not a fixed mode of conduct," that a doctrine of original sin grounds "the moral causes of war more deeply in human nature and history than a consistent freedomism permits." This may simply be too bad for a "consistent freedomism." The more fundamental answer, however, is that so-called "pessimistic theological anthropology" does not affirm war but *evil* in some form to be inevitable in human history. War is but one of the evils sin brings forth. Men have, moreover, employed war and rebellion as means for overturning established orders of injustice and tyranny, for liquidating gross evil and, admittedly, simply setting it on the move again. Certainly war or any other specific evil or institution is evitable, but the elimination of all forms of social evil is a different matter, one grounded, in truth, more deeply in human nature and history than *some* proponents of human freedom imagine. Knudson terms a "confident belief" in the possibility of a *"permanent* triumph" over forces that make for strife "the one essential philosophical presupposition of the struggle for world peace." This belief ought not to deteriorate into the pious hope that all the other hydra heads of evil, for the curbing of which *some* men have *sometimes* taken up arms, can be dealt with more easily. The notion of sin as original in human nature guards against mistaking this sentiment for sober confidence.

The author's treatment of the "growth of the argument for world peace" is of special interest. Historical study of the peace movement is a field to which, the author points out, "educated people generally, despite their interest in the cause of peace, seem to have devoted comparatively little attention." The history of ideas about war falls naturally into three stages: the moralizing and restraint of combat by the "just war" theory, the growth of international law under the mediæval church and Hugo Grotius, and plans proposed for "perpetual" peace.

Dean Knudson gives a "brief account of twelve representative plans for world peace that appeared during the past six centuries." Most notable of these are Dante's *De Monarchia,* Erasmus' *The Complaint of Peace,* the *Grand Design of Henry IV* written most probably by Sully, William Penn's *An Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe,* and the treatises on *Lasting* or *Perpetual Peace* by Saint-Pierre, Rousseau, and Kant.

In the author's opinion "no treatise has appeared since the time of Kant that has displaced his as a basic philosophy of peace. His *Perpetual Peace* is still the classic philosophical treatise on that subject." In connection with Kant this volume fully lives up to its title and gives a *philosophy* of war and peace. Perhaps the other

"plans" are themselves too largely descriptive; but how can Rousseau's social theory be adequately comprehended merely by outlining his formal recommendations for executing peace?

In the dialectic of peacemaking, two things are of equal difficulty: to begin with the actual world and yet arrive at the ideal or to begin with the ideal and make it actual. Which is more vain, the optimism of Saint Pierre or of Kant? Saint Pierre, who was a thoroughgoing utilitarian and always appealed to self-interest, yet believed "it is almost impossible but that . . . at least two (monarchs) will sign (the project for peace); that it is almost impossible but in time those two will persuade a third . . . that thus it is almost impossible but this Society . . . at last in less than half an age arrive at . . . its entire settlement," or Kant, who first conceived the peace ideal as a duty which *ought* to be achieved and *therefore can* be achieved, and who declared, "Seek ye first the Kingdom of pure practical reason and its righteousness, and then will your object, the benefit of Perpetual Peace, be added unto you"?

Knudson's optimism is, like that of Kant, grounded in idealism. His fourth and final chapter examines present-day alternatives on "the road to world peace"—a universal state, the balance of power, mediation and arbitration, disarmament, the outlawry of war, absolute pacifism, a world federation of states, and the spirit of international coöperation—and in the latter, the author places greatest confidence. ". . . the principal guarantee of peace is peace." ". . . peace is the quest for international coöperation and hence its own chief guarantee." "The sincere desire for coöperation will produce coöperation."

The unsubstantial character of such hope is revealed in the near redundance of these statements. The reader will suspect that Knudson realizes this, since he holds open for himself two ways of escape, mystical retirement and a hope born of the urgency of despair. "True peace," he says, "is a thing of the spirit. It means the cessation of spiritual warfare." And "natural law in the long run will force nations into the paths of peace. This is the way of Providence. Wars in the course of time will become so destructive that in self-defense humanity will put an end to them." This last is a nonidealistic version of Kant's belief in a principle of moral progress *inherent* in human nature: "Human *Nature* as such will do *in* and with us to compel us to move in a track into which we would not readily have betaken ourselves." In this atomic age evidence is fast accumulating that an idealism tempered by an awareness of man's (which means especially our own and our own nation's) distemper will lead us toward peace sooner than any measure of fear will drive us to it.

PAUL RAMSEY

The Eternal Gospel, by Gerald Heard, New York, Harper, ©1946, pp. xii, 234, $2.

Mr. Heard's latest book contains his lectures on the Ayer Foundation. His theme is: Our civilization is capsizing, and while this is a very serious situation, it is not a hopeless one. Our culture needs to be put right concerning its moral-spiritual ends; it needs to discover in its own terms what the "eternal gospel" is. This is the function of religion, and it is the function of enlightened men to make religion contemporary (p. xi). Thus the "problem of religion today is . . . a question of research. Can we rebalance our knowledge, can we find spiritual powers equal to our unbalanced physical powers?" (p. 195).

The first major problem to which Mr. Heard turns is the description of the "eternal gospel." It is a truth known to all men, in varying degree of explicitness

(p. 5). "It is . . . that essential sense of obligation and intuitional moral knowledge which has emerged and become defined as the common denominator and working factor in all the great religions" (p. 6). This pure distillate of religious wisdom includes cosmology, ethics, and psychology. Its cosmology is "high animism," its ethic is "dynamic asceticism," and its psychology, "evolving consciousness." This religion is as old as man himself—"it is the unchanging Law of man's nature" (p. 19)—and can be seen developing its various stages in human history. Always at hand have lurked the perils of static ecclesiastical structures, of arbitrary fissions of consciousness, of corrupt priesthoods, etc., but always, too, the law has grown in the human spirit, greater than static form or perverse religious manipulator.

It seems, then, that the great event in the expansion of the human spirit, is the discovery of law, "of Natural Law in its two hemispheres of moral and physical Law" (p. 46; *cf.* p. 53). This discovery puts man beyond the error of anthropomorphic religion. For law is self-sanctioning (*cf.* p. 49), and once man understands this, the immoral ghost of a lawgiver and law-sustainer is forever laid (p. 56). As he has grown, man discovers that his earlier religio-ethical formulations of law, *i.e.*, in terms of justice, are inadequate for the great questions of life and death until he comes upon the law of love. Here the cycle of law is completed. And this completion carries man beyond the whole idea of law into primal freedom and unity (p. 120).

Where does Christianity fit into this picture? To answer this, Mr. Heard assures us that we must realize that Christianity has passed through significantly different phases in its relation to culture, in each of which it has faced different problems and, accordingly, returned different answers. In the middle ages, Christianity was very nearly a wholly successful experiment; but in the modern world, it has failed (*cf.* p. 194). Therefore, if we are to balance physical power with psychical power, we must look elsewhere. We must, in fact, employ our spiritual resources and energy in the creation of the religion of the future.

What will this be? Christianity can contribute to it something of the doctrine of redemption—of law-ful good will "whereby that which has, comes down to the level of that which has not" (p. 201). But the "inconsistency of Private Salvation" needs to be removed, in order to make Christianity's great teaching universally appealing (p. 202). Secondly, the religion of the future teaches the eternity of God and the soul. Thirdly, this religion is sacramentalist, in the sense of awareness of the "Eternal Life running through all" (p. 205). Fourthly, this religion calls the human spirit to a radical conversion, to a true transmutation of being (p. 214). For unless man does transmute himself, he is lost. Here Mr. Heard comes forward with certain practical suggestions concerning the life of prayer and corporate religious life.

In an appendix the author develops some speculative notions concerning original sin, predestination, redemption, and eternal death. These speculations involve a form of metaphysical idealism, the preëxistence of the soul, and revision of Christian philosophical notions of the relation of spirit and body.

In this interesting book Mr. Heard states his case with fluency and occasional eloquence. Yet I do not find it persuasive, and here and there it does not seem to me to be even cogent. My difficulties gather around the following heads:

1. By what process and with what criteria has the author arrived at the highest common factors in the great religions? Related to this question is a second one: Does the "eternal gospel" thus derived have any real synoptic and synthetic fertility at all, or is it primarily an analytic convenience and fiction? What shall we say to those who see in it an arbitrary—if urbane—eclecticism? 2. What has led Mr.

Heard to suppose that he has disposed of the "higher anthropomorphism"? 3. Where is the evidence of the sweeping *credo* concerning law? 4. The ease with which he appropriates physical theory for psychological and philosophical purposes is a bit disquieting.

1. Mr. Heard identifies the "common denominator and working factor" of all the important religions, as the "eternal gospel," an internally organized and consistent body of truths and maxims of perennial fertility. I can only say that this seems to be a carpentering job, and that it has analytic value only. The cosmology of this amalgam appears to derive from Eastern philosophy; its ethic is a composite of Christianity and Buddhism; and I suppose its psychology is a composite, too, this time of scientific theory and Eastern philosophy. The attempt to read this gospel back into the dim prehistory of the race, and to carry it forward into the known development of human society, just simply seems to me not to wash. And in general, this synthesis of religious truth and wisdom has a markedly factitious air about it. It is much more an accommodation of certain elements of Christianity to a predominantly Eastern religious perspective, than a pure precipitate of the eternal core of all religion.

2. This can be clearly seen in the rejection of what Mr. Heard calls the higher anthropomorphism, which he holds to be "morally reprehensible and observationally false" (p. 7). These are strong charges, couched in rolling phrases; but I cannot see a single point at which he has fired this charge against anything but a low anthropomorphism. The persuasiveness of this attack accordingly stands in direct proportion to its being directed against an inferior product of the theistic religious mentality. Moreover, he seems not to have pondered the obvious involvement of "law" in anthropomorphic molds of thought. And at the end, he, too, is quite willing to speak of memory in the Atman. For that matter, "law" is invested, on his reading, with a kind of graciousness, a try-again-dear-brother flavor, which looks very much like the kind of religious thought he wants to avoid.

3. As to law itself: we have from Mr. Heard little but affirmations of its physical-moral unity, and the dubious introduction of Heisenberg's Principle to prove the congeniality to human freedom of the law-ful whole (*cf.* p. 48). If the metaphysical idealism which Mr. Heard tentatively advances in the appendix is negotiable, then we can conceive of a unity of law; but apart from that, just what does the unity of law mean? Now if he wants to affirm metaphysical idealism as the only adequate cosmology, he may certainly do so; but this scarcely represents a fair descriptive account of the highest common factor in the world's religions. Traditional Christianity is not idealism, for one. The author may suppose that it ought to be; but we can scarcely justify reading his preferences into the perennial philosophy or eternal gospel, as one of its integral factors.

I have also some uncertainty concerning Mr. Heard's affirmation of the self-sanctioning character of law. If law *is* self-sanctioning, then truly we must get rid of supernal lawgivers and guarantors; but to know that this is actually the case with law, we certainly need to know something more than that such a concept would give the *coup de grâce* to higher anthropomorphism. Here again Mr. Heard seems to be arrogating more to law than is empirically known; and something dangerously similar to traditional theistic affirmations concerning God. Possibly he means to say: law is law, and we must not try to get behind it. Now law is law indeed—even though physical law as statistical probability seems difficult to unify with moral law—but no matter how solemnly and grandiloquently we utter this tautology, we shall scarcely deter for a moment those who ask whether law, too, requires or is

patient of explanation. Mr. Heard assures us that it is, does not, and is not; and he is welcome to affirm such a thing; and we feel equally justified in suggesting that this affirmation requires some support, and that the charge of moral disreputability leveled against theism had better be more carefully rehearsed.

4. At its best, Mr. Heard's employment of theories current in the natural sciences and in psychology is very interesting. At other times, it is overly facile and loose and only vaguely illuminating. I have cited above his capturing Heisenberg's Principle as evidence of real, ontological, and moral free play in the universe. This appears very clearly to be an illicit transferal; and no more proves spiritual freedom than the law of gravity would prove that the interior of the earth is the natural homeland of the soul.

All in all, Mr. Heard's *credo* is a provocative offering. It represents a viewpoint of increasing attractiveness to many, because it is a compend of brilliant insights, real eloquence, urbanity, chastened, and (presumably) nonsentimental optimism, philosophic-mythologic speculation, and the latest word from the sciences. I do not know why Mr. Heard is not satisfied to let it go at that, instead of claiming that this is also the quintessential core of religious aspiration and attainment of the human spirit.

JULIAN N. HARTT

The Challenge of Our Culture, edited by Clarence Tucker Craig, New York, Harper, ©1946, pp. xi, 205, $1.50.

The high promise of this volume, as the first in the *Interseminary Series,* has been amply fulfilled in the subsequent volumes of the series. Perhaps most readers of this QUARTERLY have by this time familiarized themselves with these small but high-powered books. If any have not, they'd better. The books deal with the issues, both fundamental and immediate, which must be thought through and satisfactorily settled if individual lives are to be saved from futility and the social order from collapse or explosion. The contributing authors, six or eight to each book, ask the right questions. They do not have all the answers, and most thoughtful readers will doubtless think that some of the answers they do have are wrong, though they will not agree as to which these are. This makes the volumes perfect material for discussion groups, especially because they contain a good combination of data and opinions.

The purpose of this initial volume is to diagnose the diseases of our culture. It is therefore not a particularly cheerful symposium. Its title might not inappropriately have been, "What's wrong with everything?" This concentration on the evils and perils of the present situation does not indicate a pessimistic outlook, for the editor and contributors did their work in full awareness that their special assignment was to show into what a mess the world gets itself when it does not even seriously try to create a social order consistent with Christian principles. It was left to the others books in the series to indicate the resources of Christianity for meeting this situation. After an introductory chapter (Craig) defining the point of view from which the current scene is to be described, there follow analyses of the abuses of mechanization (Haroutunian), the corrupting and menacing rivalries for power (Elmer Arndt), race and color as grounds of conflict (Buell Gallagher), the inner personal tensions which result from such a social environment and in turn react detrimentally upon it (Walter Horton). The "spirit of our culture" as a whole is analyzed and described (Amos Wilder), and "secularism in the church" (James H. Nichols) is seen as so infecting what should be the curative agency for society's

ills that the impact of Christianity on the world is in danger of becoming less significant than the impact of the world on Christianity. The reader who goes this far must not drop the discussion at this depressing point but must go into the other volumes of the series to see what light is shining in all this darkness.

These separate but carefully integrated chapters cannot be reviewed in detail within the available time and space, but a few items may be indicated as among the things they say or provoke this reviewer to think. Craig's starting point is the proposition, basic to Christianity or any other serious religion, that the universe cannot be fully described in mechanistic terms. There is a material world of stuff and things; it is real but not ultimate; it is a creation of God; its sequences of cause and effect are dependable, like the operations of a well-oiled machine; but they do not constitute the whole of reality. There is also a moral order which is the realm of spirit and freedom. Back of both there is the Ultimate, which is "He" rather than "It." "The Ultimate is not neutral material out of which man carves his own destiny. He is a friendly power." This is not equivalent to a reaffirmation of what is sometimes called the "Victorian evolutionary optimism" (and is misrepresented by most of the writers who think they have gone far beyond it), but centres in the acknowledgment of a "redemptive God" who manifested himself in the Incarnation. For God to be redemptive means much more than for the universe to be friendly.

The assertion that the machinelike aspect of the cosmos is only one aspect of a larger total is so transparently sensible that one wonders why anyone should ever doubt it. After all, what is a machine? It is a complicated tool that somebody uses for the accomplishment of some result that means nothing to the machine itself or to any part of it but does mean something to somebody outside of it. A machine, by definition, is always a part of a situation larger than itself. A "machine" that makes itself, powers itself, repairs itself, guides itself to its own ends, and serves no purpose outside of itself, is not a machine at all. Every machine has a place where power or fuel goes into it from outside, a place where somebody can take hold to start, stop, or control it, and a place where product or power comes out of it to serve ends outside of the machine. An isolated machine, even if it were possible, would be useless and dead; and a cosmic machine would be isolated by its very inclusiveness. Craig does well to put the whole discussion on a solid foundation by recognizing that humanity is set in a universe which has a moral order and spiritual values as well as physical laws.

Haroutunian is chiefly concerned with the effects of the machine age upon individual personality and social organization. Preoccupation with "things" and the struggle to get them tends to overshadow other interests and to distort the judgment of values. One result is social injustice; another is the creation of artificial classes bound together by economic interests and pitted against each other. National and racial groups, as well as labor and capital groups, owe their separate cohesion and their mutual hostilities largely to this cause. The consequent "mass-mindedness" (*i.e.*, stereotyped thinking in each group) depresses individual intelligence, corrupts the quality of human personality, and perpetuates inter-group tensions. There is need of a larger community of interest than is attainable on the basis of material values. "Things" must be put in their proper place.

Arndt's heart is in the right place in his discussion of rivalries for power, and his principles are admirable, but some of his material might advantageously be revised a little more nearly down to date. He sees labor still precariously struggling for the right of "collective bargaining" as against highly concentrated and (so far as he indicates) absolutely uncontrolled industrial management. He admits, apologetically,

that the history of the labor movement "has led to new forms of social evil" (not specified), but the power of labor is chiefly "power to prevent a too intolerable exploitation of the workers." As a description of the present-day industrial situation, that is not very realistic. But there are many other, and better things in the chapter.

Gallagher always thinks and writes clearly on the question of race and color. No one knows more about it at first hand. Read him. Horton shows how inner personal tensions have their social results in group tensions—race prejudice, religious bigotry, narrow class interest, even war. One of his best points is developed from Fritz Kunkel's analysis of what happens in the child's mind when he breaks from the original "We" of the intimate family circle and makes the "plunge into egocentricity." Inner tensions are not measurable wholly in terms of mental disease. There is also the haunting sense of guilt and sin. "The cure for humiliation and frustration is humility and repentance."

Wilder's beautiful and sensitive chapter invites to extended discussion of nearly every point. I could cheerfully quarrel with him on many of his statements, and doubtless to the correction of my own thinking. In my judgment he unduly romanticizes the Middle Ages, though he tries not to. He yearns too much for the mediæval solidarity and sense of security. The Middle Ages "had their own way of brutalizing man and . . . condemning men and women before birth to attenuated and warped and blasted lives." Still, Wilder thinks, the spiritual environment gave the mediæval man "security and therewith a kind of personal and social health. His demons were objectified, external and well under control." Were they? Ever read the *Malleus Mallificorum?* On the modern world, he too closely echoes T. S. Eliot. The earth is a "Wasteland"—no roots, no community, no values, no absolutes, no ritual, no God. I can never believe this except when, by accident, I hear a jazz band on the radio. Then, for a while, I do. But the main point is not whether this present age is better or worse than some previous age, unless one wants to argue—as of course some do, but not Wilder—that we should go back to the "Golden Age" of the thirteenth century in every possible respect. The real point is that there are enough things the matter with our present culture to constitute an authentic challenge to Christianity. Read the subsequent volumes of the series to get the answer to that challenge.

W. E. GARRISON

The Church and Organized Movements, edited by Randolph Crump Miller, New York, Harper, ©1946, pp. xvi, 255, $1.50.

The Pacific Theological Group has prepared the second volume of the *Interseminary Series.* The product of its work is of a high standard. The volume is well organized and the individual chapters are interestingly written. The title, *The Church and Organized Movements,* suggests as well as any the subjects that are treated by the various contributors. It covers up a fundamental unclarity which marks the total discussion.

Three general purposes seem to have dominated the group which prepared the volume: 1. The church was to be interpreted in relation and contrast to the organized movements of the society in which it lives. 2. The various secular organizations which compete with the church as a social institution were to be analysed and evaluated from a Christian viewpoint. 3. The modern alternatives to Christianity were to be described and analysed.

In a way the authors have tried to fulfill all three purposes. They are most successful in the second, although their analysis of the social organizations and

enterprises that present "live options" to the members of the society in which the church lives could have been more profound and pertinent both historically and sociologically. Their accomplishment of the first purpose is indirect rather than direct: the vitality and strength of the church in the midst of competing social enterprises is not fully brought into the focus of attention. The carefully thought-out introductory chapter by the editor (Randolph C. Miller), entitled "The Discovery of Resistance and Resource," does not correct this fault because its references to the material of the volume are not specific enough. The concluding chapter, "Resources in a genuinely Christian Church" (by Edward L. Parsons), is too homiletical. The first purpose is fulfilled least of all. There is a skillfully written chapter (by Elton Trueblood) on "The New Comparative Religion" which merely opens up the discussion of Christianity's contemporary secular rivals, and there are a number of specific allusions to this subject in the main part of the book. However, the problem is never fully treated, perhaps because the authors refrained intentionally or by instruction from the main editor of the series from a social-economic and political analysis of the state of the church in the present world. The clear, comprehensive, and judicious chapter on "Christianity and Non-Christian Religions" (by Hugh Vernon White) furnishes at least some discussion of the theological criteria in the light of which Christianity's rivals must be judged, although it is devoted to the problem of missions.

The chief general contribution of the volume consists then in its description of the "organized movements" in American society that compete with the churches in the local communities. George Hedley analyses instructively (but not really critically) the various organizations of "secular radicalism," including the labor movement. Howard Thurman offers a pointed (but not very comprehensive) characterization of the "Fascist Masquerade." Buell Gallagher discusses the challenge of "social work" to the church, presenting the problems in an informative and thoughtful way but without historical profundity. Dwight C. Smith deals with "Organized Fraternalism," skillfully drawing a comprehensive and most instructive picture. Frederick West gives a good summary of the present status of the relations of "Christianity and Organized Education." Pierson Parker completes the analysis of the church's rivals by a surprisingly comprehensive and penetrating description of the "Cults."

In conclusion it should be said that if the volumes of the *Interseminary Series* were designed to stimulate seminary students to think about the problems of the ministry in these days, the present volume certainly will give them ample food for thought.

WILHELM PAUCK

The Gospel, the Church, and the World, edited by Kenneth Scott Latourette, New York, Harper, ©1946, pp. xvi, 229, $1.50.

The book is one of a series for the coming National Conference of Theological Students in June which "will serve as a study for delegates" with the hope "that there may be in them help toward our common Christian task in the fateful post-war days." Eight writers have contributed to the volume, of which three represent Union Theological Seminary, two are identified with Yale Divinity School, two are on the Princeton Theological Seminary faculty, and the remaining one is a foreign missionary board secretary.

The introduction arouses immediate interest and whets one's intellectual curiosity by a series of interrogations which suggest startling answers; and also con-

tains a solemn but straightforward and solicitous injunction which runs as follows: "We must not prejudge the answers. We must not be content with facile and ready-made replies. Most of those who read the chapters which follow are committed to the Christian faith and church. Because of that commitment they come to the questions with a decided bias. Yet the very nature of our faith demands honesty. Christians must face with all the objectivity which they can command the questions which the age proposes to them. If the issue of their quest proves upsetting to their most cherished convictions they must not seek to evade it." Thus before one begins the first chapter, he feels that here is a book whose contributors have been given full freedom of expression and they will have written without restraint their interpretation of the gospel, the church, and the world for this age. With this preparation one anticipates an intellectual challenge, if not brutal treatment for his pet theological and ecclesiastical ideas.

But there is nothing upsetting in the treatment of Christian doctrine. The conservative mind will find this statement of Christian belief quite generally acceptable. To many, however, the book will be disappointing because its contributing theologians and churchmen have found it difficult to project themselves far enough outside the church to reappraise the tenets they hold and the organization they serve. Plato in his *Republic* shows a genuine determination to get rid of stories which attribute wickedness and the use of magic to the gods. There is much in the Christian faith that smacks of magic and holy mystery which cannot pass the bar of modern religious intelligence; yet in this book none of these theological beliefs is seriously challenged. Apparently religious writers are loath to discard antiquated Christian beliefs and prefer to exert their use of the English language to disguise and preserve them.

The chapter on "The Limitations of the Church," for which its writer offers an apology, contains sufficient truth to call for sober thinking on what the church can and should do to conduct an efficient and effective Christian work. With the tenet that the church is needed and has a distinct opportunity to leaven society with the teachings of Jesus and the prophets, few will disagree. But if the present generation of theological students depends *in toto* upon this volume for its inspiration in strengthening the Christian church, they will fail to satisfy the spiritual needs of a large portion of the church, the unchurched church member.

The book contains many excellent ideas and incorporates much common sense, but there is so much that is absurd that it discredits the rest for thoughtful people. No dogmas are discarded or discredited; rather they are rendered innocuous by platitudinous and metaphysical phraseology. Santayana's comment after reading Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes* may be aptly applied to this book: "It had seemed to me that myth and sophistry there spoiled a very fine subject."

HAROLD BANCROFT WHITE

Paganism to Christianity in the Roman Empire, by Walter Woodburn Hyde, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1946, pp. 296, $4.

This excellent volume is the work of an eminent Greek scholar, for many years professor at the University of Pennsylvania, whose wide range of interests has dealt with Greek language and literature, Greek life, sports, and religion. That the author of *Olympic Victor Monuments* and the teacher for years of courses in the history of religions should have produced this volume on the ever-fascinating story of the triumph of Christianity over its chief competitors, over Græco-Roman civiliza-

tion and over the Roman empire, is not surprising. How well he has done his work must be judged not from the personal prejudice or bias of the reader, but from the standpoint of modern critical scholarship. For as Professor Hyde himself says:

> The subject is large, its modern literature vast, and its conclusions varied; the presentation of an informative account within a reasonable compass is obviously not only difficult, but venturesome and especially for a classical historian. The author has attempted to treat it in the spirit of critical historical scholarship of our time, which investigates the beginnings of Christianity as fearlessly as it would those of Mithraism or any other religion once powerful in antiquity (p. 7).

Within these limits Professor Hyde has handled his vast subject with considerable skill and remarkable erudition. His wide classical background and his tremendous range of reading in theological and historical critical literature among German, French, English, and American scholars of the past century and the present is evidenced by the voluminous footnotes and manifold references. Yet this work is far from being learnedly dull or heavy—on the contrary it is eminently readable, for, although presented in a wealth of detail, an integrated picture emerges from his clear-cut and broad approach.

In his first three chapters he lays the groundwork for an understanding of the kind of world Christianity came into. In "The Native Religion of the Romans" (Chap. I) he summarizes with the skill of a classical scholar primitive Roman polytheism and ritualism and the impact of hellenistic philosophies upon the old Roman state cult revived by Augustus. In Chapter II, "Mystery-Religions and Kindred Philosophies," he lays especial stress upon the cults of Cybele, Isis, Atargatis, and Mithra, as well as upon Neo-Platonism, the latter two in particular rivals and indeed active foes of rising Christianity, but from which Christianity took much besides mere victory. Chapter III treats of Judaism and the Old Testament in the thorough fashion of one who knows not only the Old Testament and modern higher criticism but the entire history and thought of Judaism to present times.

The next two chapters, "The Personality of Jesus" (Chap. IV) and "The Teaching of Jesus" (Chap. V), will not appeal to those fundamentalists, whether Protestant or Catholic, who reject not merely the conclusions but the very method of the critical historical approach. Professor Hyde is not a special pleader striving to make a case for or against a specific system of belief, but he is certainly against uncritical acceptance of belief as fact rather than faith. For despite all striving for objectivity the historian must here and there, in sifting and presenting his evidence, take a stand and reveal the inclination of his own critical judgment. Gibbon certainly did. Professor Hyde agrees that "little similarity exists between the humble carpenter's son and the Christ of the Christian worship, and [it is] clear that no such person as the latter ever lived except in Christian imagination as the ideal of perfection" (p. 117). But he finds no difficulty in accepting the historicity of the person of Christ (p. 125), leaving to the reader his own choice of supernatural or naturalistic explanations for the mystery of the resurrection (pp. 141-145). He finds the greatest miracle of all to be "the transformation of the Western world by his life and teaching" (p. 146). His statement that "there is nothing new in Jesus' ethical message beyond that of his predecessors" is offset by the remark that "nowhere else do we find such an accumulation of high precepts of conduct as in Jesus' sayings" (both on p. 148). Probably no one will seriously question his judgment that "without doubt war is Christianity's greatest failure" (p. 149). But many may question the judgment that "Paul started Christian theology with a false belief" [by adding the] "notion of original sin, redemption, and grace . . . to Jesus'

simple ethics (p. 160) or that Jesus "had no vision of a world-wide new religion, only a reformed Judaism" (ibid.). But he summarizes by saying that "in estimating the figure of Jesus on the basis of what little we know of his life and teaching one cannot question his greatness, for he has had no superior and hardly a peer in captivating the imagination of humanity" (p. 162).

In the remaining chapters, "Progress of Christianity" (Chap. VI) and "The Triumph of Christianity" (Chap. VII), Professor Hyde continues his narrative with the skill of a scholarly historian, marshaling the evidence on several topics in masterly fashion, *e.g.*, on the genuineness of Constantine's Christianity (pp. 193-198), turning aside to consider the problem of miracles (pp. 188-191) and considering anew the speculations of many as to the causes of Rome's fall (pp. 222-225), which he somewhat surprisingly terms "the greatest puzzle of history." Since the causes were many and various, it would seem to constitute a "puzzle" only to those who have attempted to explain it in terms of a single overwhelming factor.

The statement (p. 174) that "Alexander [was] called Severus by his soldiers because of his rigorous discipline" may well be true as a punning allusion to the meaning of his surname, but since he was a cousin and adopted son of Heliogabalus, who was a grandson of Septimius Severus' Syrian wife Julia Domna, Alexander Severus came by the family name quite honestly. Honorius died in 423, not 323 as given on p. 222. This latter is undoubtedly a typographical error, as other dates given in the same paragraph are correctly placed in the fifth century. Considering the number of dates, titles, and proper names involved, this book is relatively free from slips and misspellings. A few caught by this reviewer are: p. 50, footnote 23 (should be *Geschichte*); p. 117, line 12 (should be *motives*); p. 208, line 12 (should be *Palmyrene*); p. 210, line 8 (should be *Chrysostom*); p. 232, line 14 (should be *Augustine*). The omission of Poland from a list of countries where "anti-Semitism reigns actively on the European continent" (p. 227) is perhaps an oversight, though a large one. The consistent omission of commas before causal clauses beginning with the conjunctions *for* and *since* makes for difficult reading of many of the longer sentences, since these words are frequently prepositions in English. The reader must often go back and make for himself the natural pause that sense and syntax require.

In the Epilogue, Dr. Hyde concludes this excellent work with a brief account of the condition of Judaism and Christianity today, fifteen and a half centuries after Theodosius the Great, under whom occurred the final triumph of Christianity over paganism. In this he considers separately the Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches, Protestantism, and Unitarianism. Completing the volume are three very interesting brief essays: Excursus I, "The Origin of Christmas"; Excursus II, "Sunday Observance"; Excursus III, "Was St. Peter in Rome?" In these Dr. Hyde's scholarly historical approach is exhibited at its best in a somewhat more lengthy consideration of certain interesting topics than the exigencies of the main work permitted. The index is full and thorough; the typography a credit to the University of Pennsylvania Press.

RAYMOND T. OHL

An Essay on Morals, by Philip Wylie, New York, Rinehart, ©1947, pp. xvi, 204, $2.50.

Since Philip Wylie's *Generation of Vipers* appeared, five years ago, one hundred thousand copies of the book have been sold, and the publishers believe that it has had a million readers. Mr. Wylie has been overwhelmed with correspondents whose letters

it would take a lifetime to answer. So, as a substitute for personal replies, he has written the book now under review, with the following subtitle, printed in italics and small capitals: *A Science of* PHILOSOPHY *and a Philosophy of the* SCIENCES, *a Popular Explanation of the Jungian* THEORY OF HUMAN INSTINCT, *a new Bible for the* BOLD MIND *and a Way to Personal Peace by* LOGIC, *the* HERETIC'S HANDBOOK *and Text for* HONEST *Skeptics, including a Description of* MAN *suitable for an* ATOMIC AGE, *together with a Compendium of* MEANS TO BROTHERHOOD *in a Better World, and a Voyage Beyond the Opposite Directions of Religion and Objective Truth to* UNDERSTANDING.

There is little logic, science, or philosophy in this book. Samples of philosophical ignorance are the designations of Dewey as a behaviorist, apparently of the Watsonian type (pp. 15, 43), of James as a parallelist (p. 92), and the following astonishing chronology: "the evolution of the thought from Kant through Leibnitz and Lotze and Fechner to Schopenhauer" (p. 92). It is doubtful whether Jung will recognize this book as a correct interpretation and application of his doctrine of instincts. Probably the book is startling enough to suit "bold minds." It is sufficiently "heretical" and "skeptical" to satisfy many readers of these types, although some of them will be disappointed when Wylie denies that he is either an agnostic or an atheist (p. 143) and when he finds reasons for praising Jesus, "sad and terrible neurotic" though he was (pp. 139, 179). Discussion of the "Atomic Age" consists chiefly in a rebuke to the alarmed American public for turning for advice about the atomic bomb to the army instead of to the Freudians. The "voyage beyond the opposite directions of religion [superstition] and objective truth" [the physical sciences] has for its destination an understanding of the psychology of Freud and Jung as interpreted by Wylie.

The "Compendium of means to a better world" is probably chapter XIV. Every man's purpose is to live honestly; and if only enough men could learn to turn their attention properly, "the whole world would come about, arrest its instinctual regression, and begin to become aware." The first step in this direction is the realization that "man is animal" and a complete acceptance of "what Darwin discovered." (Neither of these two *desiderata* is clearly defined.) Boys when ten years old should be taught in all schools that every Anglo-Saxon is in part Semite and in part Negro (said to be a fact established by ethnologists but no citations given). Thus a consciousness of the blood brotherhood of men would become so firmly established in early life that race prejudices could not subsequently develop. Next should be universally taught the discovery of the unconscious mind and the unconscious domination of the sex instincts; as much attention should be given to this as to the natural sciences. There should also be much instruction in music. With this kind of education become universal, Wylie seems to expect that all the ills of modern society would be cured, and everybody would be virtuous and happy. All religions would disappear, and man would at last be free.

Why are such books popular? I suspect that it is partly because many ministers make such exaggerated claims for the benefits of religion that many of their over-critical listeners hastily decide that all religion is humbug and superstition and that the world would be better off without it. I remember how amazed I was when as a young man I first attended an Easter service in one of the largest Roman Catholic cathedrals in this country, and heard the preacher calmly inform his immense audience that some of the most wicked men in history had been popes! None of the audience in my neighborhood seemed to me to be in the least surprised at this information, which I had imagined to be a dark secret concealed from the Catholic laity. If all ministers, like the Catholic preacher of this Easter sermon, would frankly admit

that the church has often done much harm, although a greater amount of good, and that, though the mother of Christ may have been absolutely free from sin, no such claim can be made for the bride of Christ (the church), I do not believe that violent attacks upon religion would continue to make a wide popular appeal.

WILLIAM K. WRIGHT

The Meaning of Existence, by Charles Duall Kean, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. xiv, 222, $3.

Here is "existential" philosophy in the American idiom. The approach was made familiar to us in translations of Kierkegaard, but Mr. Kean combines it with the type of sociological and psychological analysis with which Americans are more conversant.

This philosophy insists that man does his thinking, not as an objective observer apart from the world, but as an actor within it. Consequently we are caught in the web of history at the same time that we rise by intellect above the present scene. The dilemma is real for all men, and so we are aware that every other person has his own subjective reality. Recognizing this, we are led to treat others not as "it" but as "thou"; and the "I-thou" form of thought is taken as the cue. At the same time we are haunted by tragedy and anxiety, both of them products of our ability to rise above time. Tragedy arises at the point where we have to choose between conflicting values, yet know we cannot make a purely objective choice, and are accordingly caught in an insoluble confusion. Anxiety results from our imagination of consequences, leading to fear of frustration of our basic needs.

From these two characteristic spiritual experiences our religious striving emerges in the "effort to solve the problem of Existence by making sense of [our] encounter with tragedy and anxiety." The solution is found not in a rational demonstration but in overcoming the conflict by decisive action. The problem is stated, therefore, in the form of myth, which is neither literally true nor rationally explicable, but carries the reader along with the actors so that he *feels* the meaning of the encounter in his own life.

Theology is made up of such myths, and the greatest of them is God, with whom also we have "I-thou" relations. What this means is found in the cross where Jesus, by identifying himself with the sin of his people accepted death, "asking nothing in return." This complete surrender to God made him Christ, and through Christ we have the resurrection as new men in an old world. From this flows the hope of social reconstruction.

This brief sketch does scant justice to the various supporting arguments and analyses of Mr. Kean, which have their own independent value for provocative thinking. To readers of Kierkegaard or, for that matter, Tillich or Reinhold Niebuhr, the general viewpoint is familiar. The volume is weak at the point where Kierkegaard himself waged his bitterest struggle: in the assurance of the reality of God. Repeatedly the author alludes to it or assumes it, but nowhere is it clearly expounded. In other words, Kierkegaard's *Sickness unto Death* is here, but not sufficiently his reorientation in *Repetition*.

The issue which this existential philosophy raises is difficult to state, simply because reason is disqualified *a priori* from solving problems. In this sense it is close to mysticism, even while it rejects the mystical conceptions of God and the soul. However the major contention of existentialism is against rational objectivity. It flatly rejects the Platonic dictum that "the philosopher is the spectator of all time and of all existence." But to acknowledge the subjective involvement of every knower in the world he knows is not to deny that *for purposes of criticism* we can discipline

ourselves to reach out beyond ourselves for a more objective basis of judgment. For the "I-thou" relation is not merely making the other's problem one's own; it is also yielding one's own to enter into the other man's viewpoint. Why the former is possible and not the latter is not satisfactorily explained; unless we are to find the answer in the assumption that man is fundamentally more selfish than social. And after all, the history of the Aristotelian view that man is by nature social (so Locke, Rousseau, and many biologists like Gerard) is as distinguished a strain of thought as that which comes from the Stoics to Augustine, Calvin, and Kierkegaard.

The volume will serve as a highly readable introduction for American readers to the much-disputed existential theology so popular among sophisticates today.

EDWIN E. AUBREY

The Disobedient Spirits and Christian Baptism: A Study of 1 Peter III.19 and its Context, by Bo Reicke, Copenhagen, Ejnar Munksgaard, 1946, pp. viii, 275, Kr. 12.

The passage of the New Testament which Bo Reicke has selected for critical study in his doctoral dissertation has been a subject of debate all through the centuries. In a preliminary chapter the course of this debate is sketched and the interpretations of the major theologians and schools are indicated, with the conclusion that "no one of them can claim priority or special legitimacy" and that "when . . . it is a question of finding the real meaning of this verse, we cannot depend so much upon traditional interpretations . . . we can only depend upon an analysis of the text itself" (p. 51).

Reicke's own investigation, thus liberated from all subservience to tradition, seeks to discover a unity and internal cohesion in the whole parænesis (3:13-22), which has not been apparent to previous students; the key to this unity seems to him to lie in the proper comprehension of v. 19. Since the whole section is concerned with the attitude of Christians in the presence of examining magistrates, Reicke suggests that the "spirits in prison" represent for the writer "the Spiritual Powers behind the state authorities" (p. 134). As Christ, enduring in manifest innocence the suffering of death, has preached the gospel to these "spirits," Christian believers are encouraged by his example to bear witness before the authorities on earth whom the "spirits" animate, by the same testimony of undeserved suffering, assured that it will be efficacious in bringing others to God. Thus in his preaching in the underworld, "Christ is described as the great Pattern" (p. 131): the gospel is to be preached to the human rulers of this world by his followers as it has been preached by him to their spiritual counterparts or masters in the world below. At the same time, the hope is held out that the testimony will bear fruit in conversion. The fallen angels to whom Christ has preached no longer have power to harden the hearts of their agents upon earth against the evidences of Christian truth and love. "There is no one so hardened, no such evil being, that the Christians ought not to let them know of the Christian hope, the Gospel, with real courage" (p. 130). "They can no longer harden their hearts when in contact with the Gospel. . . . On the contrary they are easily driven to conversion" (p. 132).

Here is the heart of Reicke's thesis. In his view, the entire passage (vv. 13-22, and even 4:1-6 as well) revolves around the exhortation of v. 15—"Always be ready to make your defence before anyone who calls you to an accounting for the hope that is in you" (my rendering). He interprets this (rightly) of the trial of Christians before a Roman magistrate; the words *apologia* and *logon aitein* certainly imply that he has in mind a formal interrogation in the law courts, not the ques-

tionings of a private inquirer. The validity of his interpretation of v. 19, however, depends upon whether it is possible to imagine that the "spirits in prison" are conceived by the writer of the Epistle as the powers which stand behind the authorities of the Roman state. That the world is ruled by spiritual powers of evil is, of course, a commonplace of early Christian thought; the question is whether these are to be identified with "the spirits in prison."

This question is therefore the first major object of his investigation, and he faces it with candour. He finds it "quite probable" that the word *pneumata* ("spirits") "can be both angels and souls of human beings at the same time without any distinction" (p. 59). Examining the relationship between the Petrine passage and the section of the *Book of Enoch* which refers to the imprisonment of the fallen angels, he shows it to be very close, not only in the general ideas but in particularities of language (especially the pleonastic use of the participle *poreuomenos*). On the basis of this connection with *Enoch,* he concludes that the *pneumata* "are the transgressors from the time of the Flood, with no very great difference between Angels and people, but with greater stress on the *motif* complex connected with the Angels' fall" (p. 69). The argument which leads him to this conclusion is developed with admirable care and thoroughness. More difficulty is found in the attempt to identify these angels, who are at least *included* among the "spirits in prison," with the demons who animate the authorities of the state. In the first place, this hardly seems compatible with the attitude of respect towards constituted authority which is inculcated in 2:13 ff. Besides, it is difficult to imagine these "spirits" as actively powerful among the kingdoms of men, while they are "in prison." Reicke has not failed to observe these difficulties, and has attempted to dispose of them. He thinks that he has produced evidence to show that "these Angels, in spite of their imprisonment, were in no way hindered from having an active effect on the life of the world" (p. 90). This reviewer is still not convinced that the proposed identification is justified. "Angels and principalities and powers" (v. 22) are "made subject" to Christ in his victory over death and his ascent into heaven; but the "spirits" of v. 19, who have been "in prison" ever since the days of Noah, now have the gospel preached to them. The natural implication is that they are now liberated, not that further restrictions are placed on their power. One must also be permitted to doubt whether the central theme of the passage as a whole lies in the *preaching;* is it not rather in the suffering of the innocent?

Space will not permit us to discuss Reicke's treatment of the reference to baptism, and the manner in which he relates it to the context. We may be permitted, however, to notice his grammatical analysis of v. 21. Here he takes the noun *baptisma* as an instance of "an appositional antecedent incorporated in a relative clause"; he devotes an entire chapter to a study of this construction in classical Greek literature and in nonliterary documents (papyri and inscriptions). *Antitupon* is then taken as an adjectival attribute of *baptisma.* Resolving the construction into its elements, he interprets: "an Ark in which some few were saved, an antitypical baptism, which now saves you" (p. 146). Unfortunately, this leaves us with the impossible idea that the experience of Noah, interpreted as an antitype of Christian baptism, now saves the Christian believer; whereas the thought which is absolutely required in the context, is that "baptism, to which Noah's experience was an antitype, now saves the Christian believer." There is really no escape from an emendation of the text here; as Hort perceived (*The N.T. in the Original Greek,* Vol. 2, Appendix, p. 102), we must adopt the conjecture of Erasmus (reading the dative instead of the nominative, of the relative). The thought runs: "Noah and his

little family were saved through water. The antitype to this (experience), namely, baptism, now saves you through the resurrection of Jesus Christ."

Among many points of detail which are deserving of mention, it must suffice to notice only one, a question of text. In v. 18, Reicke reads *περι αμαρτιων υπερ ημων απεθανεν*. There are two variants here that require consideration (apart from the unimportant variation between the first and the second person in the pronoun). Some witnesses omit the phrase *υπερ ημων* altogether; some substitute *επαθεν* for *απεθανεν*. The critical texts most in use (Westcott and Hort, Tischendorf, Nestle, Souter; not von Soden) omit the former phrase, and retain *απεθανεν*. Reicke points out that they thus succeed in arriving at a text which is not to be found in a single manuscript of any age or description. He is quite justified in describing this as a "mechanical, atomistic text reconstruction" (p. 214). For every witness which reads *απεθανεν* also retains *υπερ ημων* (*υμων*); every witness which omits *υπερ ημων* reads *επαθεν*. My own feeling is that *υπερ ημων απεθανεν* is an alteration that was introduced in the first instance into the lectionary; and that *επαθεν*, though it has no supporter of the first rank except Codex Vaticanus, is the true text.

This dissertation must be regarded as a contribution of the first importance to the exegesis of this pericope of I Peter. The evidence is examined with candour; the argument is drawn with care; the conclusions are stated with caution and with all the necessary reserves. From a scholar who makes such a beginning, much will be expected in the years to come.

FRANK W. BEARE

The Church as Educator, by Conrad H. Moehlman, New York, Hinds-Hayden-Eldredge, ©1947, pp. vii, 184, $2.

To many this will prove a thoroughly irritating book. It points out with merciless insistence a great many unpleasant facts and shortcomings which will seem to them to suggest as a more appropriate title, "The Failure of the Church as Educator," perhaps even, "The Failure of the Church." Worse than that, it fairly bristles with questions: some raised as such, others which are bound to rise in the reader's mind as he reads the text. And read it he will once he gets started if my experience is a criterion. I started to leaf it through preparatory to assigning it for review. I did not lay it aside until I had finished it, and at a single sitting.

It would not be difficult to criticize the work on several scores. For those who wish thoroughly documented volumes this will seem almost casual, for the footnotes are almost nonexistent and there are many quotations which give little or no clue as to their exact source. To some others it will probably appear somewhat loosely put together with considerable latitude between chapters and paragraphs—now in Europe, now in America. I was aware of both of these qualities, but they did not disturb me. This is not, I apprehend it, intended as a textbook, or primarily for experts. Rather it is for a large reading public which needs to be stabbed awake. And, brother, can Conrad Moehlman stab!

Really the volume is a sort of first draft of the nature of the religion of tomorrow in the light of the failure of that of today and of day before yesterday. One insistence is fundamental: "Authoritarianism is helpless before the complicated religious issues of today" (p. 64). That note is struck repeatedly; and with it is its companion: Ethical practice must be put above religious dogma. These are the law and the prophets—and I for one have no inclination to say him nay.

The part of the book that was to me the most significant was his discussion of the last stand—"ecclesiastical reaction," Dr. Moehlman aptly dubs it—against American

public education and the resultant "released time" experiment. Those who are inclined to favor this latter—and there is a lot of loose talk and looser thinking on the subject abroad today in circles which should know better—will do well to read and ponder these pages with their devastating figures. "Figures don't lie although occasionally liars figure." It will be a rash man who will attempt to dismiss Dr. Moehlman's material on the basis of that concessive clause. And there should be a deal less talk about the need of introducing religion into our secular schools after pondering these chapters.

In this volume Dr. Moehlman, who has never been especially conspicuous for his indirection, leaves little question where he stands. Words are used to reveal his thought, not to cloud it or make it more palatable. "In the American university, religion has only educational rights and privileges. If it cannot meet the tests of science, it is doomed. Its appeal to authority and revelation when subjected to objective study is found wanting. The finality of the metaphysical approach has been set aside" (p. 74). That sort of statement can be understood without commentary; so can his word on the previous page: "One word in behalf of religion in a mathematics, sociology, or science classroom is worth a year's 'preaching' in a religion class." Those who bristled at his earlier *School and Church: The American Way* and at his outspoken criticism of some aspects of foreign missions will not find their hackles smoothed by this volume. For those who can distinguish between "tradition" and "traditionalism," who can bear to recognize that too often what goes for "revelation" was the production of fathers who were thinking or guessing and who were far less informed than their sons, this is a book which will not prove dispiriting or disillusioning but, on the contrary, encouraging and challenging.

MORTON S. ENSLIN

The Genius of the Prophets, by W. Arthur Faus, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1946, pp. 190, $1.75.

The Hebrew prophets have effectively seized the imagination of the modern religious world, with the result that books about them threaten to entail Ecclesiastes' cynical gibe. This is as it should be, provided only that such absorption does not blind us to the greatness of other parts of the Old Testament. Current studies of the prophets vary in approach from historical accounts of the successive individuals, to serious studies of prophecy as a religious phenomenon, and weighty expositions of prophetic theology. Faus' book takes a sort of medial position. He arranges most of his material on five aspects of the activity of the prophets: they were "realists . . . men of hope . . . confessors . . . men of vision . . . (and) preachers." The treatment throughout is made vital with an obvious enthusiasm, and is embellished with references to the literary features of the prophets, and with sketches of "life situations" (until perhaps one grows a trifle weary of the phrase!). There is here no effort to provide a rounded picture of these remarkable ancient figures, but only to consider chosen sidelights on their character, and most of all to employ such insights for their religious relevance.

The book is open to some measure of adverse appraisal, on the grounds of its treatment of critical questions. Apart from such routine matters as acceptance of "Second" and Third Isaiah, there is an astonishing lack of discrimination among the contents of the prophetic books. Isaiah wrote the vision in chapter 2 of his book, as Jeremiah did the oracle of the new covenant, and Micah the famous passage about doing justly, loving mercy, etc. Ezekiel was carried to Babylonia in 597 and there

began his prophecy; passages are selected from his book with no hint that their genuineness has ever been doubted—even chapters 40-48 yield their grist of Ezekiel's sayings and beliefs. It is a "fact that all the prophets including the preliterary prophets, expected a dramatic upheaval in the near future which would end the existing world order and usher in a new era"; and "this outlook colored to a large extent their whole message"—a claim that is well calculated to raise many a skeptical eyebrow! Rather better is the treatment of the problem of ecstasy; Faus wisely limits it rigidly, so far as the writing prophets were concerned, although even so he is in doubtful position in ascribing it to Amos, and to Zechariah. Obviously the acceptance of Ezekiel's psychic abnormality is also but a part of the failure of critical discrimination just now mentioned.

Rather more serious is one's feeling of some disappointment with the actual structure and content of the exposition of the prophets. The five topics chosen are well enough—the author makes no claim of their being comprehensive. Some of them indeed, as the second and the fourth, stir one's imagination. How much could be said about the prophets as men of vision! In that we sense the very heart of their entire activity. But we are given a neat division of visions into meditative and ecstatic, with numerous illustrations of each and considerable exposition on the background of the "life situation"—all quite good; but it never takes wings and lifts one with the exaltation of things unseen. Happily the concluding chapter, "The Prophets Speak to Our Day," is better. It contains considerable listing of points about the message of the prophets, but eventually it moves over into more convincing treatment, so that the final half-dozen pages stir one with glimpses of what he seeks less successfully earlier in the book.

The book has much that is commendable, and, it is to be hoped, will serve to make more real many phases of the prophets' life and faith.

W. A. IRWIN

Prophetic Religion, by J. Philip Hyatt, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1947, pp. 188, $1.75.

By contrast with the usual method of considering the individual prophets in succession, this book treats the contributions of the prophetic movement by subject. Although based on a collective consideration of the work of the seven prophets whom the author regards as most important, ideas rather than persons predominate.

In successive chapters Professor Hyatt gives attention to the prophetic call, the prophets' criticism of life, view of the past, view of the future, attitude toward ritual, patriotism and policies toward the nation, idea of God, and finally concepts of sin and forgiveness. Each chapter closes with a consideration of Jesus, showing how each phase of the prophetic movement found its completion in him. The book begins with a good summary of the preprophetic movement and concludes with a chapter on prophetic religion. It has a moderate amount of well-chosen footnotes which relate the findings with those of other scholars. The two indexes (by subject and by scriptural reference) make the book of added use. It presents little that is new, but gives an excellent summary treatment. It is nontechnical, and intended for popular reading. The author says, "I hope that some ministers may be inspired by these chapters to make their own ministry more prophetic, and that some laymen may be encouraged to allow their ministers to be prophets."

Exception to Dr. Hyatt's positions can be taken at certain points. By making Amos, rather than Second Isaiah, the first full monotheist, he has missed much of the development of the idea of God in the prophetic movement. In Amos he is too

hesitant about deleting secondary materials, and in Micah too radical. In this field his most balanced work is done in Isaiah. Inasmuch as the book of Jonah is somewhat of a bridge between the testaments, one wishes this prophetic writing had been used instead of Ezekiel, which rates in quality as a minor prophecy. Professor Hyatt is too radical also in having the prophets oppose all ritual, for some of them were highly indebted to ritual, notably Isaiah at his call. Too much stress is placed on the prophetic condemnation of pride. If the prophecies of Amos are so "well organized" (p. 19), why is the call of Amos not found near the beginning in 3:1-8 (referred to again in 7:14-15) rather than, as Professor Hyatt asserts, in two fragments (7:1-9 and 8:1-2) near the end?

The author is at his best in general discussion. For instance, on the subject of prediction, he says "the prophets were concerned not so much with what *would* happen in every detail as with what *must* happen." He shows that, in the Hebrew tradition, there was a deep-seated distrust of probing into the future. It is also pointed out that prophets always considered it their right and duty to criticize the state. "Prophetic ideals of patriotism insist that a nation must be courageous enough to criticize its own actions and policies, and not exhaust its energy simply in hating the enemy." His appraisal of the Deuteronomic movement is exceptional, showing that while it had many admirable features, it also "intensified nationalism both in religion and in politics." The chapter on the Prophetic Criticism of Life is particularly important.

Formerly at Wellesley, Professor Hyatt is now professor of Old Testament and chairman of the Graduate School of Religion at Vanderbilt University, a member of the committee preparing the new Revised Standard Version of the Bible, and perhaps America's leading authority on the prophet Jeremiah.

Friends of the Crozer Theological Seminary will be interested in Hyatt's rating the commentary by Professor *emeritus* I. G. Matthews as the best solution to the knotty problems presented by the book of Ezekiel.

ROLLAND E. WOLFE

The Modern Message of the Minor Prophets, by Raymond Calkins, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. ix, 205, $3.

It is no mean tribute to the genius of Israel's prophets that men today continue to write books about them and their message. In the past five years no less than eight books about the prophets have been reviewed in the pages of this journal. Yet, in these years comparatively little has been added to the sum of our knowledge about these men. Why, then, do new books appear? Has not the central message of these men been understood and stated well and clearly? One can only observe and mark well that whenever men have studied these ancient texts which have come down to us from the prophets, they have come under the spell of their vitality and have been impelled to undertake the perennial task of stating the word of the prophet in terms of a new age.

This book may well serve as a model for a homiletical treatment of prophetic literature. Its author has demonstrated that a preacher may, by means of the commentaries available to him in the English language, discover in the prophets insights which are applicable to his own day and generation. Large use has been made of the criticism found in R. H. Pfeiffer's *Introduction to the Old Testament,* and in R. E. Wolfe's essay, "The Editing of the Book of the Twelve," as well as of the expositions of George Adam Smith and C. H. Cornill. Critical problems are at least listed in the brief introductions to the books, and the conclusions of modern scholarship

upon them are summarized. The larger proportion of space is given over to a statement of the messages of the prophets and the application of these ancient principles to problems of our day. While few new meanings emerge from the study of the ancient texts, there are many new and fresh applications. In the prophets Dr. Calkins finds passages which lead him to refer to, if not to discuss in detail, such topics as the United Nations and "crisis theology." The blending of criticism with an ostensibly strong enthusiasm is happily done in these essays. The author's frequent excursions into the contemporary world to discuss its problems seem never to be entered upon without sufficient textual basis. His style is crisp, clear, and without the overburdening of rhetoric which has too often characterized exposition.

This book is an extremely useful introduction to the minor prophets, one which will give to the serious reader as much as he may wish to learn from his first serious encounter with this section of the Bible. It will serve as an effective catalyst upon the mind of the preacher as he seeks for a word to his own congregation.

JAMES B. PRITCHARD

The Old Testament in the New Testament, by R. V. G. Tasker, Philadelphia, Westminster, ©1947, pp. 176, $2.

There is a great fluttering in theological dovecots on both sides of the Atlantic on the subject of "the essential unity of the Bible and of biblical theology." We are told that the "Word of God" has the same accent from Genesis to Revelation. Instead of rejoicing in the freedom from dogmatic constraints, won for us by more than a century of critical scholarship, frightened professors shelter behind Barth and Kierkegaard, and assure their bewildered public that the results of historical investigation are either irrelevant, or require no modification of what they choose to call "orthodoxy." This book was written to swell that current chorus, and to comfort the faint-hearted.

Although it was originally prepared as a series of popular lectures, the book makes dull reading. The author plods through all the New Testament books and discusses the Old Testament quotations and references, more or less in order of their appearance. The only exception to this procedure is an opening chapter in which an attempt is made, not too successfully, to distinguish Jesus' use of the Old Testament from that credited to him in the gospel tradition. There is an index of Old Testament references, but not one of New Testament passages discussed.

The reviewer finds it discouraging to be told by a professor in the University of London that many of Matthew's quotations, though they may not go back to Jesus, reveal "a theological truth" (p. 22); that the temptation narrative in Luke and Matthew "is probably told as Jesus told it to His Apostles" (p. 25); that Jesus' entry into Jerusalem was a staged fulfillment of Zech. 9:9 (p. 35); that, in the parable of the Wicked Husbandmen, Jesus anticipated the Christology of the primitive church (p. 36); that allegorical interpretation of scripture, though often fanciful and far-fetched, has its "legitimate use" (p. 17); that Paul's exegesis in Gal. 4:4-24 is not arbitrary "when once it is recognized that the Old Testament is not just history, but *sacred* history" (p. 103); etc.

On p. 138 the author indulges in one of the generalizations that come easy to him. "It is . . . one of the supreme errors of much that passes as Christianity in the modern world that it assumes that obedience to the ethical teaching of Jesus is possible apart from redemption. The New Testament knows nothing of any such possibility." It occurs to the reviewer that the Sermon on the Mount is usually

included in the New Testament, and that it was not predicated on any doctrine of redemption.

S. MAC LEAN GILMOUR

The Doctrine of the Imitation of God in Plato, by Culbert Gerow Rutenber, New York, King's Crown, 1946, pp. 115, $1.50.

This is a thoughtful and sensible little book, with a somewhat formidable title, on a subject well worth consideration even for those not specially students of Plato.

Where can God be found? Perhaps in that "higher realm which gives to the space-time world whatever reality the latter enjoys. This higher realm is the world of forms (*i.e.,* the Platonic ideas), of pure essences. . . . This is indeed the realm of the divine, for it bears the marks of divinity, self-existence, eternality, and immutability" (p. 5). Of course Plato's Supreme Being must be "sharply differentiated from the gods of popular religion" (p. 7). "The Platonic deity, on the contrary, brings together the realm of *ideas* (*i.e.,* the forms) and the *receptacle* (*i.e.,* matter) to form the world of becoming (*i.e.,* the space-time world apparent to our senses)" (p. 9). Thus it would seem that the *forms* and *matter* are both objective to Plato's God. "Plato is not explicit, but there is a high probability that Plato meant all lesser divinities to be aspects or attributes of the one Supreme God" (p. 16).

"Plato's God is a soul" (p. 15). Now, "*soul* is by definition that which is capable of self-motion" (p. 9). This conception of God seems to be derived by induction from the observed facts—or what we regard as facts—of our material universe and of human life, and not from any sort of revelation. On the other hand, "the origin of religion is not to be attributed to man at all, but to God through revelation" (p. 57). Perhaps, however, the induction which leads to the Platonic conception of God depends upon the idea of causality, without which, as without the ideas of space and time, it seems impossible for the human mind to function at all, just because it is human and imperfect. If so, this induction may not be reliable.

Plato's God does not seem to be a person, at least in the ordinary sense. "The God of the *Timæus* is called the master craftsman, the Demiurge. . . . He is the author of law and order in the Cosmos. This makes it pretty certain that he is the personification of Reason" (p. 41). But "we are here dealing with picture-thinking" (p. 42). Certainly, however, Plato's God is good (p. 41), and by this I think Dr. Rutenber means *morally good,* not merely good as an inanimate object such as an instrument may be good. If God is not a person, how can he be *morally* good? Moral goodness seems essentially a personal quality. Whence comes the idea that God is morally good? Is it derived by analogy from human beings who are in some sense made in the image of God?

"Human beings are *moral* creatures" [at least they distinguish, though often imperfectly, between morality and immorality], "whose possession of mind makes it possible for them consciously to achieve true manhood. In their effort to do this they are portrayed in the dialogues as looking to the *forms* (ideas) of justice, wisdom, temperance, and the like. God as the ensoulment of all these virtues becomes man's larger Self" (p. 38). "Two patterns are found in the world, one of good and one of evil, and we become like the one we look to. It is implied that God is the ensouled pattern of goodness. The pattern contemplated in this case is the *moral* pattern of the good" (p. 63). Is there then a pattern of the evil?

The attributes of God are suggested by those qualities which the imitator of God should strive to attain. In the *Theatetus* (176b-177a) "the stress on justice is ultimate, the pattern we look to determines our conduct" (p. 63). "The just man is

eager by the practice of virtue to be likened to God (*Rep.* 613a-b). The man who is most righteous is most like God (*Theat.* 176c). The man who knows that God is the measure will try to become like him in character (*Laws* 716)" (p. 67). "In *Rep.* 501b the *image* and *likeness* of God is developed within the soul by looking to justice, beauty, temperance, and the like" (p. 69, note).

Of course the virtues of men do not coincide altogether with the attributes of God, because men are created and finite, while God is the creator and infinite. Thus *wisdom* "is indeed the chief of virtues, for it is most akin to God, who is essentially mind. [For men] wisdom is basically that moral wisdom which tells a man how to live after the divine exemplar of all morality, God" (p. 70). If *temperance* means control of bodily pleasures, there can be no temperance in God, for God has no body. But even for men the control of bodily desires is not the whole of temperance, for "then the man who seeks to be absolutely emotionless is most like to God, and Plato was no unnatural ascetic" (p. 70 f.). Apparently temperance in God is moderation. *Justice* as an attribute of God "includes equity and fairness, and the wisdom which knows how to practice these things. Even in his relations to the non-human universe, God's justice gives all things their proper due. . . . God's justice is the application of his perfect excellence to all things" (p. 75). [In human life] "justice is thus the virtue of wholeness and order which is the expression . . . of the absolute wholeness and order of God" (p. 76). What *courage* "means in the case of the gods [*i.e.,* in God ?] is that the divine energy is constantly at the disposal of the good will, or, better, the divine will is always at work. . . . To overcome all these [*i.e.,* fear, social pressure, bodily cravings, etc.] courage is required [in man] of a kind that God has no need of" (p. 77). As to *mercy,* respecting the evils which others commit, "the imitator of God, like his exemplar, is just rather than merciful. God impartially assigns to each soul the penalty or praise that each has earned: mercy is not a divine attribute (*Laws* 903d-905a)" (p. 77). As to *piety* "as applied to God in *Theat.* 176 it can only mean that God is true to his own nature" (p. 79).

What Dr. Rutenber means by the imitation of God is illustrated by his quotation on p. 18 of the well-known passage in the *Theatetus* (176a): "Therefore we ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of the gods as quickly as we can; and to escape is to become like God, as far as that is possible; and to become like God is to become righteous and holy and wise."

Sometimes this author's language is not very clear or precise, as *e.g.,* on p. 63, where he says: "It is implied that God is the ensouled pattern of goodness." Sometimes he shows a confusion of terms, as in his translation on p. 24 of *Phaedo* 64d, where μετέχειν does not mean *to participate in,* but *to have a share of* something, *i.e.,* to have some of it. There are a few typographical errors, and the punctuation sometimes obscures the sense. But this book will make Plato more interesting and valuable to any thoughtful person, and will contribute to an understanding of some of the more philosophic problems of Christian theologians.

WILLIAM K. PRENTICE

Science and Freedom, by Lyman Bryson, New York, Columbia University Press, 1947, pp. xi, 191, $2.75.

Lyman Bryson speaks with authority in such varied fields as poetry, drama, journalism, teaching, social science, and radio. He habitually draws upon the accumulated social heritage for the advancement of the masses. This volume offers a practical means for saving mankind from its own destruction through an essentially reasonable use of anthropological, psychological, and scientific background. Drawing

upon excellent classical and contemporary authorities, it carefully defines and illustrates such terms as *freedom, science, culture, institutions, social change, education,* and *the good society,* all blended in a logical synthesis. Religion is included normally in the social complex, and is handled with skill, reverence, and tolerance as a constructive factor. Although the author felt that there ought to be something helpful in the Marxian analysis, he was unable to find it and therefore treated the society of the future in a fashion which ignores communism. Democracy provides him with a more than adequate substitute.

Science, Bryson holds, is on trial but if properly mastered can vindicate itself. More rather than less science is needed; it can enhance the influence of artists, poets, philosophers, and religious seers, making them better creators and critics of values. Science cannot displace "the consciousness of some immortal aspects of our lives." Freedom exists for man and society through the preferences and choices which influence the world of uncertainty and which when guided by worthy loyalties form and control social institutions. The permanent strength of John Dewey's educational and philosophical outlook is integrated with contemporary problems in a framework which the reader can enrich at will. The school, however, cannot change the overt forms of social behavior without help from other agencies of society. Here Dr. Bryson opens the door to the various avenues of adult education upon which his reputation chiefly rests. The most effective knowledge is that which is relevant; the most lasting techniques are interpretation and persuasion rather than force and violence.

The process of scientific humanism is summed up in a trinity of practical, absolute, and scientific patterns. To succeed, the practical, which rests upon experience and purpose, must be subordinated to the scientific, defined in a broad and enlightened sense, while such absolute judgments as those relating to reality, beauty, or the good must be seen as culturally determined and therefore as relative. But "scientific powers and practical powers can collaborate in the realization of the conditions that make possible the realization of the values that the absolutes declare."

A few minor slips mar the technical accuracy of a remarkably consistent piece of craftsmanship. Gandhi's name is misspelt in text, notes, and index. The index classifies under Theodore C. Hume not only the reference to the late scholarly pastor but also the citations from the philosopher David Hume.

The author claims no finality; he presents rather an hypothesis which appeals to the dignity and intelligence of man. Optimistic and sensible, its application would dispel the air of frustration and gloom so currently common. Devotees of a religion of hope and promise can do well to familiarize themselves with the argument of this book, which supplemented by their own faith and effort can strengthen their courage as they move into the difficult but significant days ahead.

EARL CRANSTON

With Firmness in the Right, by Cyrus Adler and Aaron M. Margalith, New York, American Jewish Committee, 1946, pp. xxvii, 489, $4.

This is volume 36 of the publications of the American Jewish Historical Society, which appeared in 1943, with two additional chapters, which bring the story up to the conclusion of the United Nations Conference held in San Francisco in 1945, and thus justifying the subtitle, "A Century of American Diplomatic Action Affecting Jews, 1840-1945." The attitudes and activities of a diplomatic nature, of individuals, Jewish organizations, labor unions, political parties, and high officials (chiefly in the

United States) on behalf of world Jewry from 1840 to 1945, are here reported with detailed interpretation. The diverse reactions to the various problems are faithfully presented. Resolutions introduced into Congress on behalf of Jews in foreign lands, the dissent therefrom—sometimes by leading Jews—the emendations, defeats, and triumphs, all are carefully recorded. Objections raised by Jews in various countries to this well-intentioned outside interference, as well as the chagrin of the American promoters, are not passed over (pp. 9, 407-409). The platforms of both political parties in the United States, whipped into line for the 1944 elections, in which each in rather parrotlike language pledged itself to do what it could "to establish the policy of the British White Paper of May 1939," and "to favor the opening up of Palestine to unrestricted immigration and colonization, . . . to result in the establishment there of a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth," are given due prominence, without crediting the source of inspiration (pp. 398-403). Even the well-timed pressure brought on our government by an influential European Jew who vigorously condemned Giraud's cancellation of the Crémieux decree, by which he placed Jews and Moslems in Morocco on the same level, and the rather blunt rebuke of Undersecretary Welles' reply in which he characterized the statements of the foreign Jew as untrue, are in no way glossed over (pp. 412-415). The repeated statements of President Roosevelt that he "favored unrestricted Jewish immigration into Palestine" (pp. 397, 398, 401) are duly emphasized, while the consternation caused by his confession that he had learned more about the problems of Arabia (Moslem and Jewish) by talking with Ibn Saud for five minutes than he could have learned in an exchange of two- or three-dozen letters, is also chronicled (p. 403).

One the whole, one is impressed by the number and the efficiency of Jewish organizations, their unwearied insistence on their rights, and their use of every known means to gain their ends. The Jew under any flag has a host of keen-eyed defenders ever ready to go to court on his behalf. Sometimes the desires of those under other governments have been ignored, and at times the statutes of other nations have been set at nought (pp. 52-58, 417). It also seems clear that the claims of the Jews have increased as their advocates have grown in power (*cf.* pp. 47, 397, 398). While power politics have gained privileges for the Jew, and in some measure have alleviated his sufferings, it is also suggested that they have contributed to the development of a deep-seated hatred among both the unprivileged majority and the coerced governments (pp. 9, 90, 94, 163, 391, 407-412, 415, 416).

The story, however, is one of a century of progress in human understanding and in diplomatic relations. Hopes based on the ambiguous words of public officials or on the campaign formulæ of aspiring politicians are sure to vanish in the hurly-burly of daily life. Chairmen of commissions usually find there are two sides to every problem. Congress, in the long run, gains wisdom, and even presidents, with the passing of years and the kaleidoscopic changes in the status of nations, may correct their perspective of world affairs. The representatives of the United States, in conference with world leaders in the UNO in 1945, found the Jewish problem swallowed up in that of the rights of all mankind. The charter calls for the appointment of a Commission on Human Rights whose duty shall be "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion" (p. 452). This is central in the Bill of Rights, is of international import, and thus enlists the influence of all for all who are oppressed at home and abroad.

I. G. MATTHEWS

Aging Successfully, by George Lawton. New York, Columbia University Press, 1946, pp. xiv, 266, $2.75.

With the exception of the last two chapters this is a book addressed primarily to men and women who are sixty years of age or older, with reference to the wide variety of problems facing the older person in our day. In a most interesting and vigorous style Dr. Lawton treats almost every conceivable phase of the problem. His book is a veritable mine of illustrations, countless suggestions, panaceas, quotations, and abbreviated case studies. Its very style of composition, entirely unusual among books in this field, is such as to produce the effect upon many readers for which the arguments of the book contend. Indeed, the style will be much more effective in this respect than the arguments, for this reviewer finds it impossible to avoid questioning the underlying intention of the book.

The book is intended not only for the so-called aged but for all those who are in the process of growing old at whatever age; yet actually, as the preface to the next to the last chapter indicates, the book is meant to be a conversation with the older man and woman on the most effective way of making satisfactory adjustments. How much success this "conversation" will enjoy with older people who are most tragically the victims of old age is a question which many people in the field of psychology will entertain. The direct, aggressive use of suggestion as indicated in this book amounts to a technique which is effective with those who need such understanding least, and likely to be ineffective with those who need it most. One instance of such aggressive counseling is to be found on p. 158 where "The counsellor said he would withdraw from the case unless the grandmother coöperated in trying to help the grandson." There are times in counseling when such threats are necessary, but one has the feeling in reading this book that this threat somewhat typifies the approach to the person being counseled.

If the above is a justified observation, it does not limit the value of the book for the children, relatives, and friends of the so-called aged who sometimes desperately need a better understanding of the problem facing their older loved ones. In its ability to picture this problem in dynamic terms, Dr. Lawton's book is a most phenomenal one.

The great weakness of this book, however, is the fact that it is the product of a secular age, apparently written by a secular author. It makes essentially no use of the religious resource in meeting the basic aspect of the problem of old age. In the chapter entitled "A Philosophy for Maturity" an attempt is made, but this attempt reveals that the author does not understand religion to be a living and basic factor in human existence. Dr. Lawton asks the question, "What is the spiritual life?" and his answer is, "It is a man thinking about his relations to a universe whose vastness outruns the powers of human conception. . . ." There is no comprehension of the great truth of the religious life as articulated, for instance, by St. Augustine in his cry, "Thou hast made us for thyself, and our hearts are restless until they find their rest in thee." When one combines this omission with the futility of the aggressive approach to the very often neurotic problem of the aged, one questions the lasting effectiveness of even this most stimulating approach to the problem.

DAVID R. HUNTER

A Look at Our Schools, by Paul R. Mort and William S. Vincent, New York, Cattell, ©1946, pp. x, 115, $1.50.

The American public is probably more conscious of its public schools today than ever before. On all sides they read about the shortages of teachers, the need for increased school support, and the demands for higher salaries. A volume that presents in terms that the lay public can understand the program of the modern school is indeed timely. Such a book is the one which Mort and Vincent have presented. The subtitles clearly indicate the scope of this little volume, "What Modern Public School Education Is Doing" and "A Book for the Thinking Citizen."

This book is a clear, vivid presentation of the modern, public school program addressed to an audience of lay rather than professional people. In scope the book contrasts the formal, restricted program of the schools of 1900 with the broad, social-minded outlook of the schools in 1946. The world moves rapidly, and schools are changing because times and insights are changing. The modern school program stresses the modern school as an active, working school where pupils face and solve real problems of living. While there is no taking of sides between the essentialist and the progessive viewpoints, the authors review the contributions of modern educational psychology and show how this science has indicated that the best way to learn is to learn in the way knowledge is to be used. They stress the importance of teaching the whole child through the integration and correlation of subject matter. In the discussion of methods of teaching basic skills today, such as reading, writing, and arithmetic, stress is placed upon the use of realistic, lifelike situations, rather than in vague book exercises.

The isolation of children from the workaday world necessitates bringing this world into the classroom. A generation or more ago the child worked with parents and neighbors and led a rich and satisfying life outside the school. The concept of discipline as self-discipline based on as much freedom as a child can well handle underlies the guidance concept of the learning experience. Individual differences are recognized as the basis of developing the new school program, developing talents and aptitudes of each pupil so far as possible.

Following the review of the purposes and methods of modern education in the first six chapters, the last two chapters deal with factors that help to make good schools, such as community interest, adequate support, and good teachers. Many valuable suggestions are made for the further development of our schools in the years that lie ahead.

This volume should be of interest to all parents, school board members, citizens generally, and contains much of interest to professional educators. It is a small volume of a little over a hundred pages, very readable, and a timely contribution to the literature of the public school field.

FRANK R. MOREY

The Baptists of the Maritime Provinces, 1753-1946, by George Edward Levy, St. John (N.B.), Barnes-Hopkins, ©1946, pp. xii, 336, $2.50.

An adequate history of the Baptists has yet to be written, and it cannot be written until the necessary factual material is provided by specialized studies. It is for this reason that a history of the Baptists in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island is so welcome. The present volume was prepared by the editor of the *Maritime Baptist* for the centennial of the founding of the first Baptist convention of the three provinces, and it is to be hoped that in the future other conventions, soci-

eties, and agencies will find other historians, equally competent, to tell their stories on similar occasions.

The most striking aspect of the history of the Baptists in the Maritimes has been their intimate relationship with the Baptists of the United States. The earliest churches represented a transplantation of Baptist influence from New England, having been organized by and among the settlers who came north after the expulsion of the French Acadians in 1755. One church was formed in Massachusetts prior to departure for the express purpose of emigrating as a group, but for the most part the churches were established as a result of activity by individual preachers who had joined the migration. The extension of the Great Awakening into the Maritime Provinces, through the activity of Henry Alline, gave great impetus to Baptist growth during the American Revolution. He organized churches composed of both Baptists and Congregationalists, and his attitude seems to have been similar to that of John Bunyan a century earlier. Alline held that "different opinions about water baptism" were not a "sufficient bar" to church fellowship, and so congregations were formed wherein "as to baptism each one enjoyed liberty of conscience." After several decades, however, most of the churches abandoned this practice and insisted upon close communion.

The other major Baptist group in the Maritimes, prior to the union of 1905, was also the product of an infiltration from New England. Early in the nineteenth century, influences stemming from Benjamin Randall's "Free Will Baptists" in New Hampshire and from Abner Jones' "Christians" in Vermont began to be felt. The two currents converged in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, and the resulting body became known as the Free Christian Baptists.

American influences did not cease with the founding of the two groups. Each group continued to maintain close connections with their respective groups to the south. Not only were delegates exchanged from the beginning of organized associational life, but specific interest, whether in missions, education, temperance, Sunday schools, young people's work, or the social gospel, found expression among the Maritime Baptists almost immediately they developed in the United States. Ministers were constantly moving back and forth, and printed materials from America were widely circulated.

On the other hand, the Maritime Baptists were not simply recipients, and their contributions to Baptist life in the United States cannot be disregarded. It was not within the purpose of the present volume to indicate this particular outreach, but scattered through the pages are suggestions of the tremendous contribution, in terms of leadership alone, that they have made. Shirley Jackson Case, for example, is mentioned as one of the early presidents of the young people's organization. George Barton Cutten, Charles A. Eaton, Allan Hoben, A. A. Shaw, Perry J. Stackhouse, A. J. Archibald, W. B. Hutchinson, and a host of others have rendered distinguished service among the Baptists of this country.

Since 1910, the churches of the three provinces have been faced with the problem of a static and even a declining population within the area they serve. There has been a steady movement, particularly of youth, away from the Maritimes to other parts of Canada and to the United States. The situation has been further complicated by the movement of population within the provinces from rural to urban areas. These two factors have made necessary readjustments by the churches and the Convention and have prevented any spectacular numerical gains, but the author

of this volume detects signs of renewed vitality and vigor which give promise for the future.

WINTHROP S. HUDSON

Modern Trends in Islam, by H. A. R. Gibb, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, ©1947, pp. xiii, 141, $2.50.

Lecture have their limitations. The lecturer is called upon to deliver them at a fixed time in a certain place to a specific audience. Then, if published, lectures are subjected to further limitations. What is good to hear may not be so good to read.

These Haskell lectures, delivered at the University of Chicago by the distinguished professor of Arabic at Oxford University, suffer from still another difficulty: They blaze a new trail. Arabists as a rule are interested in classical literature and mediæval Islam. Professor Gibb is unusual; he is interested in contemporary Islam. In this he has hardly an antecedent and has to deal almost entirely with raw material drawn from magazines and fresh publications, as a glance at the bibliography at the end of the book would indicate.

Gibb starts with the assumption that Islam has developed two recognized systems in its theology, the transcendentalist and the immanentist. The transcendentalist pushed to its extreme the doctrine of the otherness of God and has been represented by the orthodox theologians; the immanentist asserted God's immanence in every part of nature and has been represented by the Sufis. In the eighteenth century the balance was gradually tilting against the orthodox doctrine and in favor of the Sufi. The situation called for a reaction. Hence the Wahhābi movement, which now dominates north and central Arabia.

Both transcendentalism and immanentism were drawn together in the nineteenth century by their struggle against the pervasive influences of European culture and the onslaught of material civilization. The struggle was marked by bitter hostility against Christian missionary activity. The traditional conflict between the two wings of Islam has since been renewed, but it remains subordinate to the need of presenting a common front against Christendom. Meantime a new movement was born, modernism. This is predominantly an intellectual movement among educated laymen. It has no devotees among the ulema. It seldom finds direct expression in books or articles; its principles may be discerned from arguments and polemics of the sheikhs of the Azhar and other fundamentalist theological schools.

The modernist in Islam should be distinguished from the secularist. The modernist is one who does care about his religion but is offended by its traditional dogmatics. He is hostile to both Christianity and secularism. The secularist aims to sever social institutions—such as marriage—from religious ethics or law. Examples of purely secularist literature may be found in recent Turkish writings and in India. The father of modernism was the Egyptian Muḥammad 'Abduh. The program he bequeathed to the reform movement can be summed up in four points: purification of Islam from corrupting influences and practices, reformation of Moslem higher education, reformulation of Islamic doctrine in the light of modern thought, and defense of Islam against European influences and Christian attacks.

In India Muḥammad Iqbāl's lectures are the first and so far the only thoroughgoing attempt to restate the theology of Islam in modern immanentist terms. This country has also produced the only successful new sect in Islam, the Aḥmadīyah.

PHILIP K. HITTI

BOOK NOTICES

The Christian Heritage in America, by George Hedley, New York, Macmillan, 1946, pp. x, 177, $2.

American church history has come into its own. At the beginning of this century no single volume attempted to deal with this subject as a whole. Each denomination did what it could to tell its own story. But it is different now; William Warren Sweet, Arthur Cushman McGiffert, Perry Miller, and many others have supplied much of what was lacking although there is still ample room for further study. Of late, however, some books have appeared which deal with the story of the American churches in a manner reminiscent of the early years of this century, when denominational history seemed more important than the over-all picture. Elmer T. Clark's fragmentary but highly interesting *Small Sects of America* is one of them. Dean Sperry's *Religion in America* furnishes another example, although its purpose goes beyond mere summation. It seeks to supply not only *that* in historical development but also the *why*. Professor Hedley's *The Christian Heritage in America* should be ranged with Clark's and Sperry's books. Professor Hedley has no desire to furnish bare facts and figures; he leaves that to the United States Census. He examines the various denominations with respect to their significance to the common Christian cause. He is sure that there is such a common cause. "The army of the church of Jesus Christ is one, but it is drawn from all the miscellany of human kind but each division has its own proud tradition and its special qualities." The reader is somewhat surprised to find the Jews and Unitarians yoked together in this volume with the more Christocentric churches. True the reason is found in the fact that the Christian churches owe an important part of their tradition to the Jews and that the Unitarians think of themselves as belonging to the Christian church at large, but one wonders whether the Lutheran Missouri Synod would be in agreement with the author. Be that as it may, Professor Hedley has rendered the American reading public an excellent service by writing this volume. It was intended for college students and they unquestionably can profit by it, but one would like to see this book in the hands of many others. Its catholicity is indeed remarkable as is the capability of the author to state in one introductory sentence the contribution of each church group to Christianity as a whole. The emphasis is on the things which unite the various churches, not on those which divide them. Nor is there any need of that, they have been stated often enough. Moreover, one would scarcely bring such matters to the attention of students who are expected to worship together in one college chapel. A good book and a useful one.

J. A. C. F. AUER

Does God Exist? by A. E. Taylor, New York, Macmillan, 1947, pp. vii, 172, $2.

The late A. E. Taylor was one of Britain's most scholarly and most critical philosophers. An authority on Plato, a metaphysician, a moralist, and a philosopher of religion, he belonged in the great tradition. All of his utterances were well-considered, and *Does God Exist?* is no exception. "This little essay," as Taylor himself calls it, was originally written in 1939, and then laid aside until 1945, when the author was able to give it final touches before he died. Taylor did not propose in this work to set forth either old or new arguments for theism, much as we wish that he might have done so. He restricts himself to two tasks. First, he undertakes to show that there is nothing in science or scientific method to conflict with theistic

belief. Second, he tries to prove that a completed science would not exhaust the realm of knowledge, especially the realm of moral values. By its very problem, he argues, science excludes examination of questions about what ought to be. God is related both to the world that science investigates and to the values that science ignores. Although Taylor makes no attempt to explore all of these relations, he succeeds very clearly in doing what he sets out to do. It is interesting to note that Bergson's most recent work influenced Taylor considerably. Unlike Dewey, Santayana, and Russell, Taylor tended to become more conservative as he grew older. In fact, the chief defect of this well-written and logical book is the introduction of arguments for the virgin birth and the deity of Christ into a philosophical context. Nevertheless the book is well worth reading. Its basic thesis is "the conviction that the law of right and wrong is as much part and parcel of the structure of the universe as the law of gravitation." EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN

The Quest for Inner Peace, by William E. Park, New York, Macmillan, 1947, pp. x, 207, $2.50.

In the foreword the author applies to himself and his sermons the descriptive phrase which Dr. Luccock once used, "an itinerant performer setting off the same fireworks in a different place each week." These sermons were "fireworks" which to the reviewer instead of exploding in brilliant effects just "fizzled" out. After reading 136 pages and wondering if he were too critical or if there was a simplicity beyond his appreciation, the reviewer requested his wife to listen as he read one of the sermons. If there is any comfort in common suffering he found it, for this sermon was taken to pieces in a way comparable to some of his own Sunday post-mortems. The *Christian Leader's* comment on the previous volume of sermons by the same author and quoted on the cover of the present volume reads, "Here is a collection of discourses which are brightened at every turn by apt illustrations and anecdotes." The same statement might well be made of this volume provided the word "apt" is omitted. There are numerous illustrations and anecdotes. Some are very good and some are atrocious. Some noticeably are unrelated to the point at issue, and others because of the strained effort to use them stick out like sore thumbs. Many of the illustrations can be aptly described as "long and thin." The reviewer wonders in some of the messages why a text was even suggested at the heading of the chapter. In some cases the text is used in an entirely unjustified manner and meaning when considered in the light of original context. The acknowledged purpose of the author was to write sermons which would appeal to young people in a simple straightforward manner. The author, it seems, in his effort to gain simplicity and in his overzealous desire to appeal to youth somehow loses the exalting and exhilarating element which accompanies great preaching. Perhaps the secret of the original effectiveness of these messages is explained in the speaker and the audience. His personality and the spirit of the audience were apparently inadequately conveyed in the written reproductions. The author has preached the sermons in forty schools and colleges; so there must be something in them which the reviewer did not discover. If you have the time to read these sermons, possibly you will find what it is. JAMES HOUSTON IVEY

A Trial on Trial, by Maximilian St. George and Lawrence Dennis, Chicago, National Civil Rights Committee, ©1946, pp. 503, $5.

For the reader who is interested in the problem of free speech in wartime, the present volume is an important contribution. It deals with the famous mass sedition trial of thirty defendants which started in Washington in April, 1944. The point of

view is legal and ably presented. The thesis is that the whole affair was "a Department of Justice experiment in imitation of a Moscow political trial." It was a failure because of its unreasonable length (nearly eight months), and "the sustained farcicality of the whole proceeding." The trial came suddenly to an end with the death of the trial judge and, according to the authors, "the government was still not half way through the presentation of its case." In any event it is the contention of the book that the government did not have a real case but was trying to railroad the defendants to jail because their beliefs had been disturbing to the administration. The outside observer will have to admit that the evidence against the thirty defendants was, for the most part, pretty slim and quite subjective. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that many of these people were Nazi sympathizers and could be regarded, in time of war, as a threat to the prosecution of the struggle against Hitler. Moreover, it seems rather strange, (or does it?) that men should contend for the rights of free speech in order to bring in a regime which would abolish these same rights. I am not suggesting that St. George and Dennis would so do, but *some* of the defendants, were they to become dictators, would unquestionably abolish free speech for the opposition. In a broad sense the question always is this: "How much free speech can or should be allowed by a government in time of war?" There is, obviously, no absolute answer to that question. In World War I an English jurist made the following observation: "It has been said that a war could not be conducted on the principles of the Sermon on the Mount. It might also be said that a war could not be carried on according to the principles of Magna Carta" (Lord Justice Scrutton in Ronnfeldt *v.* Phillips, 35 T.L.R. 46 (1918, C.A.).

RAY H. ABRAMS

His Word through Preaching, by Gerald Kennedy, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. x, 234, $2.50.

The Preface begins: "A Church of England bishop once remarked that a sermon is something a clergyman will cross the continent to deliver, but will not cross the street to hear. . . . No two men ever see their profession in quite the same light, and the wide gaps, the misinformation, and the misinterpretations of the writer are all apparent to every reader. Why, then, does anyone have the courage to lecture on the subject, or write about it?" When a man starts like that, he has two of the qualifications necessary for writing a book on preaching: a sense of humor and a sense of proportion. The reader suspects that he will also be affirmative in a pleasant, straightforward way rather than in a disturbingly dogmatic manner. The ensuing volume fulfills that expectation. There is throughout a pleasing sanity about the discipline and art of preaching and a common-sense presentation of the message of the sermon (the two divisions of the book). But there is also an amazing amount of ground covered by the eleven chapters and a multitude of subjects discussed, for the ready access to which the rather simplified and terse index is inadequate. At times the reader wonders if there is not an attempt to say something about too many things. The author has read widely and has good material readily available at just the right place. His mind absorbs literature and gives it out again in direct quotation or in plain and pungent suggestion. So much that the author says is so completely consonant with this reviewer's experience and conviction that the latter is too inclined to praise. Therefore, a few objections may be compensatory. First, "The Gospel As Drama" (pp. 27-30) seems to offer a specialized quality of drama, a kind of homiletical metonymy. Second, the discussion of the relation between preaching and house calling (pp. 41-42) is certainly one relation that is controlled by an objective, but the conclusion is a little harsh. The alternative to not having tea with one's parishioners or presenting "a

running commentary on the headlines or a little pious gossip about what has been going on in the parish" is certainly not "at least four hours a day of study [as] the only foundation upon which you can build an adequate preparation of sermons." It is to be hoped that the author does not mean it to be. If he does, this reviewer hereby enters a demurrer. It ought to be pointed out that when one writes about the message of the sermon, theology enters into the picture; that can hardly be avoided. The reader must be careful to distinguish between his criticisms of the two. Finally, is it too pedantic to wish that there were no split infinitives? ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

The Affirmation of Immortality, by John Haynes Holmes, New York, Macmillan, 1947, pp. 75, $1.50.

We assume, says Dr. Holmes, that the processes we use when we study nature are adequate for all types of inquiry. This is what blocks our investigation of immortality. For actually we live in two worlds, or, rather, we live in one world which is subject to two different types of interpretation. Consciousness is as much of a reality as matter in motion. On the basis of both the testimony of introspection and the witness of the mystics we must affirm the existence of Spirit. In the cosmos it is known as God, in the heart of man it is soul, in the relations between men, conscience. The belief in a spiritual power which amplifies, elevates, and finally transcends man is necessary if either man or his world is to be understood. As a mere animal, man is unaccountably overendowed, and as a mere play of atoms, the world is hopelessly irrational. We should not be troubled by our inability to verify our hope for immortality by sense experience since such verification is impossible for many of our basic beliefs. Our hope is confirmed in the only way it can be, that is, as a hypothesis required if the facts are to be reduced to order. This latest book from the pen of Dr. Holmes is the Ingersoll Lecture on the Immortality of Man delivered at Harvard in 1946. J. S. BIXLER

Unity and Difference in American Life, edited by R. M. MacIver, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. 168, $2.

We have prided ourselves on the fact that the United States is a melting pot for many peoples and cultures. Our achievements along this line have been remarkable. This is partly due, of course, to the relative homogeneity of the cultural and racial groups involved. In spite of this good record, however, we are now confronted by some very serious problems of racial and cultural differences and tensions. There is the fear in the minds of many that these tensions are apt to become more or less violent conflicts. Many issues divide our people. Of these, four are of first importance: racial, ethnic or cultural, economic, and religious. In the effort to help meet these issues of group relationships in American life, the Institute of Religious and Social Studies of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America has published a series of addresses by twelve representative leaders of American life. Dr. R. M. MacIver, professor of political philosophy and sociology at Barnard College and Columbia University, is the editor. The names of the contributors are sufficient to warrant full confidence in the reliability and objectivity of the various treatments: E. L. Bernays, Louis Finkelstein, Lawrence K. Frank, E. Franklin Frazier, Eli Ginsberg, Walter H. Hamilton, Gerald W. Johnson, Clyde R. Miller, Allan Nevins, Ralph W. Sockman, and Vilhjalmur Stefansson. There is a threefold organization of these issues under the general title, "Unity and Difference in American Life." What is the common ground achieved by American society? What are the issues which divide us? What

can we do to meet these divisive issues and achieve a real unity in American life? These are the three major questions the various contributors try to answer. The American culture is a very definite reality, but we are divided on the issues of race, of ethnic factors, economics, and religion. These are extremely serious differences and something must be done to overcome them and to achieve a workable unity. It is recognized that the schools, the press, business, and the courts have special responsibilities to find ways of unifying our culture. What seems to be a rather strange omission is the failure to recognize the church and synagogue as agencies of religion for the achievement of cultural unity. Does this mean that these religious agencies are impotent to help achieve cultural unity and can thus be discounted, or does it mean that they are to be considered simply as causes of disunity? Dr. Bernays in his address, "What Can Business Do?" indeed, seems to discount the church because it and its leaders "can represent only the patterns, the folkways, or the culture of their communities." There is no question about the devisiveness of religion in some of its manifestations, but to discount all religious agencies as impotent to help achieve cultural unity is to misread much of our Judæo-Christian history.

CHARLES M. BOND

The World's Great Scriptures, compiled by Lewis Browne, New York, Macmillan, 1946, pp. xvi, 559, $5.

Shorter Bibles, anthologies of religious selections—these are common. The present volume is distinctly different and far more useful. The author has selected what appears to him most vital in the world's holy books, quite unconcerned that while presenting material from so-called "dead religions," often at considerable length, he has omitted entirely Jainism, Sikhism, Shintoism, Mormonism, Bahaism, and Christian Science. This was not due to caprice. He has favored those which seem to him most important. Thus he culls from Babylonia, Egypt, Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. And from these selected he lays his emphasis not on theology or ritual but on ethics. It is in this sphere, he is convinced, that the kinship of mankind is most reliably to be traced: "Men may differ grossly in what and how they worship, but not in why and how they believe they should behave." The result is a volume which will have a wide appeal. It is not primarily a scholar's tool, but a book to be read and enjoyed. It can scarcely help battering down many prejudices, raising many questions, and attacking in general the invincible ignorance that has so long seemed a necessary concomitant of true piety. In addition to the texts, beautifully printed and prefaced by very brief but often illuminating introductions, are more than a hundred modern drawings by the author, which add to the attractiveness and value.

MORTON S. ENSLIN

The Luminous Trail, by Rufus M. Jones, New York, Macmillan, 1947, pp. ix, 165, $2.

Readers of the books of Rufus Jones know his engaging way of writing simply and clearly about the mystical experience of religion; a critical yet devotional manner that makes mysticism sensible and challenging. Here is "the luminous trail of saints whom Christ has made" (p. vi) from Paul to Phillips Brooks, a trail made by well-knowns like Francis of Assisi and Catherine of Siena, yet a trail that includes also others like Hans Denck, Sebastian Castellio, and William Law. All these, and others, speak of the enduring and vitalizing experience of the presence of God, answering the *via negativa* of Aldous Huxley's *The Perennial Philosophy* with a strong argument for the way of affirmation. The author does not believe in an easy way or

life that suggests the inherent progress of mankind. Quite the opposite! The saints he knows and writes about are those who discovered a light that shines in darkness, and the darkness overcomes it not. Their luminous trail, therefore, becomes a source of courage and hope, and an arrha of the spirit of God. ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

Fletcher, Beaumont & Company, by Lawrence B. Wallis, New York, King's Crown, 1947, pp. xiii, 315, $3.75.

The sophisticates for whom these playwrights so carefully devised their dramas may well remind even the theologian of the demands of our own sophisticated and weary era. As Professor Wallis demonstrates, John Fletcher and his associates belonged by breeding and education to the cultured world. Distinctly not Puritans, they offered "no serious philosophy of life . . . but sought to grip, move, startle, surprise and amuse the audience for whom they wrote." Through careful examination of the various critical evaluations of their work, from their own day until now, and with abundant and well-chosen quotations and citations, the author presents not only a set of clarifying and definitive views, but again and again suggests a parallel to the demands that preachers as well as playwrights are confronted with today. The emphasis that Jacobean audiences stressed upon emotional rather than logical treatment of a theme markedly suggests our contemporary longing for less of scientific indifference to the emotional or ethical consequences of research and more painstaking attention to evangelical enlightenment—less of apologia of any sort and more interpretation of the spiritual means—the grace of God—whereby man may be delivered from materialism's bondage. Indeed, the thoughtful preacher, whether in city or rural neighborhood, may well meditate upon the closing chapters. It is to be hoped that similar examinations of our present needs will produce sundry articles and even volumes upon the rationale of homiletics for the twentieth century.

JOHN C. SCAMMELL

The Abolition of Man, by C. S. Lewis, New York, Macmillan, 1947, pp. 61, $1.25.

As he has reflected upon education, Professor Lewis, a notable authority, has more and more clearly perceived that its trend for some considerable time has headed toward the conquest of conscience—educators are clearly bent upon being conditioners, "to produce conscience and decide what sort of conscience they will produce." The denial of spiritual forces, apart from conditioned reflexes, has made it clear that "Duty itself is up for trial: it cannot also be the judge. And 'good' fares no better. They [the educator-conditioners] know quite well how to produce a dozen different conceptions of good in us. The question is which, if any, they should produce. No conception of good can help them to decide." This powerful indictment cuts to the root of our chief peril, insists that the cardinal problem is "how to conform the soul to reality," rather than the aim of applied science to "subdue reality to the wishes of men." Here is a volume that drives with brevity, scholarship, and devotion—drives powerfully against what our forefathers would justly call Antichrist. Let the clergy expend its price from the funds allotted for "pastoral care"; the investment will bring increase of courage and joy in the task of the ministry.

JOHN C. SCAMMELL

Christian Perfection (Fénelon), edited by Charles F. Whiston and translated by Mildred W. Stillman, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. xiii, 208, $1.75.

For the Presiding Bishop's Book for Lent, Bishop H. St. George Tucker of the Protestant Episcopal Church in this country has chosen Mildred Whitney Still-

man's translation of some of Fénelon's letters and instructions to people living at the court of Louis XIV and to others immersed in the life of France over two centuries ago. Fénelon's advice is flavored with common sense, but stresses the need of complete abandonment to the will of God who does all for our good. Pure love of God lies in singleness of will rather than in a feeling of joy in prayer. A generation like ours that is acutely aware of the evil that grows out of the self-centred will can find here a clear summons to "want with no reservations all that God wants." This book is designed for devotional reading—a kind of reading that is well described by Charles F. Whiston in the introduction to the work. ROLLAND W. SCHLOERB

Comfort Ye My People, by Russell Dicks, New York, Macmillan, 1947, pp. ix, 136, $1.50.

"A Manual of the Pastoral Ministry" indicates the purpose of this volume of prayers, scriptures, and poetry to be used with the sick, the dying, the bereaved, and the aged. A concluding selection of occasional prayers provides material for a wide field of service, including a prayer for Catholics, a prayer for Jews, and prayers before and after the birth of a child. The choice of materials is chaste and extremely useful. Of convenient pocket size, the volume will be of great use to pastors. One word of caution: the ministry to the sick and bereaved comes with more grace and effectiveness when it is immediately personal; a book in the hand while praying for the afflicted is usually less impressive than a prayer in the heart. Therefore, the inspiration of such a volume is best when it is directed to the pastor.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

Living Memorials, by J. Randolph Sasnett, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1947, pp. 192, $2.50.

Let every minister and church become acquainted with this book! We have too long been careless, unwise, and even irreligious in our treatment of memorials. "We now realize the necessity for emphasis on *memorials that serve.* Not objects merely to be admired, but causes to be shared . . . 'Living Memorials' . . . keep alive in the processes of history the best influence of the honored and they are by their nature vital contributions to human living" (p. 19). Designed to be adopted by any church, however large or small, and adapted to each church's own plan, the memorials here suggested are listed under seventy general headings with many subdivisions. Other very practical helps include articles of organization and bylaws, forms of gifts and bequests, sample brochure, legal facts, and dedicatory resource material. The author's philosophy of memorials is sound and highly commendable. When developed in a church, it will not only minister to existing needs but will also reveal new and challenging opportunities for religious expression both credible and creditable.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

Gailhac of Béziers, by Helene Margaret, New York, Longmans Green, ©1946, pp. 262, $3.50.

The original French title was *Un Apôtre* by M. l'Abbé Leray. The hero founded the Religious of the Sacred Heart of Mary, a teaching order which now operates in the United States. This biography not only describes the good life of Gailhac but also the evil gossip and intrigue he encountered within Roman Catholicism. That church in France was very human. The relics of Gailhac of Béziers include a hair shirt, found several days after his death "in the bottom of the drawer . . . a cincture

provided with points of iron and two disciplines from which hung metal balls," and a scarf which in 1945 cured "Father F" of an abscess. Even so twentieth-century relic worship is no match for Simeon the Stylite. The *imprimatur* and foreword of Archbishop Spellman grace the volume.

CONRAD HENRY MOEHLMAN

450 Stories From Life, edited and compiled by Leonard Rush Jenkins, Philadelphia, Judson, ©1947, pp. 336, $2.50.

This book is generously dedicated to those who really wrote the stories it contains, stories that originally appeared in *The Secret Place.* The compiler, choosing stories that "are worthy, and in most cases successful, efforts on the part of the writers to interpret and to make clearer the meaning of certain verses of Scripture" (p. 13), includes five of his own; the usual number chosen is one. The words "compiled and edited by" appear only on the title page; they are omitted in three other required places. Although they are not all "stories," they are generally good and usable, and the nineteen-page introduction (a part of which is used on the front flap as a blurb) is suggestive. Some of "the great Fellowship of Christians whose labors of love" (from the dedication) are here collected will watch with interest the sale of the book.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

Freedom and Order, by Eduard Heimann, New York, Scribner, 1947, pp. xiv, 344, $3.

As indicated in its subtitle, this book aims to draw some lessons from World War II. The longer perspective of history will no doubt be needed to evaluate the events of these war years, but Dr. Heimann gives sufficient evidence at this early date to show that blame for the war cannot be placed on some convenient scapegoat. He sees a world-wide solidarity of guilt from which few individuals have escaped. His main thesis is that the war was the result of the failure properly to adjust the tension between freedom and order. This was a moral failure since the leaders and people of all nations were not sufficiently moved by the spirit of justice to arrive at a proper balance between the two. He believes that it was the constitutional weakness of democracy which produced Hitlerism. This weakness is the lack of balance between freedom and order. Liberty becomes perverted into oppression of the weak by the strong or degenerates into anarchy and chaos as demonstrated in Germany during the years preceding Hitler's rise to power. In turning from liberty that resulted in chaos several nations welcomed order, even though it was order imposed by a despot. At this point the totalitarian nations became blameworthy since they did not achieve order through law but through tyranny. Although the Nazi leaders in Germany and the war leaders in Japan have been defeated, the basic malady is still present to be cured. Heimann is highly distrustful of a liberalism that believes the problem can be solved by giving all men freedom to do as they wish in the confidence that order will become the automatic consequence of the pursuit of self-interest by each individual or group. People do not know enough nor are they good enough to be entrusted without restraint with the power that a technological society makes possible. He has great confidence in such experiments as the TVA which gives large encouragement to local committees, and which seems to resolve the tension between a planned economy and individual initiative. This book deserves the careful attention of anyone who is trying to understand the lessons that a war which cost thirty million lives should teach our generation.

ROLLAND W. SCHLOERB

BOOKS RECEIVED

Hebrews in the Greek New Testament, by Kenneth S. Wuest, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1947, pp. 271, $2.50.

Volume IX in a series of detailed "expositions of the Greek text for the English reader" by a teacher in the Moody Bible Institute.

**Evil and the Christian Faith,* by Nels F. S. Ferré, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. xi, 173, $2.50.

Manifest Victory, by J. R. Mosley, rev. ed., New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. xvi, 297, $2.

A revised and enlarged edition of a book which first appeared in 1941 and which was reviewed in these pages (July, 1941, pp. 272 f.). The present edition has a three-page foreword by W. H. Kilpatrick and a half-page foreword by E. Stanley Jones (the latter advertised in the blurb).

**The Holy Spirit in the Life of Today,* by F. W. Dillistone, Philadelphia, Westminster, ©1947, pp. 126, $1.50.

Holy Hours in the Holy Land, by Walter R. Alexander, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, ©1946, pp. 160, $2.

A popular memory of an odyssey to Palestine in which "at every site the author relives in retrospect the events which were enacted there."

All Out for God, by Walter R. Alexander, Chicago, Moody Press, ©1946, pp. 140, $1.50.

A brief biography of the author's son-in-law, John C. Cowell.

The Mediator, by Emil Brunner, Philadelphia, Westminster, ©1947, pp. 624, $6.

The Divine Imperative, by Emil Brunner, Philadelphia, Westminster, ©1947, pp. 728, $6.50.

Man in Revolt, by Emil Brunner, Philadelphia, Westminster, ©1947, pp. 564, $6.

These three widely-read works by Dr. Brunner were first published in German in 1927, 1932, and 1937 and were promptly translated into English. The present volumes are reprinted without revision or change.

**Foundations of Democracy,* edited by F. Ernest Johnson, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. ix, 278, $2.

**Everyman's Adventure,* by Merle Williams Boyer, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. ix, 172, $2.50.

**What Must the Church Do?* by Robert S. Bilheimer, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. xi, 148, $1.

**The Christian Significance of Karl Marx,* by Alexander Miller, New York, Macmillan, 1947, pp. 117, $1.75.

**Jésus Transfiguré,* by Harald Riesenfeld, Copenhagen, Ejnar Munksgaard, 1947, pp. ix, 370, plates 2.

**The Pastor and the Children,* by Mildred Moody Eakin and Frank Eakin, New York, Macmillan, 1947, pp. ix, 182, $2.

**Faith and Freedom,* by Russell J. Clinchy, New York, Macmillan, 1947, pp. xi, 121, $1.75.

**It So Happened,* by Muriel Lester, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. xiv, 240, $2.

**What Is a Man?* by Robert Russell Wicks, New York, Scribner, 1947, pp. xxi, 224, $2.75.

**The Lord Reigneth,* by Adam W. Burnet, New York, Scribner, 1947, pp. 134, $2.

**In the Secret Place of the Most High,* by Arthur John Gossip, New York, Scribner, 1947, pp. 210, $2.75.

**Lyman Pierson Powell,* by Charles S. Macfarland, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1947, pp. 299, $3.75.

Little New Angel, by Sadie Rose Weilerstein, Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society of America, 1947, pp. 139, $2.

An attractively bound and illustrated book for children, and giving an intimate picture of life in a Jewish home. Little girls will read it with avidity; their parents will find it provides many insights into Jewish folkways and family life.

**Memoirs of John R. Sampey,* Nashville, Broadman, ©1947, pp. 286, $2.50.

**Ethics,* by Radoslav A. Tsanoff, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. xiv, 385, $3.50.

**Skeptic's Search for God,* by Barbara Spofford Morgan, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. xiv, 248, $3.

**Seeds of Redemption,* by Bernard E. Meland, New York, Macmillan, 1947, pp. ix, 162, $2.50.

**The Soul of Frederick W. Robertson,* by James R. Blackwood, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. xiii, 201, $2.

**Jacob Boehme's "The Way to Christ,"* translated by John Joseph Stoudt, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. xxxix, 254, $3.

**Hellenistic Greek Texts,* by Allen Wikgren and others, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, ©1947, pp. xxvi, 275, $3.50.

**These Words upon Thy Heart,* by Howard Tillman Kuist, Richmond, John Knox Press, 1947, pp. 189, $2.50.

**Stop Looking and Listen,* by Chad Walsh, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. 112, $1.25.

**The Bible To-day,* by C. H. Dodd, New York, Macmillan, 1947, pp. ix, 168, $2.50.

**Essays on Antisemitism,* edited by Koppel S. Pinson, New York, Conference on Jewish Relations, 1946, pp. xi, 269, $2.50.

**The Spirit of Chinese Culture,* by Francis C. M. Wei, New York, Scribner, 1947, pp. xii, 186, $2.75.

**Thomas Jefferson,* by Henry Wilder Foote, Boston, Beacon, 1947, pp. ix, 70, $1.25.

Southern Baptist Handbook, 1947, Nashville, Sunday School Board of the Southern Baptist Convention, n.d., pp. 500.

**Render unto the People,* by Umphrey Lee, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1947, pp. 164, $1.50.

* To be reviewed.